









in the 21st Century
edited by
Huhua Cao and Vivienne Poy
University of Ottawa Press
542 King Edward Avenue
Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5
www.press.uottawa.ca
Th e University of Ottawa Press acknowledges with gratitude the support extended to its 
publishing list by Heritage Canada through its Book Publishing Industry Development 
Program, by the Canada Council for the Arts, by the Canadian Federation for the 
Humanities and Social Sciences through its Aid to Scholarly Publications Program, by the 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and by the University of 
Ottawa. 
© University of Ottawa Press 2011
All rights reserved.
Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication
Th e China challenge : Sino-Canadian relations in the 21st century / 
edited by Huhua Cao and Vivienne Poy.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-7766-0764-1
1. Canada--Foreign relations--China.  2. China--Foreign relations--Canada.  
I. Cao, Huhua, 1961-  II. Poy, Vivienne, 1941-
FC251.C5C55 2011                              327.71051                           C2011-901927-2
Acknowledgements
First of all, we would like to thank all the contributors for their extraordi-
nary collaboration on this volume. It has given us a unique chance to work 
on this important project, examining the relationship between Canada and 
China during the past forty years. With the exception of the relationship 
with the United States, Canada’s relationship with China is likely to be its 
most signifi cant foreign connection in the 21st century. In that light, this 
book has the potential both to be very useful to those studying the relation-
ship and to make an important impact on policy-makers in both countries.
We would also like to thank the Honourable Allan Rock, President and 
Vice-Chancellor of the University of Ottawa, for taking time to write the 
preface. His support will certainly encourage us to continue to contrib-
ute to the relationship between the two countries, and the series of which 
this book forms a part will contribute greatly to the University of Ottawa’s 
eff orts to increase awareness of its leadership on international issues.
We are also grateful for invaluable assistance in preparing the manu-
script for publication that we have received from Carol Reichert, Policy 
Advisor to Senator Vivienne Poy; Jennifer Th omas, Manager, Communica-
tions and Special Projects of the Offi  ce of the President of the University 
of Ottawa; Marie-Eve Reny of the University of Toronto; and Ruibo Han, 
Matt Gaudreau, Yuanyuan Zhai, Jean-Francois Parent and Alex Payette of 
the University of Ottawa.

Contents




Introduction: Canada’s Response to China’s Increasing 
Role in the World
Huhua Cao 1
EVOLUTION OF CANADA-CHINA RELATIONS
Chapter 2 
Canada’s Staying Power: A Diplomat’s View
Fred Bild 12
Chapter 3 




Canada and China: Th e China Strategy of 1987
B. Michael Frolic 47
Chapter 5 
Th e Politics of Soft Power in Sino-Canadian Relations: 
Stephen Harper’s Visit to China and the Neglected 
Hong Kong Factor
Sonny Shiu-Ling Lo 66
Chapter 6 
Friends across the Pacifi c: Links between Canada and 
Hong Kong in Historical and Contemporary Perspectives
Ming K. Chan 81
Chapter 7 
Canadian and Chinese Collaboration on Education: 
From Unilateral to Bilateral Exchanges
Qiang Zha 100
CANADA-CHINA: THE GROWING INTERDEPENDENCE
Chapter 8 
Canada and China after the Global Financial Crisis
Yuen Pau Woo 122
Chapter 9 
Post-Colonial Transformations in China’s Hong Kong and Macau: 
Implications for Cross-Taiwan-Strait and Canada–PRC Links
Vivienne Poy 126
Chapter 10 
Hong Kong: Canada’s Partner in Prosperity
Perrin Beatty 133
Chapter 11 
Th e Transformative Eff ects of the Global Economic Crisis: 
Implications for the World and Shanghai’s Aspirations
Th omas d’Aquino 139
Chapter 12 
Th e Canadian Constitution and the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms: A Global Template for Minority Rights with 
Relevance to China?
Errol P. Mendes 148
THE CHINESE DIASPORA AND IMMIGRATION IN CANADA
Chapter 13 
Chinese in Canada and Canadians in China: 
Th e Human Platform for Relationships between China and Canada
Kenny Zhang 158
Chapter 14 
Transnational Intergenerational Support: Implications of 
Aging in Mainland China for the Chinese in Canada
Ghazy Mujahid, Ann H. Kim and Guida C. Man 183
Chapter 15 
Th e Bridge Too Far?: Language Retention, Ethnic 
Persistence, and National Identifi cation among the 
Chinese Diaspora in Canada
Jack Jedwab 205
Chapter 16 
Changing Territorial Strategies: Chinese Immigrants in Canada
Huhua Cao and Olivier Dehoorne 222
Chapter 17 
Causes and Consequences: Overeducated Chinese Immigrants 
in the Canadian Labour Market
Tony Fang 241
Chapter 18 
Conclusion: Reimagining Canada’s Present and Future 
in the Shadow of the Rise of China
Jeremy Paltiel 268
Notes on Contributors 280
Appendix 292




Immigration from Hong Kong to Canada, 1996–2005  85
Chapter 7
Table 7.1
Numbers of Chinese Students in Selected Countries, 
with Annual Rankings, 2002–04 109
Chapter 13
Table 13.1
Speakers of Non-Offi  cial Mother Tongues in Canada, 
1971, 2001 and 2006 162
Table 13.2 
Population of Canada Aged 15 and Over by Educational 
Attainment, 2006 164
Table 13.3
Population of Canada by Citizenship, 2006 165
Table 13.4 
Population of Canada Aged 15 and Over by Major Field of 
Study, 2006 167
Table 13.5
Visibility of Chinese Canadians by Occupation, 2006 169
Table 13.6
Visibility of Chinese Canadians by Industry, 2006 170
Chapter 14
Table 14.1
Trends in Age Groups within the Population of Mainland 
China, 1970–2000, with Projections for 2010–2025 185
Table 14.2
Indicators of Longevity in Mainland China in 2007, 
with Projections for 2025 and 2050 186
Table 14.3 
Selected Characteristics of Immigrants from Mainland 
China to Canada, 2006 190
Table 14.4 
Age at Arrival of Samples of Immigrants from Mainland 
China to Canada, by Period of Arrival, as Reported in 2006 191
Table 14.5 
Number of Trips to China by Chinese in Canada since Arrival 193
Chapter 15
Table 15.1 
New Permanent Residents in Canada by Top Five Mother 
Tongues, 2000–2008 207
Table 15.2 
Canadians with Mandarin, Cantonese and Other Chinese 
Languages as Mother Tongues, 2006 209
Table 15.3 
Generational Status of Mandarin and Cantonese as Mother 
Tongues among Canadians, 2006 210
Table 15.4 
Visible Minority Chinese Reporting Belonging to Canada 
and Belonging to an Ethnic or Cultural Group, 2002 214
Table 15.5 
Sense of Belonging to an Ethnic or Cultural Group 
Correlated with Sense of Belonging to Canada among the 
Visible Minority Chinese Population, 2002 218
Chapter 16
Table 16.1 
Numbers and Main Destinations of Immigrants from 
Mainland China to Canada, in Successive Periods from 
before 1961 to 2001–2006 227
Table 16.2 
Immigrants from Mainland China Going to Fourteen
Canadian CMAs, in Successive Periods from before 
1961 to 2001–2006 228
Chapter 17
Table 17.1 
Weighted Means by Immigration Status 250
Table 17.2 
Weighted Means by Educational Match 253
Table 17.3 
Determinants of Mismatch (Multinomial Logit) 256
Table 17.4 
Wage Impacts of Educational Mismatch 




Main Source Countries of Internationally Mobile 
Students, 2007 110
Figure 7.2 
Main Destination Countries of Internationally Mobile 
Students, 1999 and 2007 110
Figure 7.3 
A “Glonacal” Agency Heuristic 111
Chapter 13
Figure 13.1 
Canada’s Top Ten Communities by Ethnic Origin, 2006 159
Figure 13.2 
Origins of Chinese Immigrants Admitted to Canada, 2006 160
Figure 13.3
Immigrants from Mainland China to Canada by Entry 
Category, 1980–2008 161
Figure 13.4
Visibility of Chinese Canadians in Populations of Canada, 
Provinces, and Territories, 2006 166
Figure 13.5 
Visibility of Chinese Canadians in Populations of Four 
Major Cities, 2006 166
Chapter 14
Figure 14.1 
Parent–Support Ratios in Mainland China, 1970–2000, 
with Projections for 2010–2050 186
Figure 14.2 
Chinese Immigrants to Canada by Place of Origin, 1980–2006 188
Figure 14.3 
Chinese in Canada with Family in Mainland China by 
Gender and Marital Status, 2002 192
Chapter 15
Figure 15.1 
Selected Non-Offi  cial Mother Tongues of Canadians, 
by Th ousands of Users, 1996, 2001 and 2006 208
Figure 15.2 
Selected Non-Offi  cial Languages Spoken in Canada, 
by Th ousands of Speakers, 1996, 2001 and 2006 208
Figure 15.3 
Knowledge of English and French among Canadians 
with Chinese Mother Tongues, 2006 212
Figure 15.4 
Canadians with Chinese Mother Tongues Having 
Knowledge of Neither English nor French, 2006 212
Figure 15.5 
Use of Mother Tongues in the Home by Members of 
Second Generations in Selected Language Groups for 
Age Cohorts 15 to 24 and 25 to 34, 2006 214
Figure 15.6 
Proportions of Members of Selected Visible Minority 
Groups Reporting Belonging to Canada and Belonging 
to Ethnic or Cultural Groups, 2002 216
Figure 15.7 
Proportions of Members of Selected Visible Minority 
Groups Aged 30 to 44 Years, and in First and Second 
Generations, Reporting Belonging to Canada, 2002 217
Figure 15.8
Correlation between Having Friends of the Same First 
Ancestry and Having a Strong Sense of Belonging to 
Canada for the Visible Minority Chinese Population, 2002 218
Figure 15.9 
Correlation between Number of Trips to Country of Birth 
and Sense of Belonging to Canada for the Visible Minority 
Chinese Population, 2002 219
Chapter 16
Figure 16.1 
Increase in Numbers of Chinese Immigrants in Toronto, 
Vancouver and Twelve Other CMAs, in Successive Periods 
from Before 1961 to 2001–2006 229
Figure 16.2 
Increase in Numbers of Chinese Immigrants in the 
Canadian Provinces, in Successive Periods from 




Evolution of Spatial Distribution of Immigrants from 
Mainland China in Selected Canadian CMAs, 1990 and 2006 232
Map 16.2 
Spatial Distribution of Chinese toward Suburban Areas 




It has been more than forty years since diplomatic relations between Canada 
and the People’s Republic of China were established by Prime Minister Pierre 
Elliott Trudeau. Th roughout that time, China has undergone dramatic eco-
nomic changes, and the country is now considered a key player on the global 
stage. China’s emergence as an economic powerhouse, coupled with its suc-
cessful eff orts to expand its sphere of infl uence, have had a profound eff ect 
both on the development of international policy and on the global commu-
nity as a whole. Meanwhile, Canada has worked steadily to strengthen cultural 
and economic exchanges with China, balancing strong trade against concerns 
such as human rights, the rule of law, climate change and the environment. 
While ebbs and fl ows in their bilateral relations have occurred, Canada and 
China continue to engage in collaborative eff orts in political, commercial, 
cultural and academic arenas. Canada must not only persist in raising its pro-
fi le as a contributing partner in this strategically important region, but also 
continue critically to examine its foreign policy toward China.
Th e China Challenge: Sino-Canadian Relations in the 21st Century is 
therefore a timely and relevant analysis of the history and future of the 
relationship between Canada and China. It examines topics such as Otta-
wa’s foreign policy priorities, China’s increasingly important position as an 
international policy-maker, China’s growing economic clout and its poten-
tial implications for Canada’s future prosperity, and the human and demo-
graphic aspects of bilateral relations. It off ers readers perspectives from both 
scholars and Canadian government representatives, current and former, on 
why, from both a domestic and an international standpoint, China is more 
important to Canada than ever.
Th is book is the fi rst in a series, China in the 21st Century, to be pub-
lished by the University of Ottawa Press. Th e series will greatly contribute 
to the University of Ottawa’s eff orts to increase awareness of its leadership 
on international issues, a priority identifi ed in Vision2020, the university’s 
strategic plan for the future. It will also further advance the university’s 
eff orts to encourage collaboration between universities and governments. 
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Given the complex global issues facing the Canadian government today, 
it is critical that senior offi  cials and elected leaders have access to thought-
ful and fully developed knowledge and ideas from sources beyond their 
own departments. Universities, with their capacity for critical thought and 
independent research, can play an important part in the development of 
this information, and in nourishing an open and rigorous policy process as 
an important component in the future progress of bilateral relations with 
China.
With its rich cultural heritage, its tremendous economic infl uence, and 
the world’s largest population, China will see its economic potential and 
its status among nations continue to fl ourish in coming decades. As it cur-
rently stands, China has made signifi cant moves in trade relations with the 
United States, Australia, South America and Africa, is a leading force in the 
G20, has permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, 
and is the second largest economy in the world after the United States. If 
Canada wishes to maintain a strong international presence, it must fi nd 
ways to bridge the ideological diff erences that constitute foreign policy 
challenges in its relationship with China in order to reinforce its relevance 
and its capacity to develop new Canadian markets in Asia.
Th e China Challenge: Sino-Canadian Relations in the 21st Century and the 
subsequent books in the series China in the 21st Century will serve as valu-
able resources, providing policy-makers with expert knowledge, insight and 
opinions so that they may make the best decisions on how to enhance our 
nation’s dialogue with China on vital issues of strategic interest for Canada.
1
Th e international position of the People’s Republic of China has undeni-
ably changed since Canada became one of the fi rst developed countries 
to recognize it, in 1970 (even before the People’s Republic was admit-
ted to the United Nations). When Mao Zedong declared on October 1, 
1949, that China had fi nally “stood up” in the world, he had underes-
timated his country’s potential to rise internationally. In 1949, China’s 
ability to stand up implied its ideological move away from capitalism as 
the best instrument of struggle against “imperialism” and its “defend-
ers” (see Friedman 1994 and Kirby 1994). Th e autonomy of the Chinese 
state was a product of its ability to resist the most infl uential capitalist 
world powers. In the 1960s, autonomy went as far as resulting in China’s 
complete isolation from the international community, in a context where 
its relations with the two world superpowers were tense (see Gittings 
1964, Kirby 1994, and Yahuda 1983). In no way did autonomy result in 
China’s ability to infl uence the world scene. Indeed, China was to remain 
far from the centre of global political interests for several more decades. 
Up until October 25, 1971, it was denied membership in the United 
Nations, while Taiwan, under the name of the Republic of China, was the 
sole offi  cial representative of the Chinese nation.
During the Maoist era, one way in which the People’s Republic regained 
autonomy in its foreign policy was “by dealing with foreign powers indi-
vidually, not as a unit” (Kirby 1994, p. 17). Th is strategy, among other 
implications, meant that ideological diff erences would not be the unique 
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standard for defi ning the boundaries of China’s relations with foreign part-
ners. It opened the door to the possibility that China might have privileged 
relationships of varying degrees with diff erent western powers, based on 
each country’s ability to give and take. Th is strategy certainly played in 
favour of bilateral relations between China and Canada under the leader-
ship of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and since.
Following thirty years of remarkable economic growth since the end 
of the 1970s, leading to China becoming the second largest economy in 
the world after the United States (see Barboza 2010), its ability to “stand 
up” today has a profoundly diff erent meaning. While Deng Xiaoping, the 
architect of China’s economic reforms at the end of the 1970s, stressed that 
China should “maintain a low profi le and never take the lead” on inter-
national matters, the country’s impressive economic growth over the past 
thirty years not only has changed its economic status in the world, but has 
also allowed the country to become a more and more important player in 
the process of making important political and geopolitical decisions.
China has played a key mediation role in ensuring six-party talks to 
fi nd a peaceful resolution to security concerns resulting from the deter-
mination of North Korea to develop nuclear weapons. In Central Asia, 
the Chinese government has been the key to the creation and hosting of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) since 2001. It has also in 
recent years become an active participant in the Asia–Pacifi c Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) regional forum, and ASEAN-plus-three. Th e outstanding pace 
at which its economy has grown has given China an important position in 
the G20, and has planted the seeds for a potential “G2,” comprising the 
United States and China. China has become a “soft power,” not in Nye’s 
military and security terms, but in the realms of popular culture, diplomacy 
and participation in multilateral organizations, as well as development aid 
(Kurlantzick 2007, p. 6).
China’s presence and infl uence have also grown in Africa. Chinese lead-
ers have sought to strengthen political relations with that continent by 
establishing the China–Africa Cooperation Forum in 2000 (Kaplinsky, 
McCormick, and Morris 2008, p. 14). One of the main commonalities 
emphasized by China in its attempt to draw African interests closer to its 
own has been an emphasis on their common imperialistic and neo-imperi-
alistic enemies (Taylor 2005, p. 5). According to the China–Africa Business 
Council, China has become Africa’s third largest trading partner. While 
the value of its trade with the continent was only US$ 2 billion in 1999, 
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by 2005 that fi gure had risen to US$ 39.7 billion (Taylor 2005, p. 2). As 
Joshua Kurlantzick (2007, p. 6) maintains, “Beijing off ers the charm of a 
lion, not of a mouse: it can threaten other nations with these sticks if they 
do not help China achieve its goals, but it can off er sizeable carrots if they 
do.” Indeed, some countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have cut off  
relations with Taiwan as a result of Beijing’s “soft” infl uence (Kurlantzick 
2007, p. 10). China is becoming more attractive than western countries 
as a foreign direct investor in some African countries, in part because the 
Chinese do not impose conditions relating to good governance and human 
rights. Th is has attracted criticism from the West, which sees China’s exclu-
sive focus on the commercial foundations of such investment as detrimen-
tal to universally accepted norms on sustainable development and human 
rights. Africa could well become a new arena for economic and other forms 
of rivalry between China and the West.
For Canada, bilateral relations with China between the 1970s and the 
1990s may have been substantially confi ned to foreign policy, but China’s 
emerging position in the world has also had profound eff ects on Canada’s 
domestic policy. As Paul Evans (2006, p. 284) claims, the average Canadian’s 
“trip to the gas station reveals how China’s demand for energy is increasing 
prices for energy and natural resources; and a trip to the bank reveals how 
mortgage and interest rates are tied to China’s purchase of US securities.” 
Beyond the fact that China has bought a yearly minimum of US$ 80 bil-
lion worth of US government debt since 2005, the Chinese government 
has been crucial in the (still slow) recovery of the world economy from the 
recent crisis. Beijing made its largest purchase of US debt in June 2010, 
when the US Treasury sold China US$ 108 billion worth of Treasuries over 
a few days (see Kruger 2010). China’s share of US imports has increased 
to approximately twenty percent of the total, and China has replaced Can-
ada as the number-one trading partner. Canada’s share of imports into the 
United States has fallen to fi fteen percent (see Ratner 2010). Given China’s 
position in today’s globalized world, its fi nancial choices undeniably have 
a profound eff ect on other countries’ fi nancial and commercial priorities. 
One week before the G20 Summit in Toronto in June 2010, President 
Hu Jintao announced that the People’s Bank of China would interrupt the 
initially fi xed 23-month peg in the yuan, which would allow for more fl ex-
ibility in the movements of the currency (see Ratner 2010).
Th e facts set out above suggest that China is no longer just an interna-
tional “policy-taker,” but is increasingly playing a role as an international 
“policy-maker.” As Paul Evans (2006) has pointed out, policy-makers around 
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the world have to be concerned about what Beijing will do next. Similarly, 
Canadian policy-makers have yet to establish a comprehensive domestic 
and foreign policy strategy to deal with the growing Chinese infl uence at 
the global level. Th e fi rst step toward dealing with this changing global situ-
ation is to understand better how China’s identity, guiding philosophies, 
traditions, cultures, and domestic social, economic and political challenges 
aff ect its positions in the international community. Th is cannot be achieved 
without a close collaboration and sharing of knowledge between China 
scholars and Canadian policy-makers. Such collaboration may help Canada 
in formulating a better-grounded foreign policy strategy toward the Chi-
nese economy. It may also help Canada to go beyond the foreign policy 
dead end created by an overemphasis on the social and human rights prob-
lems that still pervade Chinese society.
Redefi ning Canada’s Foreign Policy toward the “New” China
Th e domestic challenges that the Chinese regime currently faces are numer-
ous, and Canada may constitute a model that China may wish to examine 
and possibly adopt in order to address some of them.
Income disparities in China have grown considerably since the 1980s, 
not only across regions and provinces, but also between urban and rural 
areas and across social classes (see Cao and Bergeron 2010). In the context 
of growing social and economic grievances, and with a judicial system that 
comprises an ineff ective and saturated system of petitions and complaints, 
collective protests frequently erupt in various parts of the country. A recent 
case among several others was that of a workers’ strike for better work con-
ditions at a Honda Motor Company parts factory in southern China in 
June 2010. Generally, despite some considerable progress with respect to 
citizens’ economic and social rights, China’s record on political rights has 
yet to improve signifi cantly. According to the Human Rights Risk Atlas 
2010, China fell to twelfth position in an index where Somalia was ranked 
at number one and the United States at 134.
Th e protests in Xinjiang on July 5, 2009, and the ways in which the 
authorities have responded to popular discontent, also indicate that ethnic 
tension remains, and command and control tactics are still the state’s solu-
tion. While the state has manifested some signs of increasing willingness 
to accommodate civil society on some levels, its intentions as far as politi-
cal reforms are concerned remain diffi  cult to capture. Some legal reforms 
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introduced since the year 2000 suggest that the government is making 
eff orts to establish political transparency and a more rigorous rule of law, 
but it remains primarily concerned to maintain the survival of its own auto-
cratic regime. In the current circumstances, democracy remains far from 
attainable.
China’s environmental problems and the broader challenge of global 
warming have also been the target of concerns in the West. China has 
become the world’s biggest emitter of greenhouse gases and, although it has 
made a formal commitment to cut the unit GDP carbon dioxide emission 
level by forty percent by 2020 (see Xin 2010), the need to maintain stable 
growth may make this target very diffi  cult to reach.
Th e clashing positions of Canada and China on human rights in China 
have had a deteriorating impact on the two countries’ bilateral relations, 
as China is becoming more resolute about its own distinctive political 
positions and ideology. Following the Tiananmen Square incident in June 
1989, the Chinese government’s attempts to maintain its own version of 
the Chinese national identity have relied upon emphasizing “Chinese val-
ues,” defi ned in opposition to what it depicts as Western cultural frame-
works. In some cases, Chinese nationalism has been manifested in the form 
of anti-Americanism. Th e Chinese regime has reached a position of eco-
nomic infl uence in the world that allows it to choose what it wishes to 
accept from western powers, and ignore what it believes it does not need. In 
such circumstances, a bilateral policy attempting to impose what are seen 
as “Western values” upon the Chinese government is unlikely to generate 
satisfactory outcomes for either of the two parties. Some of the values that 
Western countries regard as universal are not necessarily interpreted with 
the same degree of importance by the Chinese regime. For example, Chi-
nese policy-makers tend to place a greater emphasis on the right of nations 
to achieve development than on the civil and political rights of individuals. 
A more constructive dialogue among Canada’s and China’s scholars and 
policy-makers on contentious areas such as human rights and the proper 
treatment of minorities may lead to a Canadian foreign policy that empha-
sizes the exchange of ideas on the basis of equality and mutual benefi t.
Establishing a good dialogue with China is the key condition for sta-
ble, fulfi lling and profi table bilateral relations. In an attempt to explore 
the avenues that Ottawa might exploit in order to strengthen its ties with 
the People’s Republic of China, this book discusses how Canada holds the 
potential to overcome the foreign policy obstacles posed by ideological dif-
ferences with China. Th e two countries have had bilateral relations based 
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on mutual respect and solidarity ever since the time of Pierre Trudeau, but 
more importantly, since the 1990s Canada has cultivated privileged ties 
with Hong Kong. Canada is demographically advantaged to the extent that 
four percent of the Canadian population is of Chinese origin, and it has 
become an important destination and centre of interest for the Chinese 
diaspora. Conversely, about 300,000 Canadians live in China today, which 
makes Sino-Canadian economic, cultural and political relations more 
important than ever.
Th e Structure of Th is Book
Th ere are several reasons why a sustained dialogue between Canadian 
experts on China and practitioners is needed. First, before the 1980s, 
when China remained isolated from the centre of international poli-
tics, the number of China scholars was incomparably lower than that of 
scholars of other world regions, and the visibility of China scholarship 
remained severely limited. Today, as China’s position in world politics has 
become central, understanding China is no longer confi ned to academia, 
but is also becoming a priority among government policy analysts and 
policy-makers across policy areas.
Second, in the past fi ve years bilateral relations between China and 
Canada have been aff ected by inadequate policy-making and misunder-
standings on the part of both Ottawa and Beijing. Mutually benefi cial 
relations need to be based on well-grounded and attainable policy expec-
tations. Due to their familiarity with Chinese culture, traditions and, in 
some cases, the languages, their extensive research, and their regular visits 
to the country, China scholars have the potential to make important con-
tributions to the bilateral policy-making process on the Canadian side by 
off ering policy-makers in-depth briefi ngs on the evolution in the Chinese 
government’s domestic and foreign policy priorities and challenges. Gen-
erally, well-grounded policies can be based only on multidisciplinary and 
multi-dimensional considerations, and the latter requires taking various 
opinions into account.
Hence, this book brings together a diversity of perspectives from both 
China scholars and Canadian government and non-government represen-
tatives on the history and future of Sino-Canadian relations, and addresses 
the ways in which Canada has redefi ned and will continue to readjust its 
foreign policy with respect to domestic and external policy changes in 
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China. Some of the chapters are written as speeches, hinting at the Cana-
dian government’s foreign policy positions on China, and others take the 
form of more standard analyses. Th is mixture of writing styles is illustrative 
of a broader diversity in approaches and perspectives. We hope that this 
volume will be of help to Canadian and Chinese policy-makers in develop-
ing a suitable bilateral strategy that could be benefi cial for both countries.
Th e book is divided into fi ve parts. Th e fi rst part comprises the pres-
ent chapter. Th e second part provides an overview of the history of Sino-
Canadian relations from both practitioners’ and scholars’ perspectives. Fred 
Bild’s chapter emphasizes the absence of patterns and linearity in the his-
tory of those relations, and explains, on the basis of concrete examples, that 
diplomatic ties since their inception have been the fruits of spontaneous 
initiatives or windows of opportunities, which had their own underlying 
intentions, depending on their nature, timing, and initiators. Charles Bur-
ton explores the domestic factors that informed Canada’s foreign policy 
towards China from the 1970s to the early years of Stephen Harper’s gov-
ernment, focusing on four key periods or events: the recognition of the 
People’s Republic by the Trudeau government, Brian Mulroney’s response 
to the Tiananmen incident, Jean Chrétien’s “Team Canada” initiative, and 
the suspension of the Canada-China Bilateral Human Rights Dialogue in 
2006. B. Michael Frolic accounts for the motivations underlying the cre-
ation of Canada’s strategy toward China in 1987. Sonny Lo explores the 
foreign policy decisions of the Harper government in relation to China, 
compares them with the Mulroney government’s relative coolness toward 
China in the 1980s, and argues that this change in attitudes to China 
results from Canada’s need to adapt to a globally rising China, the Chinese 
Canadian diaspora’s demands for improved bilateral relations, and strategic 
concerns on the part of the Canadian business elite. In a similar vein, Ming 
K. Chan explores the demographic and socioeconomic dimensions of the 
relationship between Canada and Hong Kong, and maintains that this 
historical bond has the potential to secure a relationship of trust between 
Canada and the People’s Republic. Qiang Zha then discusses how Canada 
and China’s bilateral relations have become more balanced and equitable as 
China’s infl uence in the world has expanded.
Th e third part of the book comprises speeches made by current and 
former politicians, business leaders, and policy leaders, addressing the 
implications of, and conditions for, a growing demographic and eco-
nomic interdependence between Canada and China. Yuen Pau Woo 
explores the ways in which China constituted a “bastion of stability” 
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during the recent world economic crisis, compared to the United States, 
and suggests that Canada should draw from China’s stable position in 
the crisis to diversify its sources of investments and increase fi nancial 
and commercial cooperation with the country. Such a strengthening of 
bilateral relations would undeniably require moving beyond some of 
the negativity that has undermined Canada and China’s relations in the 
past ten years. Senator Vivienne Poy stresses that Canada’s emphasis on 
human rights has had negative implications, and suggests that Hong 
Kong and Taiwan should be the gateways into China for Canadian busi-
nesses. Perrin Beatty, a former Canadian federal minister, shares similar 
views, stressing that Hong Kong off ers a legal and commercial environ-
ment that is ideal for Canadian companies seeking to expand ties with 
China. Th omas d’Aquino, a leading voice of Canadian business, claims 
that the recent world economic crisis should be viewed as a window 
of opportunity for greater multilateral cooperation based on mutual 
harmony between economic development and environmental protec-
tion, and explores the ways in which Canada’s and China’s bilateral rela-
tions could be a future experimental terrain for the realization of such 
an objective. Errol Mendes, switching from economic to legal issues in 
the framework of interdependence, describes the similarities between 
Canada and China when it comes to the rights of ethnic minorities, and 
argues that Canada should serve as a global constitutional model for 
China and other multiethnic states that face important constitutional 
problems related to social stability.
Th e fourth part of the book concerns the Chinese diaspora in Canada. 
Kenny Zhang claims that, unlike most countries, whose relations with China 
boil down to investment deals and trade agreements, Canada, with its signifi -
cant and highly diversifi ed Chinese Canadian population, has the opportu-
nity to take bilateral ties a step further by reaching agreement in the area of 
human capital. In their chapter, Ghazy Mujahid, Ann Kim and Guida Man 
maintain that as China’s population grows and ages, the Chinese diaspora in 
Canada is likely to have more frequent exchanges with the People’s Repub-
lic for longer periods of time. Th e authors examine three dimensions of the 
relations between migrants and their families in China: the care that migrants 
extend to their parents in China, the care that grandparents in China provide 
for young children sent back to China, and mutual support as a result of 
elderly parents immigrating to Canada under sponsorship arrangements. Jack 
Jedwab stresses that Canadians who speak Chinese as well as English and/
or French will reinforce the collective capacity for building cultural bridges 
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between people in the two countries. Huhua Cao and Olivier Dehoorne 
address the evolution of the geographic distribution of Chinese immigrants 
to Canada over the past one hundred and fi fty years. Not only have Chi-
nese immigrants to Canada become better represented in smaller cities, there 
has been a shift away from settling in Chinatowns to settling in suburban 
areas. Th e authors address the policy implications associated with retaining 
skilled economic immigrants under an increasingly fl exible economy. Tony 
Fang addresses some of the downside of deepened demographic ties between 
Canada and China, namely the fact that Chinese nationals immigrating to 
Canada are increasingly more educated than Canadian-born workers and yet 
their incomes tend to be lower.
Finally, in the fi fth part of the book Jeremy Paltiel suggests that Canada 
should move away from a foreign policy based on a “frame of teacher and 
pupil.” It may be more appropriate for both Canada and China to use each 
other as a mirror, as opposed to a model, in order to analyze each other’s 
practices and to see how the latter may be adapted and improved.
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It is a particularly unrewarding task to try to fi nd patterns in Canada’s 
relations with China. To maintain that they evolve through a sort of sub-
conscious thread leading from discovery to mutual exploitation, through 
disappointment, before eventually attaining a level of “maturity,” results 
in nothing more than an academic exercise for ordering ephemeral con-
clusions. Besides, as Norman Bethune, Canada’s most famous adventurer 
into war-torn China, demonstrated, such searches for leitmotifs are often 
founded on preconceived notions (in his case, political ones). Using solid 
19th-century logic, the great doctor saw any country’s venture into another 
as being rooted in imperialistic urges. According to Bethune, it normally 
got into gear after a succession of missionary explorations, followed by cap-
italist entrepreneurs, who were soon afterwards reinforced by military and 
diplomatic personnel. Here I will seek to show that such linear reasoning 
had nothing to do with the relationship as it evolved between Canada and 
the Orient, least of all China, but rather that what seemed to dominate 
most often were spontaneous initiatives, each with its own specifi c underly-
ing motivations, depending on the time and the chief actors involved.
During my stay in China I discovered, however, that the imperialistic 
mindset that Bethune described did fi nd some echo in some of our Chi-
nese counterparts. Th e best example of this occurred several years after 
my departure, when a PhD student in 2004, at the Beijing Institute of 
Contemporary International Relations showed me what he called a policy 
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Asian policies were viewed as nothing less than part and parcel of US 
strategy for the encirclement of China. As he read them out to me in 
translation, these included Canada’s assistance to nations in Southeast 
Asia, its participation in the Korean War and subsequently in the Inter-
national Commissions for Supervision and Control in Indochina, its rec-
ognition of Taiwan, and even its acceptance of immigrants from Hong 
Kong. I’m not sure I was entirely successful in disabusing this young 
researcher of this interpretation but I tried to explain to him that, with 
carefully designed Ptolemaic epicycles, this sort of reasoning could pur-
port to show contradictory policies—such as Canada’s uninterrupted 
relations with Communist Cuba, its outspoken criticism of US policy in 
Vietnam in the 1960s, and even its negotiation of diplomatic relations 
with the People’s Republic long before the Nixon–Kissinger initiative—as 
nothing more than manoeuvres inspired by Washington.
As a former practitioner of the art of diplomacy, rather than as an aca-
demic, I am struck by the ways in which categories applied to human 
endeavours can confuse just as much as they can elucidate. Academics, pre-
sumably, are engaged in combing through the remnants of past activity to 
detect the true roots or causes of contemporary reality. Th e practitioners, 
primarily preoccupied with the here and now, delve deep into their archives 
only occasionally for clues to present-day problems. Yet I fi nd that, when 
discussing yesterday’s or today’s China, both worlds, the more practical as 
well as the more detached, tend to examine the subject with far too little 
regard for the past and within excessively restricted frameworks. My experi-
ence tends to show that, contra the logic of grand strategy or overarching 
schemes, Canada’s relationship with China has been conducted from simul-
taneous, overlapping and sometimes contradictory motives, and managed 
with the best of intentions by harried but professional diplomatic staff . Th is 
visceral knowledge resists the glib categorization of academic researchers. 
Th at the short history of relations between Canada and China might be 
driven by shifting contingencies and irregular interventions of chance is a 
view that many seekers after patterns eschew.
Having spent some time in recent years examining various epochs of 
Canada’s relationship with China, I am struck by the diversity of motives 
and approaches of all those steeped in that highly eventful and turbulent 
country. I suppose that, if one were to view the relationship from the view-
point of view of missionaries, government offi  cials, politicians, business 
people or ideologically driven activists, one could easily come up with 
handy labels to describe each group’s distinct motivation. Th e examples 
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provided would, however, refl ect much generalization and selectivity. On 
the question of recognition of the People’s Republic, for example, Lester 
Pearson seems to have been prompted initially by a desire to move quickly, 
before US policy became too unyielding and enshrined non-recognition as 
a NATO doctrine. His successors on this subject, Paul Martin Sr. and then 
Pierre Trudeau, proceeded according to their own calculations of Canada’s 
interests. Th e former was determined to convince Washington to take the 
bull by the horns, rather than wait for the Th ird World vote at the United 
Nations to seat the People’s Republic over US objections. Th e latter, on 
the other hand, was confi dent from the outset that it was a matter of fi rst 
changing the mindset within the Ottawa policy establishment and then 
fi nessing the US position. One could argue that each of these three actors 
faced diff erent situations when they played their roles on the stage, and that 
they faced three diff erent sets of obstacles and political climates. It is none-
theless clear that, while they all pursued the same objective, their personal 
motivations were signifi cantly diff erent.
Similar diff erences can be found among diplomats or other govern-
ment offi  cials, although their professional requirement of obedience to 
their political masters usually serves to paper over any individual distinc-
tion in personal outlooks. Even between activists of the same ideological 
persuasion, such as James Endicott and Norman Bethune, one can fi nd 
serious diff erences of approach and basic motivation. Th is is not to say 
that comparisons are odious, but rather, more simply, that lumping people 
together into ready-made categories is a futile exercise. Th e same applies to 
the “phases” of the Sino-Canadian relationship.
Early Contacts
One can go back to the earliest trans-Pacifi c contacts and see that the unpre-
dictable often played a determinant role. I sometimes wonder whether mere 
accident interfered with the promotion of a more robust channel of com-
munications and commerce from our western shores. After all, After all, the 
earliest recorded trade between Canada and China was that of the Haida 
Gwai otter pelts worn by Captain James Cook’s crew on their way to the 
Bering Sea, who would not have pursued their voyage to the China coast 
if their captain had not been murdered during their stopover in Hawaii. 
Yet it was as a result of this contact that the Hudson’s Bay Company joined 
the fur trade with China and that, as early as 1788, a certain Captain John 
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Meares started to import Chinese labourers to the west coast of Canada 
(see Gough 2000). On the other hand, political timetables and sheer venal-
ity contributed to the development of “the Chinese fact” in Canada. Such 
speculation does not lead far, but it does serve to illustrate the web of disas-
ters, hardships and determination that fashioned the beginnings of our 
dealings with the people of China.
Following these initial contacts, a whole century went by before Canada 
brought in thousands of Chinese labourers to do the hardest and most 
dangerous work in the construction of the western segment of our trans-
continental railway. It happened, again quite by accident, just in time for 
the Canadian Pacifi c Railway (CPR) to partake of an unexpected bonanza 
from the transport of Chinese silks headed for New York and European 
markets. In the mid-19th century a silkworm disease had devastated silk 
manufacture in Europe and, as a result, textile mills were competing for 
rapid and low-cost supplies of Chinese silks. With the completion of the 
rail link to Vancouver, the cross-Canada route to New York turned out to 
be the fastest. It was a trade that saw the vessels of the CPR’s own White 
Empress Line unloading tonnes of bales of silk onto newly outfi tted “silk 
trains” in Vancouver, to be sped virtually non-stop to Montreal and New 
York in four days fl at, an exploit that lasted into the 1940s, to the great 
profi t of the CPR (but with scarcely a mention in our history books). On 
the other hand, if white Canadians, newly settled in British Columbia, had 
not given vent to their rabid racist tendencies at the time, Canada might 
well have had far greater numbers of hard-working Chinese and Japanese, 
and their industry and enterprise might have helped the country avoid 
much of the economic depression of the end of the 19th century.
Such questions abound throughout the evolution of our early foreign 
relations and, to my mind, underline the random nature of much of these. 
Most of the time, there was no one, neither actor nor thinker, who had any 
notion that they were participating in what was to be an ongoing link with 
a part of the world that would one day be of critical importance to Canada.
Governments and Asian Trade
Although there was a signifi cant missionary presence in China, and there 
were even a few industrialists there by the late 19th century, it was not until 
the beginning of the 20th century that solid foreign relations (“hard power” as 
opposed to “soft power”) started to aff ect the relationship. Not surprisingly, 
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the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, of which Canada, inescapably, was a 
participant, had a direct eff ect on relations with China. While the alliance 
provided the coast of British Columbia with some Japanese naval protection 
during the First World War, this was not judged reason enough after the war 
for admitting sizeable numbers of Japanese migrants seeking employment. 
By implication, the already strong rejection of Chinese labourers was intensi-
fi ed. Objections to the treaty of 1902, which was renewed in 1905 and 1911, 
eventually led Prime Minister Arthur Meighen to propose that it be replaced 
by a multilateral agreement. He thereby opened the way to the Washington 
naval and disarmament conferences of 1921–22. Th us the British role in the 
Far East was responsible, at least in part, not only for the strengthening of 
anti-Asian sentiment in British Columbia, but also for Canada’s discovery of 
the joys and challenges of multilateralism and Anglo-Saxon solidarity. Both 
of these starting points turned out to be important for the evolution of some 
of the long-term characteristics of Canada’s foreign policy, even though at this 
stage they were still some distance away from guiding Canada’s relations with 
Asia, and particularly with China.
Blocking immigration and promoting trade were the dominant themes 
of Canadian relations with the whole of Asia throughout the fi rst half of 
the 20th century, but the advent of the Great Depression soon made the 
latter a moot point. Th e fl are-ups created by Japan in Manchuria and else-
where in China commanded a certain amount of attention from Cana-
dians concerned about foreign aff airs, particularly as there were obvious 
divergences emerging between British and US policies in the region, but 
as the spectre of another war in Europe loomed ever larger, Canadian eyes 
were riveted eastward. Apart from a small segment of public opinion on 
the west coast, the country lost interest in the Pacifi c theatre and would 
heave a sigh of relief after Pearl Harbor ensured that the United States 
took on that burden. Canada’s contribution of around 6,000 soldiers to 
the war eff ort in the Pacifi c was in no way comparable to the scale of its 
commitment to the European theatre.
Canadian Activism in Asia
In the post-war euphoria Canadians hardly noticed at fi rst that their coun-
try had emerged as the second strongest economy in the world. Th e fact 
that Canada also had considerable political infl uence was, however, a real-
ity that Lester Pearson and his small cohort of talented Foreign Service 
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offi  cers were not slow to exploit, although it required agility, sang froid and 
resourcefulness to do so. It started in Japan, where a select group of Asia 
specialists played a very active role in advising General Douglas MacArthur 
on the reconstruction and democratization of the country. More generally, 
however, the main institutions through which Canada conducted its post-
war relations with Asia were the very institutions it had helped to shape: 
the United Nations and the Commonwealth, and the latter’s newly minted 
Colombo Plan. If Canada had not played a signifi cant part in these devel-
opments, its subsequent outlook on East Asia would no doubt have been 
quite diff erent, yet it cannot be said that these initiatives all fi t together in 
an overall plan. Th ey happened piecemeal. Only when one looks at them 
together, many years later, can one propose that there was a theme to all 
this “helpful fi xer” activity, as Pierre Trudeau labelled it many years later.
Again, if the Korean War had not erupted when it did, in June 1950, 
Canada’s relations with China would have been quite diff erent throughout 
the Cold War (Ronning 1974, p. 179). Indeed, some claim that the Korean 
emergency need only have started six weeks later for Canada’s position in 
relation to China to have been radically altered. Th at strikes me as far-
fetched. Mutual recognition might well have been established with Beijing 
at that time, but it would probably not have hindered or delayed our par-
ticipation in the UN-approved multinational force under US command. It 
certainly would not have been a propitious beginning for renewed bilateral 
relations. Even though it might have given Canada easier access to Beijing 
as the war progressed, it is doubtful that it would have changed much in the 
déroulement of that war. As it was, Lester Pearson failed to dissuade MacAr-
thur from crossing the 38th Parallel and heading towards the Yalu River, nor 
could he restrain the latter’s nuclear sabre-rattling against China (Pearson 
1973, pp. 159–64). Much more evident is the fact that Canada’s Cold War 
stance, in spite of its insistence that the North Atlantic alliance had no 
relevance to East Asia, refl ected a mindset that determined a readiness to 
bear arms in the face of open aggression against non-Communist regimes. 
In other words, the Cold War became the thematic backdrop for much of 
Canada’s intentions and actions in the Far East (Stairs 1974, pp. 128–30).
How Did We Get Here?
If there are trends to be drawn from this brief outline of Canada’s meander-
ing into the politics of East Asia, they certainly do not denote a determined 
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attempt at developing a Canadian policy toward China, much less a strategy. 
Th e 1950s, and more specifi cally the Korean confl ict, marked an hour of awak-
ening. For the fi rst time, Canadians were forced to conclude that the British 
and US approaches were not reconcilable. Moreover, neither seemed to fi t into 
any scenario that would suit Canada’s objective of keeping the situation from 
deteriorating into a long-term confrontation between East and West. In par-
ticular, Canadian leaders came to the conclusion that the US approach risked 
spreading war to China and the rest of Asia. In 1954, when the fi rst Taiwan 
Straits crisis erupted, Ottawa found itself pleading that Quemoy and Matsu 
did in fact belong to the People’s Republic, which represented no threat to the 
West (Geoff rey Pearson, p. 132). In September the same year, when the United 
States created SEATO, a collective defence pact modelled on NATO with the 
Philippines, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, France, Taiwan and the United 
Kingdom, Canada’s participation was not sought, nor did Canada wish for it. 
By this time the Canadian government had begun to have serious doubts about 
the wisdom of the US strategy in Asia.
In less than twenty years, tumultuous though they were, Canada’s view 
of East Asia had gone from a passing interest, through a distant concern, to 
a current and persistent headache. Th e Geneva Conference held in 1954 to 
settle the confl ict in former French Indochina seemed for a moment to hold 
out a promise of some détente in Cold War animosity. It was short-lived, 
however, and it saddled Canada with a role about which decision-makers 
had serious reservations. Th e three International Commissions for Supervi-
sion and Control for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, on which Canada was 
to serve alongside India and Poland, were not under UN direction, and the 
United States had made it clear that it would not consider itself bound by 
the Commissions’ fi ndings or recommendations. In addition to the cost 
in human resources, the resultant delay in opening offi  cial relations with 
China was even more regrettable. It is ironic to note here that not long 
after Lester Pearson had been subjected to a violent harangue by President 
Lyndon B. Johnson at his Texas ranch, Pearson’s foreign minister, Paul Mar-
tin Sr., undertook yet one more vain eff ort to seek an acceptable form of 
recognition of the People’s Republic (English 1991, p. 141).
Recognition at last
Both the Indochina fi asco and the recognition conundrum had to await the 
arrival of new actors on the scene before they could be tackled conclusively. 
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For Canada, the principal new fi gure was Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Caught up in 
the new optimism of the 1960s and contemplating, somewhat prematurely, 
a radically changed world, Trudeau called for a rethinking of Canadian for-
eign policy. He imposed a new questioning of previous stances: Had previous 
policies been too narrowly defi ned by fear of the Soviet menace? Had Canada 
been hoodwinked into seeking security under US leadership? Had Canada 
been too oblivious to the overbearing friendliness of its southern neighbour? 
Th ese questions underlay Trudeau’s prescription of a foreign policy rooted 
in domestic concerns. Economic growth and the quality of life were objec-
tives that were thus dutifully enshrined in a (multicoloured) “White Paper,” 
Foreign Policy for Canadians (see Department of External Aff airs 1970). It 
caused quite a stir when it was published in 1970, especially since it implied 
criticism of Pearson’s approach and policies.
In the fi nal analysis, however, despite some trendy new management jar-
gon in the paper and some exaggerated calls for new forms of action, Trudeau’s 
government innovated in only two areas: China and NATO. Th e latter gen-
erated much heat in Ottawa and other capitals, but in the end resulted in no 
major change. Th e former was successful and at long last normalized Canada’s 
relationship with China, just in time, some would say, to keep Richard Nixon 
from taking all the credit for China’s opening to the West. Canadians have 
been understandably upset that in the United States and, indeed, the world 
over, the Nixon–Kissinger bombshell completely obscured Canada’s achieve-
ment in clearing the way to ending the isolation of the People’s Republic. 
Why did Canada get credit for this pioneering work only in Beijing and 
among a handful of Canadian scholars who study diplomatic history? Th e 
main reason is, of course, that the repercussions of Nixon’s move marked a sea 
change in US geopolitical strategy and the fi rst step towards a détente of a dif-
ferent order than that which was proving so tenuous with the Soviet Union 
in Europe. Hardly a single US commentator noticed that, by the time Nixon 
visited China, the Canadian Embassy in Beijing had been open for business 
for more than a year. It took Washington and Beijing another seven years 
before they were able to upgrade their liaison offi  ces in each other’s capitals to 
full-fl edged embassies. In the meantime, no fewer than sixty-six other coun-
tries had established relations with Beijing, most of them using the Canadian 
“take note” formula regarding Taiwan.
Th e United States, of course, had to amend the Canadian formula, not 
only because of the pressures from its Taiwan lobby, but also because it sought 
to maintain most of the military ties it had forged with Taiwan since 1949. 
Th e Japanese, who negotiated recognition in 1972, were up against even 
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more formidable diffi  culties resulting from the tragic past of their actions 
against China from 1894 to 1945, and the need to sign a peace treaty. Th e 
latter was negotiated over six years after the exchange of ambassadors in 1972. 
If one looks closely at these two agreements, both of them much more elabo-
rate than the one with Canada that was their forerunner, what shines through 
clearly is the shared Japanese and US objective of preserving as much as they 
could of their former special ties to Taiwan. Both countries have since suc-
ceeded in doing so, to a certain extent, but only in exchange for a more clear-
cut recognition of Beijing’s claims to the island. It turned out, some twenty 
years later, to be a non-trivial point, since those who followed the Canadian 
formula are now in no way committed to withholding recognition from an 
eventual independent Taiwan. Such are the dynamics of diplomacy.
However world-shaking all this may have seemed at the time, there were 
hardly any immediate changes to be seen in bilateral relations, either after 
the Canadian breakthrough or after the signing of the Shanghai Communi-
qué by the People’s Republic and the United States. When Trudeau under-
took his fi rst offi  cial visit to China, in 1973, the Chinese media greeted 
him warmly as a lao pengyou, an “old friend.” Agreements were signed for 
the opening of consular missions, as well as for trade under most-favoured-
nation terms. None of this, however, was to have any immediate eff ect. 
China fi rst had to struggle through the last years of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, and the changing of the guard after the deaths of Zhou Enlai and 
Mao. It was not until Deng Xiaoping’s reforms got under way that eco-
nomic relations started to move into a higher gear. In 1983–1984 agree-
ments were signed on launching aid through the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) and on the protection of investments. Trade 
accelerated, and investments grew in such fi elds as telecommunications, 
hydroelectric power and mining technology. Canadair and de Havilland, 
Alcan and Nortel all made their way into the Chinese mainland. Th e days 
when all trade had to be conducted at the semi-annual Canton Trade Fair 
were gone. Th e barometer for the relationship between Canada and China 
was at last set fair.
Tiananmen and After
All of this seemed to come crashing down with the disastrous events in 
and around Tiananmen Square in June 1989. Th e growth of trade slowed, 
investments from Canada plummeted, and non-commercial exchanges 
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entered a diffi  cult phase. Most of China’s newfound partners, at least those 
outside Asia, asked themselves whether China was a country with which 
they could build a long-term future. On learning of Deng’s subsequent 
intransigence, many people called for China to be punished. Canada did 
not follow the example of some of its allies by imposing signifi cant trade 
sanctions, but it did curtail some CIDA programmes, especially those 
involving government agencies such as the security services and the police. 
Visits by senior offi  cials were kept to a minimum and ministerial visits were 
ruled out for the time being (see Clark 1989). In Chinese eyes, however, 
Canada’s most unpardonable act was to declare all Chinese studying in 
Canada at that time eligible for landed immigrant status. According to a 
classifi ed briefi ng paper prepared by the Department of External Aff airs in 
1990, over eighty percent of them seized the opportunity thus off ered.
I arrived in Beijing to take up my assignment as Ambassador in Octo-
ber 1990, in the midst of this period of deliberate coldness. It happened 
to be the week of the twentieth anniversary of the establishment of diplo-
matic relations. Th e only instructions I had were to refrain from any cele-
bratory statements: “marking” the event was all we were doing. I couldn’t 
help asking myself whether this was what we could have foreseen in the 
days when we were elaborating China policy pursuant to the Trudeau 
initiative. Had no one entertained the notion that Chinese reforms might 
someday lead to upheavals and that the regime would resort to violence 
to retain its hold on power? Indeed, I do recall some memorandums of 
the early 1980s in which such possibilities were raised, but Deng’s smil-
ing face and his reassuringly pragmatic approach to modernization, com-
bined with the rise of Gorbachev, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
liberation of Central and Eastern Europe, had mesmerized most Western 
governments into the belief that Communist regimes, on every conti-
nent, were on the way out.
One year earlier I had had the privilege of attending the political meet-
ings of the annual G7 summit, that time in Paris. When it came to dis-
cussions of how to show disapproval of what had happened in Beijing 
just a few weeks before, there was a consensus that each member country 
should institute some sort of sanctions; each being left to choose the type 
and intensity. Th e United States was unwilling to limit its military coop-
eration with China because it did not wish to jeopardize its listening posts 
on Soviet activities to the north and west of China. Th e British, fearful of 
how Beijing might react to the gigantic public demonstrations in Hong 
Kong, sought to keep their own reaction muted. Listening to the earnest 
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and shocked entreaties from Margaret Th atcher and George Bush Sr., and 
the extensive discussions that followed, none of my Canadian colleagues 
nor I imagined that within a very short time this entente would be bro-
ken by more than one of the participants. In fact, two weeks before the 
meeting in Paris the United States had already secretly sent two emissar-
ies, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of 
State Lawrence Eagleburger, to assure Deng that President Bush wished 
for the close relations between China and the United States to continue 
(Suettinger, pp. 79–83). Less than fi ve months later, the United Kingdom 
sent its own secret envoy on a similar mission. Japan, on the other hand, 
reluctant from the outset to impose any sanctions at all, was the fi rst to 
lift the economic and aid restrictions it had imposed, and did so by the 
end of the year. What happened to the mood of the Pearson and Trudeau 
years, when one dared to dream of “participatory internationalism”?
A “Mature Relationship”
Up to that point Canada had caused the Chinese government few prob-
lems, indeed none that had raised more than the occasional eyebrow in the 
Chinese leaders’ compound in Zhongnanhai. No one there harboured any 
serious doubts about Canada’s sincerity in striving to develop ever more 
cooperative relations. During some ministerial visits, and even during the 
visit of Governor General Jeanne Sauvé in 1987, qualms had been expressed 
regarding human rights, but never with much insistence, and certainly with 
no implication that the subject might harm the future of our relations. All 
that had changed on June 4, 1989, and bilateral ties entered a new, more 
mature phase. Maturity is usually an irreversible process, but does it mean 
that previous levels of trust and cooperation can never be recovered? Th e 
future was to answer both “Yes” and “No” to this question.
At this juncture, I must confess that the offi  cial coolness in our rela-
tions paradoxically aff orded me and my team at the Embassy a certain 
latitude in action that we would not have had under the more hectic 
pace of bilateral visits and incessant requests for information that had 
characterized the period before Tiananmen. I was able to proceed without 
interruption to get acquainted with my staff , learn the special features of 
our mission’s modus operandi, and call on many diplomatic colleagues, 
several of whom were in Beijing on their third or fourth assignment. 
All the Western-oriented ones gave me valuable insight into the ways in 
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which they were coping with the strained relations between our hosts 
and their respective headquarters. Least expected was the eagerness with 
which major government offi  cials, including Politburo members, were 
prepared to grant me interviews, not simply to reiterate the message I had 
been hearing loud and clear since landing at the airport—that “China’s 
reforms and opening to the outside will continue unabated”—but also 
to encourage any contact and activity that could give the appearance of 
normal relations and business as usual.
Executives from the relatively few Canadian fi rms that had remained 
active in China during these troubled times were delighted to fi nd that, 
with less than forty-eight hours’ notice, I could take them to call on virtu-
ally any Chinese minister to make representations on whatever venture they 
were encountering diffi  culties with. Years later, when things had returned 
to “normal,” they referred to this period as the “halcyon” days. Relations 
did not, of course, return to normal that quickly, nor for that matter did 
China’s economic development, but by 1991 trade fi gures were up from the 
previous lows. Our CIDA offi  cers managed without diffi  culty to reorient 
their objectives so as to favour more grassroots activities and even the immi-
gration branch was able, through the drop in two-way traffi  c, to refurbish 
its appallingly overcrowded and understaff ed premises.
I soon became aware, however, that the mutual striving for “normal rela-
tions” was a two-edged sword. Th e Chinese side could hardly maintain for 
long their extremely polite and productive demeanour while bemoaning 
that there were no high-level visits between our two countries. On our side, 
I asked myself how one could continue to take advantage of this positive 
atmosphere while trying to introduce human rights issues into bilateral 
discussions. I wrote in my diary at the time:
Th e mission is beginning to work at cross purposes. Th e political sec-
tion remains eager to track human rights violations, while the trade 
section calls for discretion, lest their trade promotion activities be ham-
pered. Tomorrow I’m to make a démarche on the Minister of Industry 
on behalf of a Canadian company that feels aggrieved by the uneven 
playing fi eld on which it is having to face other foreign competitors. 
Obviously that’s not the moment to bring up the forthcoming trial of a 
well-known dissident. (See Bild, p.4).
Nonetheless, the political section of the Embassy kept close track of the 
human rights situation, particularly as the dissidents of 1989 were brought 
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to trial one after the other. We made representations to the Foreign Minis-
try and lost few opportunities to impress upon our various Chinese inter-
locutors the opprobrium that China was reaping through the harsh sen-
tences being meted out. I even took the message to the provinces, fi guring 
that local offi  cials would be more susceptible to such representations. At 
the outset, I quite relished the exercise and, while sitting next to some local 
potentate at a lavish banquet, would whip out a list of political prisoners 
alleged to be in his province’s jails. Th is rude behaviour tended to startle 
them, but only rarely elicited anything other than the standard reply: “the 
only people in prison are criminals, not political activists, and local govern-
ments cannot intervene or even raise questions about names on a list, since 
that would infringe upon the independence of the judiciary.” Th e experi-
ence was sometimes amusing, usually a bit chilling, and always without 
any noticeable eff ect. My eff orts to enlist the cooperation of like-minded 
members of the diplomatic corps in this exercise were largely unsuccess-
ful. A few tried to emulate my antics, only to become disillusioned. At a 
more junior level, however, we did manage to get a cooperative tracking 
and light harassment activity organized. Stalwart young offi  cers from a few 
Western embassies took turns making early morning visits to the Ministry 
of Justice, where the day’s upcoming trials were posted. Whenever a known 
dissident’s name was on the list, one of these courageous young diplomats 
would knock at the courthouse door and ask for permission to attend. 
Rebuff ed every time, they nevertheless persisted for several months until 
the series of trials came to a close.
While this painful internal process was going on, the smiling face of 
China was being beamed to all its neighbours. Th e foreign minister, Qian 
Qichen, undertook a series of visits to all the countries of the region. 
Mutual recognition was restored with Indonesia and Singapore, and diplo-
matic relations were established with Brunei. China was now in position to 
seek the status of a dialogue partner of the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations. (See Deng and Yang, pp. 113-116). North Korea was manoeuvred 
into accepting the “two Koreas” solution for membership in the United 
Nations. India agreed to resume boundary talks (the only ones that would 
not be settled defi nitively). Vietnam fi nally accepted China’s terms for nor-
malizing relations. South Korea switched its recognition from Taipei to Bei-
jing. Cross-border trading posts were opened with Russia and the recently 
independent republics of Central Asia. Qian Qichen was able to boast, in a 
speech to the diplomatic corps at the Foreign Ministry in June 1991, that 
his “policy of good neighbourliness has created harmony throughout Asia.”
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Meanwhile, Canadian policy on China remained unmoving, not to say 
stagnant. Instructions from Ottawa became less and less clear. Rumours 
reached us of divisions within the Cabinet, with the ministers bearing 
economic portfolios calling, though not loudly, for a resumption of high-
level visits for the benefi t of the business community. Th e Canadian 
foreign minister at the time, Barbara McDougall, who seemed to have 
made China-bashing her favourite pastime, insisted on keeping China in 
Coventry (according to one of the fi rst high-level Canadian dignitaries 
to resume contact with China in 1992). None of this was enough to frus-
trate my team of exceptionally enterprising offi  cers, except on such rare 
occasions as when three Members of Parliament, Beryl Gaff ney (Liberal), 
Svend Robinson (NDP) and Geoff  Scott (Progressive Conservative), 
descended on Tiananmen Square with the deliberate intention of creat-
ing a scene. Disregarding our clear instructions not to organize any kind 
of public event unless they wanted to land in jail, they went ahead and 
invited foreign media, through open-line telephone calls, to attend their 
placing of a wreath in memory of the victims of June 4. I won’t recount 
our representations at the Foreign Ministry except to say that, after the 
trio had been expelled manu militari, I was able for several months there-
after to embarrass my hosts with veiled references to the high regard that 
Canadians have for elected representatives visiting us from afar. Th e area 
hit hardest, however, by this frosty Canadian approach was arts and cul-
ture. Th e business community in Ottawa still had enough clout to keep 
some export credit assistance alive, and CIDA had managed through 
bureaucratic momentum to keep most of its programmes in China afl oat, 
but when it came to publications on Canada, orchestral tours or literary 
exchanges, budgets were at zero.
What distinguishes Foreign Service staff  in the fi eld from desk-
bound bureaucrats at headquarters is that the former are not afraid 
to use their ingenuity. In this case, they encouraged Canadian study 
centres at some twenty-two Chinese universities to undertake transla-
tions of major Canadian works or organize scholarly conferences on 
Canadian subjects. Th ey even managed to stage a Sino-Canadian con-
ference, in Spring 1992, to discuss modern media challenges. A dozen 
Canadian producers, directors and distributors were brought together 
for a week with their Chinese counterparts. Th ey came away with at 
least an inkling of the market opportunities then opening in China. Th e 
Chinese, for their part, gained a better idea of what could be obtained 
from “Hollywood North.”
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Take-Off  Resumed
It was pure coincidence that this fl ight into the media arts happened as the 
Chinese economy regained its thrust. I wrote the following in my diary in 
1992:
Ever since May I’ve been involved almost full-time in commercial mat-
ters…. the number of Canadian visitors …seems to be doubling by the 
week…. is this how trends aff ect policy? …one deals with public relations 
only when nothing more immediate is at hand? …In the commercial 
area trends appear so much more clearly…. after all, what was the impe-
tus that brought the Canadian business community back to this side of 
the Pacifi c? …hardly the speeches I made to Chambers of Commerce 
across Canada…. no, it was the eighty-eight-year-old Deng Xiaoping’s 
“Nan Xun,” his grand tour of the South, that did it. He exclaimed that 
the results of market reforms were spectacular and must be continued. 
Business took off  again almost immediately and the investment queue 
never slackened again. Th e “almost” in the preceding sentence denotes a 
six-week hiatus between reports of Deng’s declarations in the Guangdong 
press and an acknowledgement in the People’s Daily. Future historians will 
tell us what occurred in that period…. the battles at the apex of the hier-
archy must have been epic …but it was a fi ne example of power, timing, 
and skill at staging a media event.
Th e brakes that had been put on economic reform in the immediate 
aftermath of Tiananmen were suddenly loosened. By the end of 1992 
bilateral trade was at a high of 4.6 billion dollars, with capital goods 
accounting for more than half the total. Canadian investments had dou-
bled over the previous year.
With all these positive developments, yet another serendipitous occur-
rence put us on a new human rights track. In early 1993, some of our Chi-
nese university acquaintances suggested that we give some thought to joint 
university research projects in the area of institutional reform and demo-
cratic development. Th e idea apparently had support in inner councils in 
Beijing. Th e fi ve scholars eventually chosen, supported by CIDA funds, 
left for a six-week study trip to examine Canada’s democratic institutions 
and practices. Th e report they submitted to the State Council seemed to 
have had some eff ect, since it was mentioned to me on several occasions by 
senior offi  cials whom I met at social functions. In the planning of China’s 
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fi scal reforms, they said, the Canadian tax system was being referred to 
frequently. It was still some distance from more liberating subjects, such 
as freedom of assembly or habeas corpus, but we thought it might be a 
start. Lo and behold, a few weeks later the Royal Society of Canada was 
invited to send a group of scholars to China to discuss “the transition 
from feudalism to the rule of law.” Th is was to be the beginning of an 
ongoing dialogue among offi  cials and experts on how to modernize state 
institutions, the dialogue that the present Canadian government unfortu-
nately decided to cancel “for lack of results.” It is not for me to comment 
on the progress in these exchanges after I was no longer on the scene, 
but what seems to have been overlooked in the hasty condemnation of 
one of the more successful projects of enlightenment is that these fi rst 
steps of 1993 led in the same year to the training of Chinese judges at 
the Université de Montréal. Since then, according to CIDA (reporting in 
May 2010), more than 275,000 prosecutors, judges and criminal lawyers 
have received training in the application of Canadian and international 
legal and human rights standards. Only simplistic or ideologically twisted 
reasoning could refuse to recognize that such exposure of future genera-
tions of Chinese jurists will inevitably have an eff ect on China’s reform of 
its legal system. I never encountered anyone in China who rejected the 
idea that legal and political modernization was necessary: the question 
to which no one had ready answers was how it was to come about. It is 
precisely this question of “how” that these programmes were addressing.
At the same time, Canada took initiatives to extend China’s involve-
ment in multilateral aff airs. Th e Embassy pursued a dialogue at the 
highest levels of the Foreign Ministry on questions such as nuclear non-
proliferation, regional security and restraints on the export of missile 
technology, as well as on the future of China’s participation in the various 
Asia–Pacifi c cooperation bodies. 
Th us it was that in the waning days of the Mulroney era had left the 
foreign ministry portfolio, the larger picture of Canada’s interests in 
China once again came to the fore. Th e list of ministers waiting to visit 
China suddenly became overcrowded and more than our mission could 
handle. Th e Canadian Embassy in Beijing in 1988 had boasted a total 
of eleven commercial offi  cers, the largest such complement of the entire 
Foreign Service. After June 1989, this number was reduced to six, not to 
grow again, except briefl y before the Team Canada exercise in November 
1994. Ad hoc infusions of assistance permitted us to cope. Th e air was 
not cleared, however, until the election of a new government in Ottawa 
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and the statement by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, on March 19, 1994, 
that no one should expect him to tell the Chinese government what to do 
when he could not even make any of the provincial governments toe the 
line. André Ouellet, the new Liberal foreign minister, thus had a ready-
made platform for explaining the new government’s revised approach on 
human rights: individual cases and particular problems would continue 
to be dealt with directly, but in private. In a wider context, however, 
human rights objectives were enshrined in the government’s statement 
entitled Foreign Policy on China: A Four-Pillar Partnership. Th ey would 
be advanced through cooperative constructive projects seeking to develop 
good government and the rule of law.
Who could have predicted that, a mere fi ve years after the tragedy of 
Tiananmen, the Prime Minister of Canada, accompanied by nine provincial 
premiers, two territorial leaders, and close to 500 business people, would 
fi ll the Great Hall of the People, along with some 1,200 Chinese guests, 
including many provincial leaders, cadres and most of the Who’s Who of 
the new Chinese business class? From then on, with Ottawa determined to 
forge an ever friendlier and more mutually benefi cial relationship with Bei-
jing, relations went from strength to strength. In 1997, Chinese and Cana-
dian leaders agreed to build a “21st-century framework for partnership.” 
By 2003 they had put in place a whole panoply of agreements to enhance 
political, economic and cultural collaboration in areas as diverse as animal 
and plant inspection and quarantine, shipping, air transport, potash, petro-
leum and nuclear energy development, and collaboration between judicial 
systems. China announced that it would establish a research facility at the 
vice-ministerial level on Sino-Canadian relations and coordinate positions 
on major international issues, as well as in the areas of energy, environmen-
tal protection and telecommunications.
In 2005, when Prime Minister Paul Martin Jr. made his fi rst offi  cial 
visit to China, the two countries had already had some diff erences of 
view regarding Chinese mineral and petroleum acquisitions in Canada. 
Nonetheless, they signed a joint statement on energy cooperation, prom-
ising to work closely on oil sands, energy effi  ciency, the environment 
and related matters. When President Hu Jintao visited Canada later that 
year he talked of “upgrading the China–Canada comprehensive partner-
ship.” Th ese were not just well-chosen words: they refl ected actions that 
were already under way, as well as future intentions. Both governments 
had realized that if the world’s environmental problems were to be taken 
seriously, they needed close cooperation on protecting the planet and 
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developing greener technology. Th e advances being made in China today 
in new, environmentally friendly methods and machinery demonstrate 
that those policies were on the right track.
Th e long honeymoon was to sour thereafter, as several issues seemed to 
spell more trouble for the future of the relationship, including Canada’s 
apparent inability to extradite Lai Changxing, whom China regards as its 
most wanted criminal; China’s detention of the Uighur Canadian Huseyin 
Celil without recognizing his Canadian citizenship and associated consular 
rights; Ottawa’s intervention in Chinese attempts to buy major interests 
in Canadian mining and oil companies; Beijing’s refusal to grant offi  cial 
tourist destination status to Canada; and Ottawa’s granting of honorary 
citizenship to the Dalai Lama. Of course, as a friend of mine used to say, 
the past is behind us, the present is uncertain and the future is always full 
of hope, but the recent past, despite current deliberate attempts to patch 
things up, has opened several areas whence misunderstanding, mistrust, 
and recrimination can reappear in old or new guises.
Conclusion
I trust that this narrative of Canada’s evolving approach to foreign policy 
conundrums will have demonstrated that an absence of overriding strategic 
objectives was generally the rule. While the search for trade and investment 
opportunities was often a dominant motive, for a long time relations were 
mostly of an exploratory or hopeful nature and, when they were success-
ful, it was more a result of luck rather than of precise planning. On the 
other hand, economic opportunities were frequently missed simply because 
of confl icting short-term political aims, as when racism on Canada’s west 
coast coincided with inadequate labour supply. Indeed, one could point to 
similar confl icts today between political short-sightedness and longer-term 
fruitful relations with China.
None of the above is meant to underestimate Canadian foreign engage-
ments. I am quite certain that a similar stock-taking of any other world 
power, major or secondary, would not be able to boast better batting aver-
ages. Such is the foreign aff airs beast. What I do mean to underline, how-
ever, is that circumstances, the irrationality of some players, unpredictable 
events and sheer chance have fashioned our so-called policies more often 
than not. What ought to be obvious to any practitioner of the art is that 
the numerous foreign policy papers, whether they speak of “pillars” or “pat-
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terns,” have hardly ever had any infl uence on what went on in practice, nor 
did they guide any policy-maker more than for a few hours after their pub-
lication. To point to Canada’s obvious desire, from the early 20th century 
onward, to avoid having to chose between the United Kingdom and the 
United States, or to its later striving to become less dependent on either of 
them for trade, is no more enlightening than stating that a rat caught in a 
cage has as its fi rst objective to get out and, second, to feed itself. If we must 
label the various stages of our relations with China, I would prefer to divide 
them into two major categories: those where there was a clearly evident 
policy line, applied with some consistency, and those where confusion and 
haphazardness were dominant. A superfi cial examination of Canada’s rela-
tions with China over the past forty years would tend to place most of them 
in the second category. Since the “mature” relationship dates only from 
1989, with the latter segment representing few mature features, one would 
have to conclude that the major part of this period should be classifi ed as 
unclear. Coincidence, after all, is the vernacular of history.
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Commentary on relations between Canada and China relations tends to 
lament the shortcomings of Canada’s response to the challenge of China’s 
dramatic rise to power over the past thirty years. Th e perception is that 
Canada is not suffi  ciently politically and economically committed to 
China for Canada fully to realize Canadian interests in China. Th e focus of 
this analysis has been on the very dynamic changes in China since China 
embarked on policies of “opening and reform” in 1978. Th e argument is 
that China is transforming dramatically year by year through a staged pro-
cess of sloughing off  the legacy of Marxist ideology and Leninist organiza-
tion that informed the People’s Republic of China from 1949 until the 
inauguration of the new paradigm of “opening and reform” in late 1978. 
Th is line of argument maintains that Canada is not keeping up with inno-
vative policy and greater commitment of government resources to engage 
China in ways that adequately meet the imperatives of China’s ongoing 
transformation and expansion.
However, this kind of analysis is based on a narrative that is “China-led,” in 
the sense that China is seen as highly active in the dynamic, while Canada is 
depicted as a largely static and passive entity. It tends to downplay the dramatic 
transformation of the international context as a whole and Canada’s commen-
surate reinterpretation of its own position and role in international relations 
since 1970. It also does not take into account core aspects of China’s political, 
economic and social system that are fundamental to the regime, and therefore 
are not amenable to reform so long as the current regime remains in place.
Chapter 3
The Canadian Policy Context 
of Canada’s China Policy since 1970
Charles Burton
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Th e Trudeau Era: Rapprochement with China, 1968–1984
Th e establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and China in 
1970 was a highly controversial political decision for Canada in the context 
of the times. Due the xenophobic imperatives of the “anti-imperialist,” “anti-
colonialist” Marxist discourse that legitimated the assumption of state power 
by the new Communist regime after the establishment of the new People’s 
Republic of China in 1949, interaction between Canada and China in all 
aspects had been very much reduced. Soon after the new Communist gov-
ernment came to power it had ordered nearly all the resident Canadian busi-
ness people and missionaries, including doctors and teachers, many of whom 
had been resident in China for many years, to leave the country and resettle 
elsewhere. Th ose expelled included the children of Canadians who had been 
born in China. Only a very small handful of Canadian Communist fellow 
travellers were allowed to stay on in the “New China.”
China’s entry into the Korean War engaged Canada and the People’s 
Republic in direct hostilities that, for the fi rst time in our countries’ histo-
ries, saw Canadians and Chinese confronting each other on the battlefi eld. 
In the years that followed there was a common perception in the West, exac-
erbated by US McCarthyist fear-mongering, that the Russian-dominated 
Soviet Union and “Red China” secretly shared a foreign policy agenda to 
“liberate” all the nations of the world through “revolutions” informed by 
Marxist-Leninist ideology. Th e fear was that Communist subversion might 
ultimately transform Canada into a totalitarian dictatorship answerable to 
the Soviet Union. As the West and the Soviet Bloc vied for the allegiance 
of the post-colonial Th ird World, a new fear of a “domino eff ect,” in which 
one Asian nation after another succumbed to Communism, seized the 
imagination of US policy-makers. Many interpreted this in terms of the 
“Soviet alliance” gradually moving toward achieving a critical balance of 
power in the Cold War. Th e future of Canada as a Christian nation, loyal to 
the British Crown and based on principles of liberal democracy and private 
enterprise, was perceived as being under severe threat.
Th e Chinese Nationalist regime in exile in Taiwan, fi ghting to regain 
its control of the Chinese mainland, was seen as a beacon of hope for a 
reversal of this ominous trend. Th e Nationalist regime, despite being in 
eff ective political control only of Taiwan and a few other islands off  the 
southern Fujian coast, was diplomatically recognized by Canada as the 
sole legitimate government of the whole of China. On that basis, the 
Nationalist regime occupied China’s permanent seat on the UN Security 
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Council. Reports of economic chaos, famine and severe political repres-
sion in China through the 1950s and 1960s enhanced the urgency that 
many Canadians felt about continuing to support the remnant Nation-
alist regime’s thin aspirations to “gloriously retake the mainland” from 
the “Communist bandits,” despite the fact that almost the entire popula-
tion of China lived securely within the People’s Republic. Th e author-
ity of the Chinese Communist Party was well consolidated by the early 
1950s, after a series of political campaigns had eff ectively decimated any 
political opposition. Canada’s lack of any formal institutional relations 
with the most populous nation on Earth was a highly irregular state 
of aff airs. Th e diplomatic conundrum was that neither the Republic of 
China based in Taiwan nor the People’s Republic would abide any cross-
recognition of “two Chinas.”
In 1970, after years of negotiations, the governments of Canada and the 
People’s Republic managed to fi nesse this point, and thereby remove a sig-
nifi cant barrier to formal diplomatic relations and the exchange of embas-
sies. Th e “Canadian formula” with regard to the mainland regime’s claims 
over Taiwan was that the Canada “takes note of” them. Th is formed the 
basis for Canada’s recognition of the People’s Republic in October 1970 
and was subsequently adopted by many other nations that recognized the 
People’s Republic in the years following (see Canada, Foreign Aff airs et al. 
2010). Nevertheless, there was much political resistance in Canada to the 
requirement, negotiated between Ottawa and Beijing, that the diplomats 
of the Republic of China be made to close its Embassy and return to Tai-
wan before diplomatic relations between Canada and the People’s Republic 
could fi nally be established (Evans and Frolic 1995, pp. 241–52).
Th is is not to say that Canada had not had any contact with mainland 
China at all between 1949 and 1970. In fact, Canada began a very sig-
nifi cant trade with China in the form of wheat sales, starting in 1958. At 
that time China was suff ering from a very severe food shortage due to the 
disastrous policies of the “Great Leap Forward” campaign. In 1961, an 
agreement was signed to ship CA$ 422 million worth of wheat to China 
over two and a half years (see Canada, Foreign Aff airs et al. 2010). Th is 
initiative was undertaken at the behest of Alvin Hamilton, the Minister of 
Agriculture in the Progressive Conservative government of Prime Minister 
John Diefenbaker. Th ese sales to China were much opposed at the time by 
supporters of Canada’s role in the Commonwealth, who felt that supplying 
China with so much wheat would have the eff ect of aiding China in its 
very serious confl ict with India, one of Canada’s Commonwealth partners. 
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Moreover, the United States had a very strict embargo on trade with the 
People’s Republic at this time.
Th is major Canadian trade initiative with China amounted to an auda-
cious challenge to the China policy of the United States. Alvin Hamilton’s 
initiative was seen as a signal that Canada’s foreign policy would be made in 
Canada and would promote Canadian values in international aff airs. Canada 
was anxious to make it clear to the United States, to the world and to Cana-
dians themselves that Canada would not simply follow in lockstep with the 
foreign policy doctrine of the United States. As Canada became much less a 
functionary of Britain in the post-war period, questions of Canadian identity 
had assumed new urgency. Th e cultural imperative for Canada to distance 
itself from the United States was deeply felt by much of the Canadian popu-
lation in those years. (Today the main public function room in the Canadian 
Embassy in Beijing is named the Alvin Hamilton Room in honour of his 
contribution to the development of relations between Canada and China.)
Th e Diefenbaker government’s “wheat diplomacy” with China set the 
stage for Canada’s initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s, aimed at growing 
closer diplomatically to the People’s Republic. It is important to note that 
Canada’s approaches to China under Prime Minister Lester Pearson, and 
then under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, took place at the height of the 
Vietnam War. At that time China was supporting the regime of Ho Chi 
Minh with arms and logistics, so that, as Canada was negotiating formal 
diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic, Chinese-supplied guns, 
bombs, and grenades were killing the young drafted soldiers sent to Viet-
nam by Canada’s neighbour and close ally the United States. It was also at 
exactly this time that China was engaged in the highly anti-American ideo-
logical campaign that formed part of its “Cultural Revolution.” Canada’s 
approaches to the Chinese regime to establish formal diplomatic relations 
allowed Canada’s Liberal government to continue to “play the China card,” 
and thus very explicitly and forcefully assert its foreign policy as being inde-
pendent of that of the United States. From the Canadian point of view, this 
can be paired with Trudeau’s outreach at the same time to Fidel Castro’s 
regime in Cuba, another arch-enemy of the United States.
Refl ecting on the motives for Canada’s decision to formally recognize 
the People’s Republic in October 1970, it now seems clear that engagement 
of China through formal diplomatic relations would reduce China’s diplo-
matic isolation, and lead to China becoming a more active and responsible 
member of the community of nations (see Evans 2009). Moreover, one 
might today look to Trudeau’s watchword of “reason over passion” as an 
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explicatory factor. Th e Nationalist government in Taipei controlled terri-
tory occupied by just one sixtieth of the Chinese population, so it made 
rational sense to change to having diplomatic relations with the govern-
ment in Beijing, which was in control of the territory occupied by the other 
fi fty-nine sixtieths of the Chinese population.
By the late 1960s as the People’s Republic celebrated twenty years of sta-
ble, albeit ruthless, Communist rule, many Canadians no longer perceived 
the regime in Taiwan as a beacon of hope for the “free world,” but rather 
reinterpreted it as one of many morally bankrupt and corrupt right-wing 
military regimes throughout the world supported by the military and eco-
nomic might of the United States. Th ese ranged from the “banana repub-
lics” in Central and South American to the regimes of Mobutu Sese Seko 
in Zaïre and of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. Mao Zedong’s regime 
was apparently identifi ed with the interests of workers and peasants, and 
committed to comprehensive social justice, including egalitarian distribu-
tion of China’s national wealth. It was seen by many in Canada as off ering 
an exemplary developmental model for Th ird World development.
Arguably of greater signifi cance, these diplomatic initiatives can be seen 
as responding to the strain of thought in Canada at the time that the global 
spread of US technology and capital would have a profound impact in 
transforming domestic economic and political institutions, and might even 
destroy their soul, culture, spirit and identity. Th is idea was articulated 
at length by the distinguished Canadian “Red Tory” philosopher George 
Grant (see Grant 1965), and had strong currency among leftist Canadian 
nationalists, whose political stance was strongly anti-American. Th ese left-
ist Canadian nationalists were entranced by the idea of Mao’s China forg-
ing a Chinese response to the crisis of modernity on Chinese terms, being 
beholden neither to the Soviet Union nor to the United States, and thus 
allowing the Chinese people to be, as these Canadians understood it at 
least, more truly human. It goes without saying that there was much mis-
information and naïveté about the true nature of the Chinese “Cultural 
Revolution” in Canada in those years.
Trudeau’s visit to China in 1973 was important symbolically, in that 
Trudeau met at length with Premier Zhou Enlai and more briefl y with 
Chairman Mao Zedong, and travelled in China accompanied by Zhou and 
the recently rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping. However, the visit had few sub-
stantive results, beyond a consular agreement that led to some Chinese 
citizens being permitted to reunite with family in Canada, and some sports 
and public health exchanges.
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Overall, in these fi rst ten years of relations Canada was not able to do 
much to realize its interests in China. Levels of trade, except for wheat, 
remained very low. Bilateral and multilateral relations in other areas were 
also quite constrained by China’s xenophobic ultra-ideological policies of 
those years. Movement of people back and forth between Canada and China 
was also very limited. Canada’s entire immigration programme in China was 
handled by a single clerk on a part-time basis. Canadians resident in China 
in the 1970s amounted to a small number of diplomats, fewer than twenty 
Canadian exchange students, a handful of Canadians working as translators 
and teachers, and no business people at all. Th ey could all be easily gathered 
around the Embassy swimming pool in Beijing on Canada Day.
Th e level of activity between Canada and China was low, but relations 
were “friendly,” as many Canadians were strongly supportive of the poli-
cies of the Chinese Communist Party during these years. Canada–China 
Friendship Associations sprung up all over Canada, and the emphasis was 
on Canadians “learning from China.” Th is “friendship” was not a mutual 
interaction, in the sense that the base-line assumption of this friendship was 
that Chinese socialism was morally superior to Canadian capitalism.
Th e Chinese Communist Party’s decision in December 1978 to repu-
diate the policies of the Cultural Revolution as “ten years of disaster,” and 
in general to abandon the “movement politics” and “socialist econom-
ics” of China’s Marxist era after the death of Chairman Mao, was some-
thing of a shock to the pro-Maoist political pretensions of the Canadian 
“friends of China.” However, after China’s adoption of policies of “open-
ing and reform,” the possibilities for deepening relations between Canada 
and China became much heightened, and there was much enthusiasm 
for this development on both sides. In 1979, Canada extended a $2 bil-
lion line of credit to encourage expansion of economic relations under 
the new conditions. A small development aid programme run out of the 
Canadian Embassy in Beijing began in 1981. A general agreement on 
development cooperation was signed in 1983, a major step forward as 
under Mao China had refused developmental assistance from Western 
nations. Th e Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) was 
to help China to “build international linkages and learn from foreign 
expertise by supporting people-to-people contacts and education pro-
grams in Canada and China” (see Canadian International Development 
Agency 2005). Twinning agreements between Canadian and Chinese 
provinces and municipalities also grew apace, with high levels of activity 
back and forth (see Canada 2009).
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In January 1984 the Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang became the fi rst 
Communist leader to address a joint session of the Canadian Parliament. 
Th e degree of eff usiveness with which Zhao was greeted in Canada could 
not have been greater. In his introductory remarks, Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau noted that “our bilateral relations have achieved such variety, 
depth and warmth,” and eff used about his “most valued memory” of his 
visit to China in 1973, when he had discussed politics with Zhou Enlai 
“far into the night.” In thanking Premier Zhao, the Speaker of the House 
of Commons, Lloyd Francis, referred to a parliamentary delegation that 
visited China in 1983, noting with evident enthusiasm that “all members 
of the delegation were absolutely delighted with their visit” (see Parlia-
ment of Canada 1984). It is puzzling today to try to comprehend how 
elected members of the legislature of a liberal democracy such as Canada 
could have been “delighted” by an authoritarian one-party state whose leg-
islature meets for only two weeks a year in a committee of the whole to 
rubber-stamp approval for the often repressive rule of the Chinese Com-
munist Party. It appears that Canadian concerns about pervasive reports of 
human rights violations in China were not raised while Zhao Ziyang was in 
Canada, despite Trudeau’s determined championing of the new Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms only two years before.
Th e newly elected Progressive Conservative Government of Brian Mul-
roney was probably less pleased by Zhao’s meeting for ninety minutes in 
Zhongnanhai, the government compound in Beijing, with René Lévesque, 
the leader of Quebec’s separatist Parti Québécois, in October 1984, but this 
had no impact on relations overall.
Canada’s Response to China under Brian Mulroney after June 4, 
1989
Th e tone of relations between Canada and China was dramatically trans-
formed after the Tiananmen incident in 1989 (see Brook 1992).  Many 
Canadians had been elated by the “democratic spring” in Beijing that year, 
identifying it with recent “people power” movements along the lines of 
Solidarity in Poland or the People Power Revolution that had toppled the 
authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986. Th e 
televised images of the military suppression of the movement in Beijing 
after June 4, 1989, brought home to Canadians the powerful reality of the 
Chinese Communist security apparatus, which was jarringly dissonant with 
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the naïve warmth with which most Canadians had previously approached 
China’s authoritarian regime.
On June 5, the Parliament of Canada held an emergency debate on the 
situation. Bullets had come through the window of the Canadian diplomatic 
staff  quarters at Jianguomenwai. Canadian students in Beijing were encamped 
on the grounds of the Embassy compound awaiting evacuation. Joe Clark, 
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, made a statement on behalf of the government: 
“I know that all members of the House of Commons and, indeed, all Cana-
dians, share a deeply felt sense of horror and of outrage at the events that have 
unfolded over the last few days in China” (as quoted in Mulroney 2007, p. 
665). In a statement to the press, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney said: “We are 
appalled by the tragedy that has been visited upon young people in China seek-
ing greater democratic freedoms within the system. It’s a calamity for them and 
it’s a calamity for the breath of fresh air that was a democratic impulse running 
throughout China” (quoted in Mulroney 2007, pp. 665–66). As Mulroney 
recalls in his autobiography (Mulroney 2007, p. 666):
I also spoke in Vancouver just a few days after the Chinese attack on the 
students. “I say to those young heroes: ‘Do not despair, victory must 
eventually be yours because liberty cannot be denied.’ Canada abhors 
the great tragedy that has been infl icted on those brave young leaders in 
Tiananmen Square. Indiscriminate shooting have [sic] snuff ed out the 
precious human lives, but they can never snuff  out the fundamental urge 
of human beings for freedom and democracy.” …Joe [Clark] hauled in 
the Chinese Ambassador to Canada to register our disgust.
Fearing continuing civil unrest, many Canadian fi rms closed their repre-
sentative offi  ces in Beijing after repatriating Canadian staff . Th e Canadian 
Ambassador, Earl Drake, was withdrawn to Ottawa for prolonged consul-
tations. All Chinese nationals in Canada were eventually granted Minis-
ter’s Permits and allowed to remain in Canada permanently if they wished. 
Most of them did so, causing considerable complaint from the govern-
ment of China, particularly in respect of those scholars who had come to 
Canada on Chinese government funding. Canada banned sales to China 
of weaponry and other goods deemed to have military applications, CIDA 
suspended negotiations with China’s Ministry of Commerce for develop-
ment aid projects worth a total of about CA$ 60 million, and CA$ 11 mil-
lion worth of ongoing programming was scrapped, since China would not 
send participants to Canada for training as they would likely not return to 
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China. A moratorium on high-level contacts between the governments of 
Canada and China was also announced (see Gecelovsky and Keenleyside 
1995). In 1990 the reduced Canadian Embassy in Beijing was directed by 
Ottawa that there should be “no celebratory activities” marking the twenti-
eth anniversary of the opening of diplomatic relations.
In fact, this stated policy of shunning the Communist government of 
China was not strictly observed. In the months and years that followed, a 
series of cabinet ministers met with their Chinese counterparts in Beijing 
and took part in bilateral consultations at international meetings in other 
countries. Th ere was a strong policy undercurrent that supported contin-
ued engagement of China as the most eff ective way to realize Canada’s 
aspirations for that nation (see Gecelovsky and Keenleyside 1995). In April 
1992 a trade delegation led by Michael Wilson, Minister for Industry, Sci-
ence and Technology and Minister for International Trade, marked the res-
toration of normal government-to-government relations between Canada 
and China. Th e Canadian policy of shunning China had eff ectively failed 
and had had no signifi cant impact on the Chinese regime, which carried on 
the status quo ante. Canadian dreams of Chinese democracy had crashed on 
the shoals of Chinese Communist authoritarian reality.
Jean Chrétien’s “Team Canada”: Engagement with China, 
1993–2003
Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien subsequently led “Team Canada” trade 
missions to China in 1996, 1998 and 2001. Th e last was the largest trade 
mission in Canadian history to date. Chrétien was accompanied by close 
to 600 business participants, eight provincial premiers, three territorial lead-
ers, the Minister for International Trade, Pierre Pettigrew, and the Secretary 
of State (Asia–Pacifi c), Rey Pagtakhan. On the economic front, the strategy 
was to send a critical mass of Canadian business people, buttressed by the 
highest level of political support, to induce Chinese state-owned enterprises 
and smaller businesses to consider contracting for Canadian products and 
services. As for Canada’s agenda of promoting liberal democracy and respect 
for human rights in China, Chrétien evidently shared the opinion of many 
in Canada’s business community that economic opening would eventually 
produce political democratization (see Evans 2009), and that directly raising 
Canadian concerns over human rights abuses in China could have a negative 
impact on Canada’s economic interests in China. Indeed, in 1994, after his 
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meeting with the Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, Chrétien made a high-
profi le public statement that he was skeptical of the effi  cacy of directly raising 
human rights concerns with the Chinese leadership: “I’m the Prime Minister 
of a country of twenty million people. He’s the President of a country with 
1.2 billion. I’m not allowed to tell the Premier of Saskatchewan or Quebec 
what to do. Am I supposed to tell the President of China what to do?” He 
reiterated this policy stance, which must have been very well received by the 
Chinese Communist leadership, in 2008 (see Gee 2008).
Chrétien visited China six times while he was in offi  ce and forged close 
personal ties with China’s Communist leaders (see Chrétien 2007, pp. 339–
43). His son-in-law, André Desmarais, is honorary Chairman of the Can-
ada–China Business Council, President of the Power Corporation, which has 
extensive interests in China, and a director of the China International Trust 
and Investment Corporation (CITIC), a Chinese state-owned conglomerate. 
Some suggest that Chrétien’s stance on human rights in China, which he 
maintained after leaving offi  ce, has been “heavily freighted with personal and 
private interests” (see McParland 2008). In November 1998, when he was still 
Prime Minister, and leading one of his Team Canada missions, Chrétien did 
make a strong statement on human rights in a speech at Tsinghua University 
in Beijing, saying: “I would be less than frank if I did not say directly to you 
that many Canadians are disturbed when we hear of people being arrested 
or in prison for expressing political views diff erent from the government” 
(Chrétien 2007, p. 343). Nevertheless, Chrétien’s policy on promotion of 
good governance, democratic development and human rights was managed 
in an ambiguous way that sent out mixed signals to the Chinese authorities 
on Canada’s commitment to this aspect of the bilateral relationship.
Despite these very proactive initiatives undertaken in the Chrétien era, 
Canada’s trade and investment in the Chinese market have not been as strong 
as those of other nations. According to numbers given in the United Nations 
Commodity Trade Statistics Database, in 1997 only 0.93 percent of Canada’s 
total exports went to China, and this amounted to 1.41 percent of China’s 
total imports. However, Canada’s share of China’s imports dropped over-
all to 1.06 percent in 2003, even though this amounted to 1.61 percent of 
Canada’s total exports. Th us, while Canada’s absolute amount of exports to 
China increased, its share of China’s import market decreased signifi cantly. 
Canada’s share of the Chinese import market bottomed out at 0.97 percent in 
2006. After the Conservatives under Prime Minister Stephen Harper assumed 
power, Canada’s share of Chinese imports modestly increased to 1.12 percent 
in 2008 and the total proportion of Canada’s exports that went to China 
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reached a new high of 2.71 percent. Canada has a huge merchandise trade 
defi cit of about four to one with China, and it has generally been widening 
over the past fi fteen years. In sharp contrast to Canada, Australia has achieved 
a modest surplus in its trade with China: Australia’s exports to China grew by 
45.4 percent in 2008, compared to growth of only 19.5 percent in China’s 
exports to Australia (see Australia 2010). Moreover, according to a report pub-
lished in the Globe and Mail in 2009, there were 130,000 Chinese students 
studying in Australia, compared to 42,000 studying in Canada, even though 
Australia has ten million fewer people than Canada (see Wheeler 2009).
Th e factors that have led to Canada’s relatively disappointing performance 
in the Chinese market have been articulated along three main lines of inter-
pretation. First, the interpretation put forward by the Federal Government 
Policy Research Initiative is that the trade imbalance refl ects the structural 
characteristics of the Canadian economy in relation to China’s within the 
global economy. Th is interpretation implies that there is no need for gov-
ernment to see this trade imbalance as a problem, since it is a phenomenon 
refl ecting global market economic principles (see Ghosh and Wang 2006). 
Second, other observers attribute Canada’s weak performance to specifi cally 
Chinese factors, such as manipulation of currency exchange rates to keep 
Chinese exports cheap and imports expensive, hidden subsidies to Chinese 
state-owned enterprises and local government subsidies to local businesses, 
local government connivance in preventing Canadian businesses in China 
from repatriating profi ts through theft of intellectual property, unfair adju-
dication of disputes with local partners, and other non-tariff  barriers, includ-
ing secret non-market, politically based decisions to give business to fi rms 
from countries other than Canada because of the regime’s unhappiness with 
the government’s “unfriendly” political engagement with the Chinese central 
authorities. Th ird, still other observers argue that the problem lies in the “cul-
ture” of Canadian business, which lacks vision and drive, and is conditioned 
by “coddling” from government subsidies and incentive programmes. Th e 
Canadian Chamber of Commerce, for example, has said that “many com-
panies are small, ‘unworldly’ and risk-averse, with limited knowledge of the 
Chinese market” (see Canadian Chamber of Commerce 2006).
Th is last explanation appears to be the most convincing overall, but 
another important factor that is diffi  cult to square with any of these three 
interpretations is that there are proportionately fi ve times as many people 
of Chinese ancestry in Canada as in the United States, so Canada should 
have a signifi cant advantage in terms of language, cultural understanding 
and willingness to function in a Chinese environment.
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Canada’s Engagement of China Today
Th ere is a high degree of consensus across all the Canadian federal parties 
that Canada’s priorities with regard to China are, fi rst, to promote prosper-
ity through trade and investment, and, second, to encourage high-quality 
Chinese immigrants to move to Canada. According to the most recent 
Census, conducted in 2006, of the 31.2 million residents of Canada 1.2 
million identifi ed themselves as Chinese. Th at amounts to about four per-
cent of Canada’s total population. Chinese is now the third most widely 
spoken language in Canada, after English and French.
Canada also wants to collaborate with China on matters of mutual con-
cern that arise in a rapidly globalizing world, such as fair trade, environ-
mental sustainability, limiting the spread of diseases, respect for human 
rights and fi ghting transnational crime. Th ere is little room for partisan 
disagreement on any of this. Moreover, Canadians of all political stripes 
are concerned by reports of alleged human rights violations in China. 
Canada’s foreign policy stands for freedom of expression, the right to 
religious and political freedom and the right to private property free from 
expropriation through corrupt deals. Even a “sensitive” political initia-
tive such as extending honorary Canadian citizenship to the Dalai Lama 
received unanimous support in the Canadian House of Commons. Inter-
nationally, China’s close relations with what Canada regards as unstable 
and repressive regimes in Burma, Sudan, North Korea, Zimbabwe and 
elsewhere are of concern to the government of Canada. Whoever forms 
the next government in Ottawa will likely continue to respect Canada’s 
fundamental interests in its relations with China. Th e main factor distin-
guishing the Liberal Party from the Conservative Party, the NDP and the 
Bloc Québecois is the question of human rights. Lloyd Axworthy, who 
was foreign minister in the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien, initiated 
a confi dential bilateral dialogue on human rights in 1997. Th e Liberal 
Party continues to support this “quiet diplomacy” approach to human 
rights engagement with China (see Liberal Party 2008). In 2006, how-
ever, Canada suspended this dialogue because it was seen as ineff ective in 
furthering human rights in China (see Burton 2006 and 2009). Canada 
is concerned that, for example, China shows few signs of moving toward 
ratifi cation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
which it signed in 1998. However, Canada is currently in discussions 
with China on a new mechanism for human rights engagement on terms 
that would be acceptable to both governments.
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In general, Canada hopes to rethink and reinvigorate the way it engages 
China along many dimensions in the years ahead. For example, most of 
the younger Chinese diplomats in Canada have near-fl uency in English 
or French, and many have graduate degrees from universities in Canada, 
the United States, Australia or Britain. Canada needs to send comparably 
qualifi ed Canadians to China, preferably people who have done advanced 
study in China, but Canada is not yet doing to a suffi  cient extent, and is 
less eff ective in realizing its interests in China as a result. Canada also needs 
to overhaul the way Ottawa does its trade promotion in China. Canada 
needs a clear strategy for better access to the Chinese market, one that 
factors in the distinct characteristics of Chinese culture and Canada’s com-
parative advantage in that market.
Finally, China requires comprehensive engagement. In the United States, 
Canada does not focus on the State Department alone. Canada’s Embassy in 
Washington engages Congress, the President and all the elements of political 
power. Th is multifaceted approach is informed by a policy decision, taken 
more than twenty-fi ve years ago, recognizing that diversifi ed engagement is 
necessary in order to enhance Canadian interests in Washington. Likewise, 
Ottawa must engage Chinese policy-makers in both the government and 
the Communist Party, all of whose decisions have implications for Canada’s 
interests. Th e focus of Canada’s Department of Foreign Aff airs and Interna-
tional Trade on China’s Ministry of Foreign Aff airs should be expanded to a 
more comprehensive engagement of the Chinese system. Canadian diplo-
mats need to better recognize that many of the most infl uential players in the 
Chinese system are in Communist Party institutions.
In December 2009 Prime Minister Stephen Harper made an offi  cial 
visit to China, following the eighteen ministerial visits made to China since 
Harper formed his government in 2006. One notable accomplishment on 
this visit was that Canada was fi nally able to negotiate “approved destina-
tion” status for Chinese tourism to Canada, something that had not been 
achieved despite considerable eff orts by the two previous prime ministers, 
Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin. While he was in China Prime Minister 
Party Harper articulated a theme about which there is a large degree of 
consensus in Canada: “Now is the time to enhance and expand our rela-
tionship, to build upon our mutual successes, and to use the authority these 
successes have aff orded us to set an example for others in the world” (see 
Canada 2010). Th e Prime Minister also observed before leaving China that 
“Canada has made a real signifi cant impact here, [but] at the same time we 
all sense we are only scratching the surface” (see CBC News 2009).
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By 1985, fi fteen years after Canada had recognized the People’s Republic 
of China, relations between the two countries had reached a level of matu-
rity. Trade was steadily expanding and China ranked as Canada’s fi fth 
largest trading partner. A growing number of high-level visits marked 
an apparent tightening of relations between the two governments. In 
early 1984 China’s Premier, Zhao Ziyang, became the fi rst leader of a 
Communist country to address the Canadian House of Commons. Both 
sides continued to invoke the spirit of Dr. Norman Bethune in declar-
ing that they had developed “a special relationship.” A fl edgling aid 
programme administered by the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA) had emerged as a promising link, and a family reunifi ca-
tion programme, established during Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s visit 
to China in 1973, had brought to Canada over 25,000 Chinese trapped 
during the Cold War to rejoin their families. China was now casting off  
the fetters of revolutionary socialism and self-imposed isolation, and was 
engaging with the outside world. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping had declared 
that China was “opening up” (kaifangle), and that modernization, not 
class struggle, had become China’s top priority. Foreigners were invited in 
to revitalize a fl agging economy, and Chinese were encouraged to xiahai, 
to jump into the sea of markets and join the outside world. By 1985, 
then, a new China was emerging, one that had abandoned collectivized 
agriculture, was actively soliciting foreign investment and technology, 
and was promoting entrepreneurship and free market principles.
Chapter 4 
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Foreigners, remembering the China of the 1970s, initially were wary of 
this sudden turn in direction. While Deng was the spokesman for a new 
type of Chinese economy and a more open relationship with the outside 
world (“It does not matter if the cat is black or white as long as it catches 
mice.”), his opponents within the Chinese Communist Party resisted these 
ideological changes. Th e struggle between reformers and “hardliners” con-
tinued throughout the 1980s, lending a measure of uncertainty to the long-
term stability of the post-Mao reforms. Could China succeed in so abruptly 
changing course, moving from a planned socialist economy to one that will-
ingly embraced Western (capitalist) market principles? Had China given 
up its commitment to supporting international revolutionary movements? 
Could it be trusted to take on a responsible role in conventional international 
institutions? Th e split between China and the Soviet Union had produced 
an emerging multipolar world. Th e Cold War was winding down and China 
was searching for a signifi cant place for itself in this changing world order, 
where the new Sino-American relationship was becoming the gold standard 
for measuring foreign reactions to Chinese policies and behaviour.
Since the 1960s Canadians had articulated the idea that Canada had a 
mission to bring China into the community of nations, thus ending its iso-
lation. In 1970, the Canadian government made a formal commitment to 
help China gain admission to the United Nations at the expense of remov-
ing Taiwan as a member. One of Canada’s tasks in the 1970s was facilitating 
China’s entry into multilateral regimes and institutions. By the mid-1980s 
China had acquired membership in the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, and Canada had pledged to assist its entry into the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariff s and Trade. Canada actively promoted China’s 
participation in arms limitation talks and in international nuclear non-
proliferation and testing regimes. In 1983, Trudeau attempted to create 
a multilateral “peace initiative” bringing together the Soviet Union, the 
United States and China.
Th e fi rst fi fteen years, therefore, represented an ambitious undertaking 
in the midst of far-reaching international and, in China, domestic trans-
formation. No one was exactly sure about the course of China’s new path, 
but there was an air of optimism that engagement with China was a major 
step forward. For the most part, however, while not opposing closer rela-
tions with China, the majority of Canadians paid scant attention to the 
construction of closer ties. A small policy community of bureaucrats and 
politicians, occasionally joined by academics and a few others, created and 
administered China policy. Th e attention of most Canadians lay elsewhere, 
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primarily on the weakened state of the economy, the love–hate relationship 
with the United States, the eff ects of the oil crises, and the constitutional 
issues involving the muffl  ing of Quebec separatism and the reassertion of 
Canadian national identity.
Brian Mulroney and Canada’s China Policy
In September 1984, the election of a Progressive Conservative government 
led by Brian Mulroney heralded a shift in Canadian politics. After twenty-
one years of Liberal rule, barely interrupted by Joe Clark’s short-lived 
government of 1979, the Conservatives were ready to put their stamp on 
Canada. Electors had voted in a party that favoured big business, advocated 
a reduced role for government, sought to water down restrictions on foreign 
investment in Canada, was intent on dismantling Canada’s national energy 
policy, and was determined to forge a better relationship with the United 
States. Th e party also contained within its ranks an anti-Communist group 
that supported Taiwanese autonomy, was suspicious of China and publicly 
criticized Chinese abuses of human rights.
Th e expectation was that Mulroney would move quickly to distance 
himself from Liberal foreign policy. Th is certainly was the case with his 
immediate shift to more positive relations with the United States. However, 
the impact on Canada’s China policy was limited. While Mulroney met 
with Ottawa mandarins and pointedly asked, “What makes you think I 
should take your advice?” (Globe and Mail 1984) his government’s policy 
initially appeared to be one of continuity rather than change. Mulroney had 
a full domestic and international agenda in other areas, and China was not 
a top priority. While the Conservatives wanted to develop Canada’s trade in 
the Asia–Pacifi c region, as did the Liberals, the main target remained Japan, 
not China. Like the Liberals, the Conservatives, despite their criticism of 
Canada’s “one China” policy and their support for Taiwan, remained com-
mitted to that policy. In the House of Commons on October 11, 1985, 
Mulroney said: “I have indicated to the Premier of China and the President 
of China the fact that the intention of this Government is to pursue the 
policy set out by my predecessor, Mr. Trudeau, with which I agree. We have 
honoured that in all circumstances” (Government of Canada 1985). 
In March 1986, eighteen months after taking power, Mulroney made a 
visit to China (as reported in the Globe and Mail, May 13, 1986). Th e time 
had come to focus on China and put his imprint on Canada’s China policy. 
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Mulroney had visited China in 1979 as a private citizen and the contrast 
seven years later was palpable. He commented:
I was struck by the tremendous changes in the last six or seven years, tre-
mendous progress that we can see visibly on the streets…. Th ere is a greater 
sense of well-being, a greater consumer reality that is there, that seems to 
be shared by the Chinese population…. As Chairman Deng said the other 
day, the Chinese are trying to be realistic. Th ey have an enormous problem, 
unique in the world, in terms of inherent diffi  culties that arise because of 
[the size of ] the population itself. (Globe and Mail 1986)
During Mulroney’s visit, Canada announced the expansion of conces-
sional fi nancing to promote trade, an additional CA$ 350 million to blend 
with the CA$ 2 billion worth of credit that had previously been extended 
by the Export Development Corporation (EDC). CIDA’s aid programme 
was doubled to CA$ 200 million over the next fi ve years. Canada presented 
China with a bulk fertilizer blending plant worth CA$ 300 million to pro-
mote Canadian potash sales. Canada also won assurances that it would 
remain a favoured supplier of wheat. Th e Chinese encouraged Canadian 
business to invest in China, including participation in the Th ree Gorges 
hydroelectric project, which was most attractive to the Canadian power 
industry. In a meeting with Canadian businesspeople in Beijing, Mulroney 
“promised to cooperate with businessmen and the Chinese government to 
make the next century ‘the age of the Pacifi c’” (Globe and Mail 1986).
In his meetings with China’s leaders, Mulroney received assurances that 
China would remain committed to the “open door policy” and was devel-
oping a trading regime that conformed to international practices in pro-
tecting commercial rights and intellectual property. With respect to human 
rights in general, Mulroney made a signifi cant public departure from past 
Liberal policy by openly dwelling on human rights in his farewell meeting 
with Premier Zhao Ziyang, commenting later:
My meeting with Premier Zhao was entirely devoted, by and large, to the 
human rights issue…. No one can challenge the right of a duly elected 
government to raise any issue with a friend, even though I recognize the 
traditional Chinese position that this is an internal matter. I didn’t raise 
it in a spirit of hostility. I raised it as the kind of subject that can be dis-
cussed between friends whose friendship is maturing and open to that 
kind of discussion. (Globe and Mail 1986)
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In the months following the Prime Minister’s visit the primary focus 
was on trade. While China had “opened up” and Canada seemingly was 
poised to expand its commercial links, trade was sluggish, failing to meet 
Canadian expectations. Th e Chinese market was slow to open up. Canada 
faced increased competition from foreign challengers, Canadian business 
people complained that Canada needed to expand its trade promotion and 
commercial presence. China was hesitant in off ering foreign companies 
intellectual property protection. Canadian companies were lobbying for 
greater participation by the government in securing deals, and the large 
concessional fi nancing fund was underused by the Chinese. Canada con-
tinued to have a trade surplus with China, but the gap was narrowing and 
Canada continued to remain heavily dependent on resource-based exports, 
primarily of wheat.
Th e China Strategy of 1987
Aside from trade concerns, the bilateral relationship in late 1986 needed 
to take into account a number of other developments. In the fall of that 
year the government instructed the Department of Foreign Aff airs and 
International Trade (DFAIT) to develop a strategic plan for China. While 
the primary goal was to increase trade, the eventual “Canadian Strategy for 
China,” as set out in a Memorandum to Cabinet, was intended to fulfi ll 
a number of other objectives (Cabinet of Canada 1987). First, it would 
consolidate and focus the various Canadian instrumentalities that had 
grown up over the fi rst fi fteen years. Th e Strategy could pull together the 
many bilateral components and provide a managerial basis for these initia-
tives. Th us high-level visits and trade could be linked more tightly together, 
CIDA’s aid programme could be used to facilitate trade, and policies on 
culture and immigration could be attuned to economic and trade interests.
Second, as a follow-up to the Prime Minister’s visit, the Strategy could 
put Mulroney’s imprint on Canada’s China policy as he sought to distance 
his government from Trudeau and the Liberals in foreign aff airs. One offi  -
cer in DFAIT observed:
We were ready to do this. Th e Prime Minister’s Offi  ce told us right 
after Mulroney’s trip that he needed a key ‘deliverable’ to establish his 
China credentials and implement the initiative announced in Beijing. 
We were already working on the components of an action plan when we 
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received offi  cial notice from the politicians to put the document together. 
(Interview 1996)
Th ird, behind the scenes the Canadian foreign policy bureaucracy 
was in the throes of major change. In 1983, the Department of External 
Aff airs (DEA) and the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce 
(ITC) had been reorganized into a single body, essentially to cope more 
eff ectively with their increasingly complex tasks. Th is merger of Canada’s 
two main internationally focused political and economic bureaucracies 
created both opportunities and tensions, as Ottawa mandarins struggled 
to adapt to new roles and expectations. Th e China Strategy served as a 
testing ground for the new partnership, bringing together sixteen minis-
tries and departments under the aegis of a new department, eventually 
to be headed by three ministers, for foreign aff airs, international trade 
and development, and development assistance. To the former “political” 
mandarins at the DEA, it was an opportunity to maintain their leader-
ship and to resist challenges to their fading pre-eminence in the foreign 
policy arena. According to one DFAIT offi  cer, interviewed in 1996, “It 
was a chance for us to retain our dominant role in the coordination and 
implementation of foreign policy. Putting together a China Strategy was 
a test of our abilities” (Interview 1996).
Finally, the Strategy served to emphasize the increased importance of 
Canada’s relations with China. It was the only country that received special 
treatment, with a strategic plan devoted to strengthening a bilateral rela-
tionship. While continentalism and trade relations with the United States 
were the primary foreign policy objectives of the Mulroney government, 
it was clear that China was emerging as another priority, soon to contend 
strongly with Japan. Implementing the Strategy also implied that Canada 
continued to be relatively optimistic about the long-term stability of Chi-
na’s economic and political transformation, even as factional struggles per-
sisted at the highest echelons of the regime.
Organizations have their formal and informal histories, and DFAIT is 
no exception. While the offi  cial nod from the politicians and the Prime 
Minister’s Offi  ce (PMO) to draft a China Strategy occurred in the fall of 
1986, informally the process had begun earlier, in the waning days of the 
Trudeau era. A senior offi  cial, John Hadwen, having just returned from 
an ambassadorial posting abroad, put together a paper proposing that 
Canada develop a China strategy, consolidating what had been achieved 
and providing a guideline for the future.
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Th ere’s a key document you won’t fi nd in the fi les—I wrote it in 1983. It 
was entitled ‘Why Canada Should Now Make a Major Eff ort in China.’ I 
sent it up and no one ever sent me a reply. After a while, I just went ahead 
and did it. And that was that…. How to get it organized? I circulated it to 
everyone in the Department and consulted widely, with a heavy emphasis 
on trade…. I went to China with EDC in late 1983 to fi nd out why the 
Chinese were shying away from our two-million-dollar line of credit…. 
I soon realized that while other government ministries and departments 
had increasing interests in China, DFAIT could put it all together. We 
had to be the manager and coordinator. (Conversation 1994)
Beginning in 1984, DFAIT organized an interdepartmental China Work-
ing Group (CWG) to help to coordinate China-related activities. Trade was 
the main focus, but discussions also centred on evaluating China’s political 
stability, linking trade and aid, coordinating high-level visits, and bringing in 
perspectives from academics and non-governmental organizations. Accord-
ing to Hadwen, “Th e China Working Group used to meet at night under 
my direction. We met at 7 p.m. and I ordered in sandwiches, wine and beer. 
Sometimes we met two to three times a month” (Conversation 1994).
I attended CWG meetings in 1985 and 1986. It was noted at the 
meeting in 1985 that there was a “broad consensus” that China’s mod-
ernization was going to continue and was presenting Canada with 
greater opportunities. How to focus and coordinate the sudden surge 
in China related activities? How to maximize our trade potential? How 
to be optimistic, yet maintain a cautious perspective? At the meeting in 
1986, we received a debriefi ng on the Prime Minister’s visit to China, as 
well as those of several cabinet ministers, and updates on concessional 
fi nancing (from CIDA and EDC), agricultural cooperation (from Agri-
culture Canada), and thermal and hydroelectric power (from the Task 
Force on the Hydro-Electric Power Sector). I had the impression that 
we were processing a great deal of information about China and, within 
the constraints of time and resources, trying to develop a coherent 
China strategy. One DFAIT offi  cial who also participated in the CWG 
commented in 1986, “It’s like herding cats. Too many independent-
minded departments, egged on by business and political interests. Too 
many egos. It’s a big challenge” (Conversation 1986).
In the fall of 1986, DFAIT was instructed by the PMO to prepare a sub-
mission to Cabinet on relations with China. A drafting team was assembled 
to liaise with concerned parties: the various government departments, the 
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CWG, the Embassy in Beijing and selected members of the policy com-
munity. Th e fi nal stage of the process, the drafting of the Memorandum 
to Cabinet, was launched at a meeting of the CWG on January 17, 1987. 
Copies of the draft were sent to the ministers involved by March, and then 
forwarded to the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Aff airs and Defence Pol-
icy at the end of the month. Cabinet approved the Strategy in early April 
1987 (Cabinet of Canada 1987: Volume 38, File 20-1-2).
In the drafting process DFAIT was guided by a number of recom-
mendations made by the drafting team. Th e basic issue, it said, was “how 
to capitalize on Canada’s fascination with China to seize opportunities 
created by its modernization drive and to position ourselves for the year 
2000, when China should have the world’s third largest GDP after the 
United States and Japan” (Cabinet of Canada 1987). Th e Strategy rec-
ommended that all ministerial visits henceforth should target priority 
government objectives, in order to stanch the excessive fl ow of offi  cials 
beset by “China fever” and making questionable journeys. Th e remaining 
recommendations were:
• to elevate the China dialogue on key Asian strategic concerns and 
global arms-control issues to the ministerial level;
• to develop a cadre of Chinese-speaking offi  cials and specialists to 
deliver programmes in China;
• to promote better partnership between government and the pri-
vate sector, in order to promote long-term objectives;
• to have high-level visits target economic objectives;
• to convene periodic meetings of leading business, academic and 
other China specialists “to ensure that Canadian strategy is based 
on national consensus”;
• to establish working committees to link federal, provincial and 
private-sector groups to promote trade objectives;
• to increase Canada’s use of the “China connection” through 
Hong Kong;
• to pursue co-fi nancing arrangements with international fi nancial 
institutions to lever greater procurement opportunities for Cana-
dian companies;
• to extend academic, cultural, professional, sports, media and other 
exchanges, in order to increase the number of Chinese students in 
Canada, to promote people-to-people contacts, to enrich Canada’s 
multicultural heritage, and to project Canada’s image as a highly 
developed and open society.
Canada and China 55 
Th e rationale for the China Strategy underlined the growing political 
and strategic importance of China to Canada. For example, according to 
the document, “China is a dominant Asia power. Canada has a stake in 
China’s stability. Canada’s recognition of the Asia–Pacifi c region as key to 
Canadian security and economic interests requires that our political dia-
logue be strengthened.” Th e document noted that Canada had positioned 
itself to meet “increasingly fi erce competition” in the China market, and 
that a careful “Canada Inc.” approach to China was “vital to commercial 
success.” In an accompanying press release, the government referred to a 
“focused,” “orchestrated” and “aggressive” strategy to cope with “our fas-
cination about China,” which often is “undertaken without a suffi  cient 
assessment of real potential benefi ts to Canada.” It asserted that there was 
now “an urgent need for more timely and incisive knowledge of develop-
ments in China” and for “better management of Canada–China relations 
through improved consultative and cooperative mechanisms.”
What was the reaction of those on the ground in China, the offi  cials in 
the Canadian Embassy in Beijing? Th e Ambassador, Richard Vessot Gor-
ham, who had been at the post since May 1984, was generally supportive of 
the exercise. In his view, while foreign observers should not be deluded into 
thinking that China will emerge as some sort of mirror image of Western 
democracy, with full freedom of political expression, a free press or respect 
for individual rights and liberties, nonetheless the reforms appeared “to have 
legs,” and “the excellent state of Canada–China relations puts Canada in a 
favoured position to take advantage of China’s opening up and moderniza-
tion” (Cabinet of Canada 1987: Volume 38, File 20-1-2). In a telegram dated 
February 6, 1987, the Ambassador reminded Ottawa that it should proceed 
with caution and temper optimism with a measure of realism:
A hardnosed look would lead us to conclude that the return on our invest-
ment (over and above Chinese expressions and sentiments of friendship 
and goodwill) have not been impressive, other than a sustained market 
for our wheat (which the Chinese buy because they need it) and recent 
encouraging sales of high tech end products. We can cite no evidence that 
the lustre of the Maple Leaf or the memory of Norman Bethune, despite 
all our eff orts and our investment of human and fi nancial resources, have 
persuaded Chinese negotiators to opt for sourcing their requirements in 
Canada. (Cabinet of Canada 1987)
Th e Ambassador “welcomed the general thrust” of the draft Strategy, 
“especially the mandate to coordinate more eff ectively the new interests 
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of the various government departments and agencies that previously were 
not involved with China.” He was critical, however, of several parts of 
the draft. In his opinion, targeting ministerial visits to sectoral priorities 
was a good idea, but would be almost impossible to achieve. In addi-
tion, “dialogue will not produce Chinese recognition of Canada as a 
world power. If we want to improve our knowledge of China and train 
more Chinese-language speakers, we need to provide substantially more 
resources to move out of the quill pen era.” Th e Strategy recommended 
that Canada should help to promote Chinese exports to Canada, in 
order to reduce the large Canadian surplus in trade with China, but the 
Ambassador wondered whether this was a useful strategy, since Canada 
would be building up China’s capacity to become our trade competi-
tor. He also thought that the comments about China’s rapid economic 
development were oversimplifi ed. China’s absorption of Western technol-
ogy and management principles required social and political liberaliza-
tion, and China would encounter many diffi  culties in disengaging from 
its authoritarian past and present. He noted that “the principles which 
have governed Canada’s relationship to China remain valid” and that the 
Strategy could build on what had already been achieved. Nevertheless, he 
cautioned Ottawa: “Don’t be mesmerized by the sheer size of China and 
this current shift in PRC policy.”
Selections from the Text of the China Strategy
Th e document is an impressive summary of informed Canadian thinking 
about China at the time, with an equally convincing set of assumptions and 
policy recommendations for future action. In this section I present a few 
highlights from the document.
On China’s commitment to reform:
China’s modern history has been marked by a realization that it cannot 
become a major power without accepting foreign technology and manage-
ment techniques, and also by a deeply xenophobic reaction to the penetra-
tion of western ideas and philosophy…. Th e long-term durability of the 
reform programme is not to be taken for granted…. China is unlikely to 
waver from its objective to become a modern industrial power in the short-
est possible time…. To achieve this status is a matter of urgency and pride 
for all Chinese, “reformers” and “conservatives” alike.
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On China’s key political and strategic role:
A nuclear weapon state, China is a major military power, a key player in 
the Asia–Pacifi c region, which is increasingly vital to Canada’s long-term 
security and economic prosperity. China’s relations with the United States 
have become increasingly warm, although United States policy towards 
Taiwan, including arms sales, hinders Sino-American cooperation. Th e 
situation in Asia remains volatile. Th e Soviet Union, perceived by China 
as its main threat, occupies Afghanistan, subsidizes an expansionist 
Vietnam, arms Filipino rebels, and is increasingly close to a dangerously 
unpredictable North Korea…. Annual ministerial-level consultations on 
security issues are essential to promote a growing convergence of security 
interests with China.
On Canada’s relations with Taiwan:
Th e one-China policy has been the cornerstone of Canada’s mutually ben-
efi cial relationship with the PRC since 1970. Canada does not maintain 
offi  cial relations with Taiwan, but the government encourages people-
to-people contacts. Th e recent establishment by the Canadian Chamber 
of Commerce of an offi  ce in Taipei should result in better access to a 
potentially lucrative market.
On Canadian development assistance to China:
CIDA’s involvement in China was a logical step in the construction 
of Canada’s bilateral relationship. Development assistance responds 
to real needs in China, particularly in the area of technology transfer 
and human resources. Canada’s programme is now one of the largest in 
China, ranking second only to Japan’s. CIDA’s philosophy is to build 
upon China’s open-door policy designed to acquire Western technolo-
gies and skills … in jointly identifi ed sectors where Canadian expertise 
meets Chinese priorities, for example, agriculture, energy, and forestry, 
as well as telecommunications and transportation. CIDA also provides 
pre-project studies through its Industrial Cooperation Division. Th ese 
provide substantial opportunities for Canadian companies with com-
mercial interests.
On trade issues:
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Th e composition of Canada–China trade has undergone major changes. 
Over the past two decades Canada has enjoyed a large surplus in our 
bilateral trade, largely as a result of strong grain and resource exports. 
Th e gap has shrunk in recent years…. Large rapid gains in the sales 
of Chinese clothing and textiles account for the declining defi cit with 
Canada…. Negotiations to renew the clothing restraint schedules 
ended without an agreement this January…. Chinese textile exporters 
still have room to manoeuvre, moving “up market” or into unrestrained 
categories. Grain sales have been the core of Canada’s exporting success 
in China…. As China’s wheat production has increased in the early 
1980s, Canadian sales have declined…. Th e dramatic recent drop in 
world wheat prices slashed receipts to Canada by almost one half. New 
suppliers have entered the fray and competition is felt from expanding 
Chinese production capacities.
Overall conditions for doing business in China are becoming increas-
ingly complex (decentralization of decision-making, fi nancial reform, the 
evolving regulatory environment, are examples of this trend)…. To launch 
joint ventures in a complicated and unfamiliar environment, where foreign 
exchange is scarce, Canadians must be well-informed, persistent, and adap-
tive. Hence, government support should be directed in a selective fashion 
to those Canadian companies that have products/technology/expertise 
that respond to China’s priority requirements, and the “staying power” to 
weather both economic ups and downs, and the slow approval process—we 
are seeing encouraging progress in our capital goods sector. For example, 
Babcock & Wilcox have sold steam generators worth 203 million dollars, 
and are in close pursuit of similar contracts. Oil and gas equipment sales 
were [worth] almost 120 million dollars in 1986. Super heavy mining vehi-
cles represented some 70 million dollars of exports.
On competition in the China market:
China is a fi ercely competitive market. Japan, the United States, Hong 
Kong, and Germany are the most important exporters to China, with 
Canada ranking a distant fi fth. Japan’s remarkable success in China 
is based on a corporate culture which recognizes the need for long-
term commitment, the presence of over 250 trade offi  ces throughout 
China, and an industrial and trading house capability that can deal 
with Chinese requirements for counter trade and commodity trade pur-
chases for export sales.
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Th e Americans sell fewer consumer durables than the Japanese, but 
successfully compete in China in the heavy industry, oil and gas, mining, 
and transportation sectors … a result of the proven quality of American 
technology and the staying power of the multinationals. Th e Australians 
have adopted a successful trade strategy which targets limited public and 
private resources to sectors where Australian companies are internation-
ally competitive, for example, iron and steel, wool, textiles, non-ferrous 
metals, transportation, communications, and coal. Th is targeted and 
pragmatic approach is more relevant to the Canadian situation.
(It should be noted that in 1983 Australia had adopted a China Action 
Plan, which in several respects was similar to the Canadian China Strategy. 
Four years later, Canadian offi  cials consulted with their Australian counter-
parts when drafting the Canadian Strategy.)
On Canadian government activities in China:
Various federal line departments and agencies have been active in China 
for several years. While the Programme for Export Market Development 
and the Promotional Projects Programme are the prime programmes for 
export promotion, the federal government has recently provided funding 
for new tools specifi cally targeted to China. Th ese include the 350-mil-
lion-dollar concessional fi nancing facility administered by EDC. Th e 
CIDA Technical Cooperation Programme is designed to provide funding 
for feasibility studies. Th e National Trade Strategy, which was adopted in 
the fall of 1985, supported the opening of the Shanghai Consulate and 
the resources to create two new trade offi  cer positions in Beijing.
While appreciative of government assistance, business groups are con-
cerned about the lack of focus of government eff orts and the potential dupli-
cation of federal, provincial and municipal programmes…. Business groups 
have also voiced a need for more in-depth analysis and identifi cation of com-
mercial opportunities. Federal government fi nancial assistance should be 
channelled into sectors where it can make the greatest diff erence, i.e., energy, 
agriculture, communications, transportation, and resource development.
On academic, community and non-government organizations:
Many leading Canadian academics are actively involved in the promotion of 
exchange programmes with China, often as advisers to provincial or munici-
pal governments. Several have served in our Embassy in Beijing and have 
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maintained close ties with the federal government. Th eir advice is regularly 
sought. Several NGOs (Amnesty International) are increasingly active in pur-
suing human rights and other questions in China. Continued consultations 
are under way with them to ascertain the appropriate means to conduct a 
useful dialogue on such sensitive issues with the Chinese government.
Th e Strategy did not mention human rights other than in these two 
brief sentences, even though Prime Minister Mulroney had confronted 
Zhao Ziyang on these issues in Beijing in 1986, and his government had 
signalled its intention to elevate the discussion of human rights issues to a 
more prominent place in the bilateral relationship.
In the fi rst of two annexes to the Strategy the government discussed 
how to improve its links with the private sector. Separate meetings were 
held with executives of the Canadian Export Association, the Canadian 
Chamber of Commerce, the Canada–China Trade Council and eleven 
companies that traded with China. Th e business associations fl agged the 
following concerns: “an urgent need for better control over the growing 
number of visits to China; insuffi  cient knowledge of the China market; the 
need for long-term corporate and fi nancial commitment; learning how to 
set up joint ventures [and] how to utilize government programmes.” Th ey 
also reaffi  rmed the value of “carefully selected and timed visits to China by 
federal ministers attuned to trade objectives,” and recommended better, 
more competitive fi nancing arrangements and a “Canada Inc.” approach 
to China that would link government and business more closely together.
In a second annex the government attached its communications plan, 
stating that “Canadians appear to regard China as a country of priority 
foreign policy importance.” However, it would be
a challenge for Canada to channel Canadians’ general and sometimes 
romanticized notions about China along more realistic and construc-
tive lines…. Public opinion would support a government initiative 
to make our relations with China more productive, particularly one 
directly linked to furthering Canadian economic interests and generat-
ing jobs for Canadians.
Th e annex added that the growing Chinese ethnic community in Canada 
“would support new government initiatives with respect to China.” 
Canadians were to be given the following message by the government as it 
carried out the provisions of the China Strategy:
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It is in the interest of all Canadians that relations with China be concluded 
in the context of a national strategy that gives coherence to exchanges tak-
ing place at all levels of government, by NGOS and by the private sec-
tor…. A successful further development of relations with China means 
potential prosperity and jobs for Canadians.
Th e senior staff  at the Canadian Embassy in Beijing would be enlisted to 
go on comprehensive speaking tours across every region of Canada, and “a 
slide show, emphasizing and standardizing our message, will be developed 
for use by government speakers at service clubs, trade organizations, and 
other targeted audiences.” Canadian media would have to be briefed to 
support the new China Strategy:
Th e government will conduct seminars and background sessions for 
Canadian journalists…. Some elements of the Canadian media may seek 
to criticize extensive ministerial travel to the PRC as envisaged in the work 
plan. One way to attenuate such criticism is to ensure that visas are linked to 
specifi c and identifi ed goals, and cast as part of a coherent approach to China.
In April 1987 the Strategy was announced quietly, without much fan-
fare, through a press release concerning a future visit to China by Pat Car-
ney, Minister of International Trade. Carney and Joe Clark, the Minister 
for Foreign Aff airs, were to speak at various venues in support of the Strat-
egy, as would other ministers,
before and after their planned trips to the PRC…. Members of Parliament 
and Senators are to be briefed on the Strategy, and information suit-
able for use in their constituencies [is to be] made available to them…. 
Minister Clark will send a letter to the Chairman of the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on External Aff airs and International Trade and 
to the Caucus Foreign Aff airs Committee outlining the elements of this 
more strategic approach to relations with China.
Th e Strategy in Historical Perspective
Th e China Strategy is an impressive document. It aptly summarizes the state 
of relations between Canada and China at a key point in time, and outlines an 
action plan to provide focus and substance to the future relationship. To my 
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knowledge, Canada has never since produced a similar document, although 
over the past twenty-three years DFAIT has occasionally attempted less ambi-
tious strategic planning exercises involving China. In 1987, its offi  cials took 
pride in what they had accomplished. Th e Strategy, in their view, maximized 
Canada’s trade objectives, strengthened government-to-government links and 
solidifi ed the new Department’s position as the coordinator and implementer, 
if not the originator, of China policy (Personal Interview 2009).
To be sure, the Strategy overemphasized trade relations with China and 
devoted minimal space to other aspects of the bilateral relationship, in par-
ticular human rights, immigration, consular aff airs and people-to-people 
links. Since 1987, these areas have become more central and now occupy a 
substantially larger portion of the relationship. In 1987, however, trade was 
the main issue motivating the creation of the Strategy. Th ese other issues 
gained more prominence in the 1990s, after the Tiananmen crisis of 1989.
In addition, the Strategy put Prime Minister Mulroney’s imprint on Can-
ada’s China policy. For twenty-one years China had belonged to Trudeau and 
the Liberals. After Mulroney’s visit to China the Strategy provided an oppor-
tunity to separate the Conservatives from the Liberal past. One therefore 
might have anticipated a China policy that downplayed the role of govern-
ment, sought to elevate Canada’s diplomatic relations with Taiwan, expressed 
suspicion of China as a Communist country, and made criticism of China’s 
failings on human rights a central element. In fact, however, the Strategy did 
none of these things. If anything, it advocated a stronger role for government, 
openly engaged China, reaffi  rmed the “one China” policy and omitted any 
criticism on human rights. In the words of one DFAIT offi  cial whom I spoke 
with in 1991, “What we saw, and what we were told, was continuity, with 
almost no change. To be frank, in retrospect, we hardly missed a step in the 
transition from Trudeau to Mulroney” (Personal Interview 1991).
In essence, Canada’s China policy before the Tiananmen crisis main-
tained its cross-party nature. What divided Liberals and Conservatives 
domestically appeared not to do so with respect to relations with China. 
Canadian domestic politics had a minimal impact on the bilateral relation-
ship in the 1980s. One can argue that the focus on trade development was 
in good part designed to provide an economic boost to Canada (“jobs, jobs, 
jobs”). However, economic recovery was an all-party goal and China policy 
was never an election issue. After Tiananmen, the Conservative human 
rights agenda brought a new dimension to the relationship, but the other 
parties supported this shift. When the Liberals returned to power in 1993 
and made trade the main thrust of the relationship, giving human rights a 
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lower priority, the Conservatives held back and essentially followed along. 
Only with the Harper government after 2005 did the consensus on China 
policy break apart, as the Conservatives called into question several of the 
key principles that had underlain the policy for many years.
Th e China Strategy made it clear that China was important to Canada 
and that trade was the main link. It recognized that post-Mao China had 
embarked on a new course and that it was possible for Canada to expand 
its relationship with this “new” China. At the same time, the Strategy 
tempered its optimism with caution, pointing out that expectations for 
increased bilateral trade and for political openness inside China might not 
easily be fulfi lled. In this respect, the document was prescient. Even with 
bilateral trade running at CA$ 50 billion, almost twenty-fi ve times the level 
of 1986, the economic relationship has not fully met Canadian expecta-
tions. Th ose who have wished for dramatic changes in the area of human 
rights and democracy have equally been disappointed.
When the Conservatives took power in 1984, they intended to clean house 
at the top levels of the public service. Th e rationale was that, after twenty-one 
years of Liberal rule the bureaucracy had become a handmaiden of the Lib-
eral Party in power. As noted earlier in this chapter, Mulroney had asked the 
mandarins in Ottawa, “What makes you think I should take your advice?” 
In fact, with respect to China policy the Conservatives did just that. Th ey 
worked closely with the mandarins to put together the new China policy. Th e 
China Strategy was drawn up by the bureaucrats at DFAIT in consultation 
with their political superiors, yet it was very much a product of departmental 
expertise. Th e politicians gave the signals and the bureaucrats fell in line.
Th e ongoing reorganization of the Canadian foreign aff airs bureaucracy 
played an important role. As DEA, once the “golden child” of foreign 
aff airs, saw its former prominence tarnished, its powers diluted and under 
attack, it rose to the occasion, taking charge of the merger with ITC, the 
international trade arm of the bureaucracy. Putting together the Strategy 
under DEA’s direction showed that the Ottawa political mandarins could 
respond to the challenge, at least with respect to formulating China policy. 
One DFAIT offi  cial whom I interviewed in 1994 commented:
My background was on the political side. When I got involved in the 
China Strategy, I had to widen my horizons, working with trade-ori-
ented offi  cials who sometimes lacked political and diplomatic smarts, 
and I, in turn, needed to focus more sharply on the bottom line, on 
dollars and cents. (Personal Interview 1994)
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While organization and institutions absolutely mattered in the process 
of preparing the China Strategy, so too did the work and ideas of individu-
als. Th e interplay of these two forces was a central element in the construc-
tion of the Strategy. As noted earlier, one offi  cial on his own began the 
process in 1983 and continued for three years developing agendas, coor-
dinating mechanisms, and expanding the horizons of the Strategy-in-the-
making. Th e Prime Minister stepped into the process in 1986 with his 
visit to China, and then, as another DFAIT offi  cial observed, “Th e PMO 
shaped the next stage of the process.” Subtle encouragement was also pro-
vided by key Chinese offi  cials, who were consulted both in Ottawa and in 
Beijing (Interviews 1987-1995). It is worth noting that the consultative 
process was wide, and included groups and individuals not normally part 
of the foreign policy-making process. Several round tables were convened 
under the aegis of the Foreign Minister and senior offi  cials, and a number 
of meetings of the CWG were opened to “outsiders.” Th is was one of the 
rare occasions when bureaucrats and politicians permitted the widening of 
the foreign policy community during the preparation of a policy agenda. 
Later, after Tiananmen, the China policy community again broadened to 
include groups and individuals galvanized by that crisis, notably the media, 
which were suddenly more attentive and critical, persistent human rights 
activists, and newly politicized members of Canada’s Chinese communities.
Th e Strategy met a surprising fate. While it served as a broad framework 
for Canada’s relations with China, in particular the work of the federal gov-
ernment and its partnership with business, the Strategy was hardly noticed 
at the time by the public. One DFAIT “China hand” commented that he 
did not know much about it and, while he agreed with the general thrust of 
the document, he had, in fact, never seen the complete document (Personal 
Interview 1992). As Canada began to implement many of the provisions 
of the Strategy, it was eclipsed by the events at and around Tiananmen 
Square on June 4, 1989. High-level visits, a key component of the Strategy, 
were formally suspended for three years. Some CIDA projects were frozen 
or cancelled. A pall settled over the relationship. Human rights, conspicu-
ously missing from the Strategy, suddenly became a principal public focus 
of relations until 1994, when the Liberals, back in power and led by Jean 
Chrétien, once again made trade the basis of the China relationship, with 
a visit by a large delegation of business people and federal, provincial and 
territorial leaders to Beijing and Shanghai.
Today, forty years after diplomatic relations with China were established 
and almost twenty-fi ve years after the China Strategy was created, both 
Canada and China have changed in many respects. Nevertheless, what was 
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constructed in 1986–87 remains an important reference point in the evolu-
tion of the bilateral relationship, reminding us of what was accomplished 
in the past and of the issues that continue to aff ect the relationship today.
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While conventional wisdom regards the visit of the Canadian Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper to China in December 2009 as a turning point, 
heralding warmer relations between Canada and China, a silent process 
involving China’s increasing “soft power” over Canada has been looming 
for some time. Th is chapter examines the various dimensions of Sino-
Canadian relations since Harper’s visit, including trade, immigration, tour-
ism, cross-border crime and sociocultural exchanges. At the same time, 
with hundreds of thousands of Canadians residing in Hong Kong, Canada’s 
soft power over China has been relatively neglected, an important issue that 
will also be discussed in this chapter.
Th e political scientist Joseph Nye invented the concepts of “soft power” 
and “hard power” to discuss the ways in which the foreign policies of the 
United States evolved, and to delineate how other countries in the world 
perceived US military, economic, cultural and political power (see Nye 
2004). “Hard power” refers to the military and economic might that a 
country possesses, but, as Nye emphasizes, these are not the only determi-
nants of a nation state’s success in world politics. In addition, “soft power,” 
which can co-opt others, is an infl uential tool with which foreign policy 
objectives can be achieved without the need to resort to coercion. As Nye 
has pointed out (2004, p. 5):
Hard power can rest on inducements (“carrots”) or threats (“sticks”). But 
sometimes you can get the outcomes you want without tangible threats 
Chapter 5
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or pay-off s. Th e indirect way to get what you want has sometimes been 
called “the second face of power.” …it is also important to set the agenda 
and attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to change 
by threatening military force or economic sanctions. Th is soft power—
getting others to want the outcomes you want—co-opts people rather 
than coerces them.
Nye stresses that soft power is not simply the same as infl uence, because 
it represents the ability to attract others through one’s culture and values, 
and “the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices” (Nye 2004, 
p. 7). While hard-power resources entail command behaviour, including 
force, sanctions and payments, soft-power resources embrace culture, val-
ues, institutions and policies (Nye 2004, p. 8). Using these concepts devel-
oped by Nye, this chapter argues that China’s soft power over Canada has 
gradually increased since Harper’s visit, but on the other hand, Canada’s 
soft power over China has not yet been fully used, even though the values 
and behaviour of Canadian citizens residing in Hong Kong could shape 
China’s policy toward Canada.
Stephen Harper’s Visit to China: Normalization of 
Bilateral Relations
Harper’s visit to China had signifi cant implications for the develop-
ment of Sino-Canadian relations. First and foremost, his visit was widely 
viewed, not only by Chinese leaders but also by Chinese commentators in 
Canada, as a long-overdue move that repaired the frosty relations between 
China and Harper’s Conservative government, which had come to power 
three years before.
Up to the eve of his visit to China Harper had adopted a far more aloof 
attitude toward China than any of his predecessors. Th e government of 
the Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau had recognized the People’s 
Republic in 1970, making Canada one of the fi rst Western countries to 
do so. In 1994, another Liberal Prime Minister, Jean Chrétien, had led a 
trade delegation to China and signed bilateral agreements covering projects 
to a total value of CA$ 90 billion. In 1998 Chrétien had visited China 
again and made several more trade agreements. Th ree years later he led yet 
another trade delegation to forge commercial and trade agreements worth 
CA$ 57 billion. Finally, in 2005, Liberal Prime Minister Paul Martin had 
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visited China and made eighty trade and bilateral deals, laying the ground-
work for both sides to discuss an approved destination status agreement in 
relation to Chinese tourists visiting Canada.
In contrast, Harper had long been seen as relatively anti-Communist, 
if not necessarily anti-Chinese, primarily because the ideology of Harper’s 
Conservative Party sees socialist regimes as undemocratic and ideologi-
cally incompatible. Most importantly, under the Conservative government 
Canada appeared to see China as a threat, and had off ered support to the 
Dalai Lama, who is seen by the Chinese government as fostering separatist 
sentiment in Tibet. Harper did not attend the opening ceremony of the 
Beijing Olympics in 2008, a decision that was taken as a sign of a disre-
spectful attitude toward China and a lack of understanding of the concept 
of mianzi (“face” or honour; see Schiller 2009a). China had also taken note 
of the Canadian media’s frequent claims about Chinese spies in Canada, 
interpreting them as signs of mutual distrust between the two countries.
In February 2009, in response to a question as to why Harper had not 
visited China after he became Prime Minister, Stockwell Day, Minister of 
International Trade, argued that Harper had had to deal with the global 
fi nancial crisis in 2008, as well as pressing domestic issues and a general 
election. Th e frosty relations between China and Canada were broken by 
the visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to Ottawa in June 
2009, when he invited Harper to pay a visit to China. Harper accepted 
Yang’s invitation and his eventual visit was widely viewed as a water-
shed in resuming a more normal and harmonious relationship between 
Canada and China.
Harper’s visit led the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to make some public 
criticisms of Canada’s tardiness in maintaining friendship with China, say-
ing that the visit “should have taken place earlier” and that he hoped “we 
are able to fi x our problem of mutual trust” (as quoted in Schiller 2009b). 
In the Toronto Sun Michael Den Tandt (2009b) reacted strongly to Wen’s 
remarks in an editorial piece headed “Standing Up for Canada”:
Th e Chinese premier took the “unprecedented step” (gasp!) of upbraid-
ing Prime Minister Stephen Harper (cringe!) at a press conference. What 
does it mean? … Will trade with China suff er? Th e Chinese Premier …
was in a press conference with Harper to begin with because China needs 
Canada. China continues to require access to the North American mar-
ket, which includes Canada. China continues to require access to our 
natural resources. Canada is a sovereign nation, one of the wealthiest on 
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the planet, with a proud, able people, blessed with values and institutions 
that are the envy of the world. China’s governing elite, in particular, could 
learn a lot from Canada…. Trade? By all means. But we don’t need to 
take dictation from any foreign leader, certainly not Premier Wen Jiabao. 
Let him sputter. Now let’s carry on, advancing our values and interests, 
as always.
Indeed, China does need Canada, but Canada also needs China’s huge 
economic market. From the perspective of the Chinese leadership, Harper 
should have visited Beijing much earlier to demonstrate Canada’s eagerness 
to treat China as a friendly state. Wen’s comment could be seen as a sign that 
he did not give mianzi (face) to Harper, just as Harper, whose advisers were 
apparently ignorant of this Chinese tradition, had failed to give mianzi when 
he skipped the Beijing Olympics. Th e Ming Pao, a Chinese-language news-
paper in Toronto, argued (December 4, 2009) that Wen’s remarks were “not 
a sign of China making Harper lose face,” but the reality is that the question 
of face is critical in Chinese political and cultural tradition. Th e Liberal Party 
leader Michael Ignatieff  was not the only observer who thought that Harper 
had indeed lost face when Wen reprimanded him.
Chinese leaders also perceived Harper’s Conservative government as 
being too close to the Republican administration of George W. Bush in the 
United States, in that both governments saw China as a threat rather than 
as a cooperative partner. Following the victory of the Democratic candidate 
Barack Obama in the U.S. presidential election in November 2008, the 
Conservative government in Canada gradually shifted toward a more Real-
politik, less ideological approach to China. Th e wind of political change in 
Sino-Canadian relations in late 2009 was to a large extent a refl ection of 
Obama’s victory. After all, Canada’s mainstream political currents are often 
shaped by the political transformations of its giant neighbour.
Despite the lateness in resuming a more friendly relationship between 
the two countries, China conferred a “gift” upon the Harper government 
by granting Canada approved destination status, which meant that the 
number of Chinese tourists visiting Canada would increase by 40,000 
to 50,000 a year, with a likely boost in annual tourist revenues of CA$ 
100 million (see Schiller 2009b). Th e Canadian tourist industry warmly 
welcome this move, as at least 70,000 Chinese tourists would visit Toronto 
each year and the knock-on eff ects on the property market, the retail sec-
tor, restaurants and casinos would be tremendous. In particular, many 
more Chinese would visit friends and relatives in cities such as Vancouver, 
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Toronto and Calgary. With 1.2 million ethnic Chinese residing in Can-
ada, many of them have their family roots entrenched in Canadian soil, 
but retain family and emotional ties with Greater China (understood here 
as comprising mainland China itself, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan). 
Th e granting of approved destination status to Canada represents a land-
mark, not only in the further acceleration of human interactions between 
the two countries, but also in the strengthening of the family, identity 
and emotional bonds between the Chinese in Greater China and the eth-
nic Chinese in Canada. Harper’s visit undoubtedly was a watershed in the 
deepening of human interactions between Canada and Greater China.
Harper’s visit also symbolized belated Canadian recognition of the 
rapid economic and global rise of China. In a speech delivered in Shang-
hai to the Canada–China Business Council and the Canadian Chamber 
of Commerce (Ming Pao, December 5, 2009), Harper said that the ori-
entation of Canada’s trade had shifted to East Asia, that the promotion of 
free trade was his government’s policy, and that the ethnic Chinese had 
played a positive and signifi cant role in the construction of the Canadian 
Pacifi c Railway. Clearly, Harper was trying to acknowledge the positive 
contributions of Chinese to Canada and to reorient Canadian trade pol-
icy toward the global emergence of China, which has become a lucrative 
market for Canadian business. Harper also announced in Shanghai that 
Canada would set up four additional trade offi  ces in China. Th e rapid 
global emergence of China has forced the Harper government to become 
far more pragmatic than before.
President Hu’s Visit to Canada in June 2010
In June 2010, President Hu Jintao visited Canada to discuss fi ve areas 
for further cooperation (Sing Tao Daily, June 25, 2010): the expan-
sion of bilateral trade involving high-technology products, with both 
Canada and China attempting to elevate the value of this trade to US$ 
600 billion; the promotion of bilateral investment in building ports, 
railways, telecommunications networks and other infrastructure proj-
ects in China’s western, central and northeastern provinces; the deep-
ening of cooperation in the use of nuclear power and natural gas; the 
development of new frontiers of cooperation, such as high technology, 
service industries and the “green economy”; and opposition to any form 
of protectionism.
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Th e focus on cooperation in high-tech development and energy is note-
worthy. China lacks suffi  cient supplies of technical expertise and energy to 
sustain its rapid pace of economic development, and Canada, with its endow-
ments of technical education and natural resources, serves as a very critical 
source of both. In September 2009, for example, PetroChina had announced 
plans to invest CA$ 19 billion in acquiring sixty percent of the ownership of 
certain oil sands projects in Alberta (Sing Tao Daily, September 1, 2009). Th e 
strategic aspect of Hu’s visit to Canada was clear, although its implications 
seem to have been neglected by many Canadian observers. Signifi cant break-
throughs were also achieved in other dimensions of Sino-Canadian relations. 
China announced that it would set up Chinese cultural centres in Canada, 
and both sides agreed on enhancing the numbers of Chinese tourists vis-
iting Canada; promoting educational exchanges; increasing cooperation on 
environmental protection, energy-saving, food inspection, crime control and 
oil sands; establishing cooperation between the Chinese Import and Export 
Bank and Canada’s telecommunication industry; creating a partnership 
between Guangdong’s nuclear power enterprise and its Canadian counter-
part; and collaborating on mining and resource extraction.
Hu’s visit was recognized by the Canadian mass media as a crucial turn-
ing point, signalling the return to the good old days of Sino-Canadian 
relations. As the Toronto Star on June 25, 2010 remarked in an editorial of 
“China’s leader reaches out”:
Hu spoke of wanting to “further scale up cooperation” and “move for-
ward the strategic partnership” between China and Canada. Th at’s stan-
dard, polite rhetoric, but it is nonetheless reassuring after a period of 
chilly relations…. China is now playing a larger role in the G20…. [It] is 
the new “indispensable” country. Beijing bolstered the G20 consensus on 
stimulus that helped avert a depression. It supports reform of the fi nan-
cial system. China’s move to revalue its undervalued currency is a positive 
(if fl edgling) signal that it takes its leading role seriously. Politically, China 
can help thwart the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran. It is also a 
big power in African development and in managing climate change…. To 
be sure, Canada’s disagreement with Beijing on democracy, human rights, 
and espionage are still deeply felt. Indeed, our own spy chief triggered an 
ill-timed ruckus on the eve of Hu’s visit by all but confi rming that China 
is one of several countries trying to infl uence our policy-makers…. But 
disagreements, however profound, need to be managed, not exacerbated. 
Th at’s something the ideologically driven Conservatives took a long time 
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to recognize. Modern Canada/China ties now go back forty years, to the 
Trudeau era. Hu’s idea for an enhanced partnership could usher in an 
even more productive fi fth decade.
Th e Fear of Chinese “Espionage” in Canada
Before Hu’s visit Richard Fadden, head of the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service (CSIS), claimed that China had infi ltrated a number of spies into 
political circles in Canada at the federal, provincial and municipal levels. 
Fadden’s claims were met with criticism by some Canadian commentators, 
who believed that the accusations had no concrete basis, and also provoked 
heated discussions within the Chinese community in Canada. One retired 
political scientist, Reg Whitaker, told the Toronto Star (June 24, 2010): 
“For CSIS to make unspecifi ed allegations on national television without 
apparently contacting the provincial government and federal government is 
something you and I, and the general public, shouldn’t hear about.” Olivia 
Chow of the New Democratic Party told the Sing Tao Daily (June 25, 
2010) that Fadden’s remarks were “irresponsible.”
In fact, analysts familiar with China’s “united front” strategy, which 
is aimed at winning the hearts and minds of Chinese and non-Chinese 
alike, do not see it as having any subversive impact on Canadian security. 
China sets out to make friends with foreign offi  cials, politicians, and over-
seas Chinese, as well as Chinese compatriots in Hong Kong, Macau and 
Taiwan (see Lo 2008 and Loh 2010). Lobbying Canadian offi  cials and 
politicians, and even Canadian Chinese community leaders, is a normal 
use of “soft power” in the Chinese political tradition. Nevertheless, some 
Canadian commentators and politicians see such work as subversive. One 
Conservative member of Parliament, Rob Anders, claimed that two other 
members of the House of Commons had received business favours and 
sexual services from Chinese agents (Ming Pao, July 31, 2010). Critics 
responded that, unless he could point out specifi c examples, such claims 
appeared to exaggerate the impact of China’s eff orts on the behaviour of 
Canadian politicians.
From a conservative security perspective, the Canadian fear of poten-
tial Chinese espionage is understandable. Canada is the neighbour of its 
superpower friend and long-term ally the United States, and is endowed 
with strategic natural resources. China’s ability to infl uence Canada’s poli-
cies and tap its high-tech developmental skills, commercial knowledge and 
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energy resources, is arguably indispensable in the augmentation of China’s 
soft power not only in relation to Canada but also in relation to the United 
States. However, any security threat from China is often overstated in the 
Canadian media and political circles, which are infl uenced, to some extent, 
by anti-Communist and anti-China sentiment emanating not only from 
within Canada but also from the United States. Huge controversy was 
aroused, for example, in September 2009, when three Chinese community 
groups, Canada ALPHA, BC ALPHA and Toronto ALPHA, went to court 
to seek an injunction against Nest of Spies: Th e Startling Truth about Foreign 
Agents at Work within Canada’s Borders, a book in which Fabrice de Pier-
rebourg, a journalist, and Michel Juneau-Katsuya, a former offi  cer of CSIS, 
made allegations about industrial espionage conducted on behalf of a num-
ber of countries, including China. In a settlement of the case in November, 
the publisher HarperCollins Canada agreed to remove certain sections of 
the book that were deemed to be “defamatory.”
Th e establishment of Confucius Institutes has also aroused some contro-
versy (see Little 2010). Since 2004 the Chinese government has supported 
the establishment of about 300 Confucius Institutes in various parts of the 
world, including seven at McMaster University, the University of Waterloo 
and other locations in Canada (Ming Pao, June 26, 2010). Th ese institutes 
can be seen as part of an eff ort by the Chinese government to shape per-
ceptions of China through the propagation of Chinese culture, language, 
literature and art. Th e use of cultural and other non-political means of 
infl uencing the ways in which foreigners and overseas Chinese view China 
is nothing new. Confucius Institutes have been supported by the Ministry 
of Education inside China, and it is not surprising that the instructors sent 
out to work in them are politically acceptable to the government. However, 
as long as Canadian students and other members of the public attending 
these institutes are politically independent and retain their capacity for crit-
ical thinking, any eff ort made by an instructor to subject them to political 
propaganda would be futile, and might well elicit negative reactions from 
those who support the idea that human rights and democratic values are 
universally applicable.
Human Rights Concerns
Perhaps the most prominent diff erence between Stephen Harper’s 
Conservative government and the Chinese regime is over human rights. 
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Harper’s sympathetic support for the Dalai Lama and his reiteration of 
the importance of human rights, the rule of law and freedom during his 
visit to China in December 2009 are suffi  cient indications of this diff er-
ence. Critics have pointed to what they regard as inconsistency on this 
issue, as, for example, when the Canadian government appeared to appease 
the Chinese regime by preventing New Tang Dynasty TV and the Epoch 
Times from attending President Hu’s public appearance in Ottawa in June 
2010 (see Delacourt 2010). However, this incident was an exception, and 
contrasted with Canada’s longstanding practice of expressing concern for 
human rights in China. In February 2009, for example, the Canadian 
immigration authorities issued a permit for a Chinese dissident journal-
ist, Jiang Weiping, to enter Canada. Jiang had been arrested in China 
in December 2000 and released from detention in January 2006 (World 
Journal, February 10, 2009). According to Jiang, he was thrown into 
prison because of his investigative reports on a corruption case involving 
the Mayor of Shenyang, a city in northeastern China. His case aroused 
the concern of some overseas Chinese human rights activists in Canada, 
whose eff orts on his behalf helped to ensure that he and his family could 
immigrate to Canada. Jason Kenney, Canada’s Minister of Citizenship, 
Immigration and Multiculturalism, insisted that Jiang’s case did not really 
aff ect Sino-Canadian relations (Today Daily News, February 8, 2009).
Concern about human rights is also articulated by some ethnic Chinese 
and Tibetan groups in Canada. Before Harper’s visit to China the Canadian 
Chinese Express reported (November 27, 2009) that some Canadian Chinese 
groups had lobbied the foreign minister, Lawrence Cannon, in favour of a 
more assertive policy on the protection of human rights in China. Accord-
ing to the Today Daily News (December 2, 2009), these groups included 
the Toronto Association in Support of China’s Democratic Movement, the 
Free Tibet (Canadian) Association and the Canadian branch of Amnesty 
International. While the Liberal Party’s international trade commentator 
Scott Brison criticized the Conservative government for paying too much 
attention to human rights issues rather than trade, a public opinion survey 
conducted by Angus Reid on December 1 and 2, 2009, showed that, of 
1,006 respondents, sixty-eight percent agreed that Canada should devote 
more attention to human rights than to trade with respect to countries 
known for human rights violations, including China (Ming Pao, December 
3, 2009). Hence, the Conservative government’s emphasis on human rights 
in China is a policy in conformity with the mainstream values of Canadian 
society. Th is explains why Harper insisted that he would not give up on 
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human rights issues for the sake of trade with China, even though his stress 
on the supremacy of human rights did not meet with applause from his 
audience in Shanghai. Similarly, when Hu Jintao visited Ottawa in June 
2010, Harper insisted that he would raise human rights with the Chinese 
President. Critics and skeptics may question whether such political gestures 
are of any use, yet the Canadian government’s position is that, in express-
ing concern for human rights, Harper and other Canadian politicians are 
expressing the values of most Canadians, who cherish multiculturalism, 
civil liberties, human rights, the rule of law and political tolerance.
In a speech delivered at Tsinghua University in Beijing, Michael Ignatieff , 
the leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, said that Canada could contribute 
more to the promotion of human rights and the strengthening of the rule 
of law through human interactions than through diplomatic activity, and 
emphasized that the Chinese people themselves, rather than foreigners, were 
responsible for resolving issues of human rights, religious freedom, economic 
liberalization and the use of the death penalty (Ming Pao, July 6, 2010). Igna-
tieff  thus appears to have adopted a more diplomatic approach to the sensi-
tive issue of human rights than Harper, even though he had been Director 
of Harvard University’s Carr Center for Human Rights before his return to 
Canada in 2006. Ignatieff  also said that Canadians should admit the progress 
made by China in the area of human rights protection, including its eff orts 
at reducing poverty. It may be argued that, from the perspective of managing 
mianzi and understanding Chinese culture, Ignatieff  is ahead of Harper, but 
critics have maintained that the Liberal Party is all too often “soft on China” 
(see, for example, Den Tandt 2009a). In any case, the Canadian political elite 
in general cannot shy away from concern for human rights in their interac-
tions with China, and the diff erences with Beijing on this issue will certainly 
persist in the foreseeable future.
Th e Lai Changxing Case and the Politics of Extradition
Th e case of Lai Changxing illustrates the dilemmas faced by the Canadian gov-
ernment in coping with China. On the one hand, the Canadian government 
has to respect the human rights of individuals, including Lai, who escaped 
from the province of Fujian to Canada, by way of Hong Kong, in 1999. Th e 
Chinese authorities accused Lai of fi nancing a multi-billion-dollar operation 
smuggling cigarettes and fuel into Fujian, bribing offi  cials and military offi  cers, 
and avoiding taxes, but, after a long process of legal actions, Lai was allowed to 
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stay in Canada, on the grounds that, if he were sent back to China, he would 
face the death penalty. In compliance with the Canadian court’s judgment, 
the authorities granted Lai a work permit, a move that aroused the anger of 
the Chinese government. Th e Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Jiang Yu 
said: “Th e Chinese government is unwavering and consistent in its position 
that the fugitive Lai Changxing return to face trial under Chinese law. We have 
already made serious representations to the Canadian side.” Another complex 
immigration case involved two brothers who worked in a branch of the People’s 
Bank of China in Harbin. Th ey were regarded by the Chinese government as 
“corrupt elements,” but after both men entered Canada their lawyer argued 
that, if they were sent back to China, they would face physical abuse or even 
the death penalty. Th e Supreme Court of Canada was not convinced by the risk 
assessment submitted by the immigration authorities, and the brothers were 
detained. Th e court also said, however, that the argument against Canadian 
protection of the two brothers was weak, and ordered that a new risk assess-
ment should be conducted by another group of immigration offi  cials. Th eir 
assessment favoured the two brothers, who then applied for landed immigrant 
status in Canada. Both these cases demonstrated not only the independence of 
Canada’s judicial system, but also the determination of the Chinese authorities 
to have those it regards as criminals tried and punished. Th e two cases also 
prompted both China and Canada to look into the possibility of negotiating 
an extradition agreement, although Lai has said that he is not afraid of such an 
agreement because he is not a criminal.
Both China and Canada are signatories of the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Corruption. Th e offi  cial Chinese view is that if corrupt indi-
viduals escape from China to other parts of the world, including Canada, 
the Chinese government has a duty to prevent the outfl ow of the proceeds of 
these individuals’ crimes. A formal extradition agreement would bring about 
the return of criminal suspects from Canada to China, but an agreement 
on the proceeds of crime would close the legal and practical loopholes that, 
according to the Chinese government, allow criminals to take state assets with 
them when they leave China. From the Canadian perspective, having formal 
agreements in place on extradition and the proceeds of crime would help to 
prevent Canada from becoming a haven for Chinese criminals, especially 
now that economic liberalization has stimulated an increase in cross-border 
crime across Greater China (see Lo 2009). Accordingly, in December 2009, 
the two governments agreed on a joint declaration on cross-border crime, 
and in January 2010, the Canadian government made the unprecedented 
decision to return to China a Chinese citizen, Cui Zhili, who was accused 
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of involvement in an insurance fraud worth CNY 16 million in Beijing in 
2002, and who had escaped to Canada in January 2003. Th e return of Cui to 
China raised the question whether Lai Changxing might also be extradited, 
but, more importantly, the Cui case showed that it was possible for both sides 
to use administrative arrangements to tackle the issue of cross-border crime.
Th e Neglected Hong Kong Factor in Enhancing Canada’s Soft 
Power over China
When Stephen Harper visited Hong Kong in December 2009 he remarked 
that, with 200,000 Canadians residing there, Hong Kong was actually the 
largest Canadian city outside Canada. In total, 292,000 Canadians reside 
in Greater China. Moreover, about 100,000 people from Hong Kong have 
studied in Canada. Th e Canadian Chamber of Commerce has a membership 
of 1,200 in Hong Kong, making it the largest Canadian business organization 
outside Canada. In 2009, immigrants from Hong Kong to Canada topped 
the three categories of economic migrants, immigrants to Quebec and other 
provinces, and family reunions, outstripping the numbers of immigrants 
from mainland China and Taiwan. In many respects, then, Hong Kong occu-
pies a central place in Canada’s relations with Greater China.
Nevertheless, the Canadian government has not yet tapped the human 
resources and “soft power” connected with the Hong Kong factor in Sino-
Canadian relations. Many politicians in Hong Kong, especially the demo-
crats, have Canadian linkages or heritage to some degree. For instance, Albert 
Chan Wai-yip, the leader of the League of Social Democrats, studied in Can-
ada and was a Canadian citizen before he renounced Canadian citizenship to 
participate in legislative elections in Hong Kong during the 1990s. Cyd Ho, 
a member of the legislature, also studied in Canada, while the deputy minis-
ter Greg So was formerly a lawyer practising in Canada, and also renounced 
Canadian citizenship when he became one of the appointed offi  cials of the 
Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region. Th e former health offi  cial Marga-
ret Chan studied at the University of Western Ontario (she is now Director 
General of the World Health Organization). Th e current Financial Secre-
tary, John Tsang, formerly worked in Canada, while the former treasury chief 
Frederic Ma Si-hang also resided in Canada before he returned to work in 
Hong Kong. Many Canadians participated in the mass protests and parade 
against the maladministration of Tung Chee-hwa’s government on July 1, 
2003 (as the former Canadian Consul General, Tony Burger, pointed out to 
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me during a meeting and discussion in June 2004). Given these and other 
close linkages between Hong Kong and Canada, it is at least arguable that the 
Canadian government should reassess its lack of a policy for using the soft 
power of Hong Kong Canadians in relations with China.
Th e absence of a clear and explicit Canadian policy on the Hong Kong 
element in Sino-Canadian relations is attributable to several factors. First and 
foremost, the human resources of the Canadian Consulate in Hong Kong are 
weak and inadequate for handling any “united front work” comparable to 
what the Chinese government is doing in Canada. Second, while the Harper 
government realizes the signifi cance of Hong Kong as the “largest Canadian 
city outside Canada,” it has no concrete policy measures, not to mention 
policy advice, on how to translate the hidden soft power of Canadians in 
Hong Kong into an eff ective instrument for articulating Canadian interests. 
Canada lacks Hong Kong experts to balance the infl uence of those Sinolo-
gists who tend to view mainland China as being far more signifi cant than 
Hong Kong. Th ird, a few diplomats in the Canadian Foreign Service may 
identify the hidden infl uence and soft power of Canadians in Hong Kong, 
but since they are often rotated to work in diff erent places, their expertise and 
knowledge on Hong Kong are constantly lost or underused. As a result, the 
Hong Kong factor has been largely neglected by the Canadian political and 
diplomatic establishment. Th e human resources of the Canadian Consul-
ate in Hong Kong need to be increased so that more staff  can be devoted to 
networking with Canadian individuals and groups in Hong Kong, organiz-
ing activities and sharing information so that a strong network and database 
can be established. Th is potentially powerful Canadian community would 
be able to infl uence various Chinese policies not only toward Hong Kong 
itself but also toward Canada. Th e existing Canadian groups in Hong Kong, 
including the Canadian Chamber of Commerce and the Canadian Club, 
should not be complacent, but should expand their membership, and educa-
tional exchange programmes and cultural cooperation projects should be bet-
ter organized under the leadership of Canadian offi  cials. Th e talents available 
in Greater China can be identifi ed and tapped so that they can contribute to 
the specifi c needs of Canada’s rapidly changing society.
Conclusion
Since December 2009, the Conservative government of Canada has belat-
edly established more friendly relations and cooperative partnerships with 
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the Chinese government in a number of areas, including trade, tourism 
and crime control. Th is shift in Canada’s foreign policy has also triggered 
an unintended dialectical process of enhancing Beijing’s soft power over 
Ottawa. Canada is geopolitically located beside the United States, whose 
relations with China have oscillated ever since the founding of the People’s 
Republic in 1949, and it is therefore understandable that China has sought 
to augment its soft power over Canada, if only as a means to infl uence 
opinion in the United States.
Engaging China should not be seen as simply having a subversive impact 
on Canada, as the constant fear of Chinese espionage in Canada suggests. 
Rather, engaging China means that Canada can and should maintain its 
tradition of supporting human rights development in the world, and that 
Canada must reassess its lack of any “united front” policy toward the Chinese 
residing in Greater China, notably in Hong Kong, where so many Canadian 
citizens live, work and raise their families. A new Canadian policy toward 
Hong Kong and, by implication, toward China as a whole, should ideally be 
adopted, in order to win the hearts and minds of Hong Kong Canadians and 
non-Canadians through enhanced cultural, social and educational exchanges 
and improved diplomatic organization and coordination. Given that many 
Chinese in Greater China appear to have a favourable perception of Canada 
as a country endowed with political tolerance, economic affl  uence, educa-
tional quality and social stability, adopting a more proactive policy toward 
Greater China would enhance Canada’s soft power over China in the long 
run. Such reciprocal moves to enhance Canada’s soft power in response to the 
gradual rise in Beijing’s soft power over Ottawa should not be seen as politi-
cally sinister. In the real world of politics, seeking to infl uence the behaviour 
and policies of other nation states is normal. If the Canadian political and 
diplomatic elite can reassess their lack of a policy for enhancing Canada’s soft 
power in Greater China, the time is ripe for its members to ponder a more 
proactive, long-term and strategic policy change in the coming years.
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Th e extraordinarily intimate, multifaceted and mutually benefi cial 
trans-Pacifi c bond between Canada and Hong Kong is not predicated 
on political-administrative ties such as those between a colonial power 
and a dependent territory, nor on war, conquest or military alliance, 
or a collective economic mode, and it is defi nitely not a case of neces-
sity between neighbours sharing a border. Rather the extensive relations 
between Canada and Hong Kong stem from deliberate choices built 
upon common interests and shared values. Until 1997, membership of 
the Commonwealth underlay the relationship, but since Hong Kong’s 
retrocession to China in that year Canadian links with Hong Kong have 
grown with a new dynamism.
More than one million Chinese now live in Canada, over half of them 
being of Hong Kong origin or with direct Hong Kong ties. Th ese Hong 
Kongers proliferate through all the ten provinces and three territories 
of Canada, though there is a heavy concentration in the largest cities: 
according to the Census of 2006, Metropolitan Toronto, with a total 
population of 5.1 million, had absorbed 486,000 Chinese, while Van-
couver hosted 380,000, Montreal 72,015, Calgary 66,375, Edmonton 
47,200, Ottawa 45,060, Winnipeg 13,750, Victoria 12,325, Saskatoon 
4,245, Regina 3,340 and Halifax 3,105. Since the 1990s, Vancouver has 
been nicknamed “Hongcouver.” Within forty kilometres of downtown 
Toronto a dozen Chinese shopping malls punctuate Greater Toronto, 
each fi lled with Hong Kong-style restaurants, supermarkets, bookstores, 
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beauty salons, and fashion boutiques. Canadians in major cities routinely 
encounter persons or businesses with Hong Kong connections.
One prominent Hong Kong-linked icon in the Canadian business 
landscape is HSBC Bank Canada. HSBC’s original name, the Hong 
Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, refl ected its birth in Hong 
Kong in 1865 and its later branching out into Shanghai and other Chi-
nese treaty ports, as well as the former British territories in Southeast 
Asia. Its Chinese name, Huifeng (“abundance of remittance”), indicates 
its role in handling remittances from overseas Chinese (Liu 2006, p. 18). 
HSBC landed in Canada in 1981 as the HongKong Bank of Canada. 
Since then, through acquisitions such as its takeover of the Bank of Brit-
ish Columbia in 1986 and its expansion among the fast-growing Cana-
dian Chinese population, it has become a major bank, particularly in 
British Columbia and Ontario. Headquartered in Vancouver and with 
260 offi  ces, including 140 branches, throughout Canada, HSBC Bank 
Canada ranks seventh among Canadian banks in terms of assets, at CA$ 
70.5 billion, and had total deposits of CA$ 49.6 billion as of August 2009 
(see Lazarus 2003). From British Columbia to the Maritime Provinces, 
there are HSBC branches in Asian malls and Chinatowns, often with 
mostly Chinese tellers serving mainly Canadian Chinese clients. Inside 
these HSBC branches, other than transactions in Canadian currency, 
one might almost feel as if one were in Hong Kong, as Cantonese is the 
language most commonly spoken, and waiting customers read Canadian 
editions of Hong Kong’s two major dailies, the Ming Pao and the Sing 
Tao. Th ey are among the more than forty Chinese-language dailies or 
weeklies published in Canada, at the core of the country’s thriving Chi-
nese-language media alongside numerous radio and television channels 
serving Chinese communities across fi ve time zones.
Historical Migration to Canada
Th e roots of Canada’s links with Hong Kong and Guangdong Province in 
southern China date from 1858, soon after the British took Hong Kong 
as a colony in 1842 following the Opium War. Linked by the British 
empire’s shipping and economic networks and buttressed by their strategi-
cally located natural harbours, Hong Kong and Vancouver soon became 
major ports on the trans-Pacifi c route for goods and “coolie” immigrant 
traffi  c. Th e Canadian Pacifi c Railway drew more than 17,000 Chinese 
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workers to Canada during the construction of its main line in the west-
ern provinces between 1881 and 1886. Chinese labourers in Canada were 
mostly Cantonese who sailed from Hong Kong to Vancouver (see Li 1998). 
Canadian Pacifi c’s links with Hong Kong lasted for decades: its shining 
White Empress ocean liners can often be seen in pre-war photographs of 
Hong Kong Harbour (see Lamb 1991) and the Canada goose, symbol of 
Canadian Pacifi c Airlines, was a familiar sight on billboards in Hong Kong 
in the 1950s and 1960s.
Some of the Cantonese labourers brought in to work on the railway or 
in the mines settled in the western provinces and built Canada’s earliest 
Chinatowns in Victoria, Vancouver, Calgary and Edmonton. Th eir prog-
ress was disrupted after 1923, when the federal Parliament passed the Chi-
nese Immigration Act, specifi cally banning further Chinese immigration, 
and was not resumed until after that Act was repealed in 1947. In 2006 the 
Canadian government issued an offi  cial apology and token compensation 
to the surviving victims of the head tax levied on early Chinese immigrants, 
symbolically closing a sad chapter in Sino-Canadian relations, and par-
tially redeeming the dark legacy of the white state’s actions against ethnic 
minorities in Canada’s collective conscience. First imposed in 1885, at fi fty 
dollars, the head tax was increased to 500 dollars in 1903. A total of CA$ 
23 million was collected from the 82,000 Chinese who reportedly arrived 
between 1886 and1923 (see Ng 1999).
Th e post-war era saw only limited numbers of Chinese immigrants 
arriving in Canada, and Cold War politics, with the absence of diplomatic 
relations with Beijing until 1970, ensured that they came overwhelmingly 
from Hong Kong rather than the mainland. Major political events on both 
shores of the Pacifi c also shaped the Chinese infl ux into Canada. Violent 
disturbances launched by pro-Beijing activists engulfed Hong Kong for fi ve 
months in 1967, partly fuelled by the Cultural Revolution in mainland 
China and Portuguese capitulation to Chinese demands over nearby Macao 
after similar riots there in 1966. Stern police measures, supported by the 
local Chinese majority, helped the British authorities to restore order (see 
Bickers and Yip, eds. 2009). Losing confi dence in the colony’s future as 
radicals waged militant anti-West campaigns across mainland China, many 
middle-class families and tycoons from Hong Kong sought safe heaven 
abroad, with Canada as their fi rst choice. Th eir exodus came at a turning 
point in Canadian immigration reform with the introduction, also in 1967, 
of a merit point system that opened a much wider door to potential Hong 
Kong immigrants with skills or wealth, in addition to those qualifi ed under 
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the family reunion provisions. Between 1968 and 1976, some 90,118 Chi-
nese immigrants were admitted into Canada, a threefold increase over the 
numbers entering before 1967 (Li 1998, p. 97). Th ese immigrants infused 
new blood into the Canadian Chinese communities, which were still very 
largely “HongKongtowns” until very recently.
Since the 1980s Chinese from both the mainland and Taiwan have also 
begun to fl ood into Canada. Th is trans-Pacifi c diaspora was reinforced by a 
new infl ux from Hong Kong after the mid-1980s, following the signing by 
Britain and China in 1984 of the accord that provided for the retrocession 
of Hong Kong to China in 1997. Th is outbound traffi  c only intensifi ed after 
the Tiananmen Incident of June 4, 1989, when the armed suppression of pro-
democracy activists in Beijing triggered a serious crisis of confi dence about 
Hong Kong’s future under Chinese rule. Many Hong Kong families seeking 
safe haven abroad chose Canada over Australia or the United States (see Skel-
don, ed. 1994 and Skeldon 1995). At the same time the United States became 
more engaged with Hong Kong and loosened its own historically tight immi-
gration controls (Segal 1993, p. 112; see also Jencks 1990). Th e annual immi-
gration quotas allocated to Hong Kong by the United States were raised from 
600 in the 1960s and 1970s to 2,000 in 1983 and 20,000 from 1994 (Segal 
1993, pp. 121–25 and 130–38, and Paau 2000, p. 205). Nevertheless, Canada 
remained Hong Kongers’ fi rst choice, and there were around 30,000 arrivals in 
Canada each year between 1991 and 1996. Th e British scholar Gerald Segal 
(1993) criticized Ottawa’s poaching of Hong Kong’s best as “immigration with-
out responsibility,” and a Canadian academic, Kim Nossal (1997, p. 87), called 
Canada’s approach to Hong Kong during its problematic transition to 1997 the 
“most aggressive” as compared with the United States and Australia.
Behind the talk of “1997 blues” there were divergent personal and family 
factors, educational opportunities and career prospects, livelihood concerns 
and political calculations among the tens of thousands of Hong Kongers 
who decided to emigrate (see Skeldon 1994, Part III, and Salaff , Wong and 
Fung 1997, and Salaff , Wong and Greve, 2010). Yet it is clear that the two 
major waves of migration from Hong Kong to Canada, after 1967 and 
between 1984 and 1997, were propelled by political upheavals generated 
in mainland China, and can also be viewed as not untypical of the patterns 
of collective behaviour that have punctuated Hong Kong’s record as a city 
with continuous infl ows and circulation of migrants shaping its human 
landscape (see Siu and Ku, ed. 2008).
Hong Kong’s more settled situation since 1997 and the revival of its 
economy have unleashed a reverse migratory cycle, with more Canadians of 
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Hong Kong origin heading toward Greater China than there are new arriv-
als from Hong Kong. Mainland China’s impressive economic growth since 
1978 has yielded business opportunities and career prospects for many 
transnational Chinese of Hong Kong origins with Canadian education and 
passports. Th e “brain drain” of the 1980s and 1990s, when there was a mas-
sive transplanting of Hong Kong talents and expertise to Canada, should 
not be regarded as a negative outfl ow, but rather as a long-term diversifi ca-
tion and upgrading, an investment yielding enhanced global networks and 
Canada-educated talents capable of making greater positive contributions 
upon their return to Greater China (see Salaff  2009).
Offi  cial data show that immigration from Hong Kong has steadily 
declined since 1997, both in absolute numbers and as a proportion of total 
immigration (see Table 6.1).
In contrast, immigration from mainland China rose from 17,533 (7.8 
per cent of the total) in 1996 to 29,336 (11.9 per cent) in 2008, yielding 
Table 6.1  Immigration from Hong Kong to Canada, 1996 to 2005
Numbers of immigrants 
from Hong Kong
Proportion of total 
immigrants to Canada, 
selected years (%)












2008 1,324  0.5
Source: Statistics Canada, 2006. 
86  Th e China Challenge
a major demographic realignment within Canada’s Chinese communities. 
Th e fact that mainland China is now, and likely will continue to be, the 
largest source of new Chinese immigrants to Canada has reshaped China-
town politics. Chinese is now the third most widely spoken language in 
Canada, after English and French.
Even the SARS epidemic of spring 2003 testifi ed to the intimacy of 
the relationship between Canada and Hong Kong. Th e return from Hong 
Kong of a single person infected with the SARS virus triggered a health 
crisis in Toronto, where 375 people were infected and forty-four died, 
while Hong Kong recorded a total SARS death toll of 299 in mid-2003 
(see Mason 2007).
Education and Alumni Networks
A crucial dimension of this trans-Pacifi c bond is the two-way traffi  c in educa-
tion and manpower development. Canadian schools and universities have 
long been Hong Kong students’ prime choice for high-quality overseas edu-
cation, while since the 1980s major Canadian cities have become havens of 
security and opportunity drawing in migratory Hong Kong families.
In the years following the Second World War Canadian degrees and 
qualifi cations, particularly in medicine and engineering, were recognized 
by Hong Kong’s colonial offi  cials as being of the same high standard as 
those from British universities. Many promising young Hong Kongers 
chose Canada for their university education, some with the hope of return-
ing home after graduation. Canadian universities also represented a real 
bargain: during the 1960s and 1970s, two major prairie campuses, the Uni-
versity of Saskatchewan and the University of Manitoba, drew many Hong 
Kong students, who paid only nominal tuitions as locals. Some 20,000 
Hong Kong students are now studying in Canada. Data from Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada show that the annual infl ow of those entering 
Canada on student permits from Hong Kong was 1,730 in 1996 (4.4 per 
cent of that year’s total foreign student intake) and 1,297 (3.1 percent) in 
1997, and fell still further to 1,148 in 2007 (1.6 percent) and 1,120 in 
2008 (1.4 percent). Th is declining trend parallels the decrease in overall 
immigration from Hong Kong since 1997.
Nevertheless, a disproportionate enrolment of ethnic Chinese students, 
not only from Hong Kong, but also from mainland China, Taiwan and 
Southeast Asia, fi lls Canadian campuses from the University of Victoria on 
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the Pacifi c to the Memorial University of Newfoundland on the Atlantic. 
At the University of Toronto, for example, the 1,736 students from China 
(including Hong Kong) constituted the single largest bloc (31 percent) of 
total international (non-Canadian) undergraduate enrolment in 2007, and 
the largest group (17 percent) among international postgraduates. Th ese 
fi gures do not, of course, cover students who originated from Hong Kong 
and have become citizens or landed immigrants, or who were born in Can-
ada to Hong Kong immigrant parents. It is fi tting that the History Depart-
ment at the University of Toronto off ers a course on the history of Hong 
Kong, perhaps the only such regular course mounted at a leading university 
outside Asia.
Meanwhile, the Canadian presence in Hong Kong can be seen in the 
large number of organizations such as the Canadian Club, established in 
1952, the Chinese Canadian Association, founded in 1989 and now with 
more than 3,000 members, and the Canadian University Association, which 
since 1961 has functioned as an umbrella body for more than twenty uni-
versity alumni bodies active in Hong Kong, where an estimated 100,000 
alumni of Canadian universities live and work. Th ere are three schools in 
Hong Kong off ering a Canadian curriculum: the Canadian International 
School of Hong Kong, the Delia School of Canada and the Christian Alli-
ance P.C. Lau Memorial School. Hong Kong’s various tertiary institutions 
currently employ some 200 Canadian faculty and staff  members as well as 
more than 530 Canadian degree-holders.
Many Canada-trained Hong Kongers have returned home to become 
leading academics, professionals, captains of enterprises, tycoons or pub-
lic offi  cials. Today Canadian degree holders, many of them also Canadian 
landed immigrants or naturalized citizens, constitute the largest group of 
foreign-educated persons in Hong Kong. In fact, according to the Cana-
dian Department of Foreign Aff airs and International Trade, in 2008 the 
320,000 Canadian citizens formed the largest single bloc of “foreigners” 
(strictly speaking, foreign passport-holders) in Hong Kong. Many of 
them are Hong Kong-born or Hong Kong-raised, but Canada-educated. 
Th ese Canada-processed Hong Kong talents have penetrated into many 
layers of Hong Kong’s social, cultural and economic fabric. For example, 
three graduates of Canadian universities serve in the Legislative Council 
of Hong Kong: Cyd Ho (University of Waterloo) and Albert Wai-yip 
Chan (who resided in Canada for ten years, from Grade 10 through two 
degrees, but later abandoned his Canadian citizenship to contest Hong 
Kong elections), both directly elected; and Patrick Lau (University of 
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Manitoba), who represents the functional constituency for architecture. 
Other prominent Hong Kongers with Canadian connections include the 
noted scientist Professor Lap-cheeTsui, Vice-Chancellor of the University 
of Hong Kong (see Huang 1992, pp. 146–53).
Hong Kongers and Canada’s Asia–Pacifi c Outreach
Over the years persons of Hong Kong origin have contributed much to 
enrich Canada as a democratic, progressive and multicultural society.
Any list of Hong Kongers reaching the heights of the Canadian political 
establishment must begin with Adrienne Clarkson, who retired as Gov-
ernor General in 2005 after almost six years in offi  ce (see Huang 1992, 
pp. 166–85). Th ree other Canadians with Hong Kong connections have 
been Lieutenant Governors of Canadian provinces. Th e late David Lam 
(1923–2010) arrived in Vancouver soon after the Second World War and 
served two terms as Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia, from 1988 
to 1995 (see Huang 1992, pp. 58–69); Norman Kwong, born in Calgary of 
Cantonese parents who arrived via Hong Kong, became Lieutenant Gover-
nor of Alberta in 2005; and Philip S. Yee, who was born and raised in Hong 
Kong, has been Lieutenant Governor of Manitoba since 2009.
In 1998 Vivienne Poy, daughter of the prominent Hong Kong busi-
nessman and philanthropist Richard Charles Lee (see Poy 2006), became 
the fi rst Asian Canadian to be appointed to the Senate. From 2003 to 
2006, Senator Poy served as Chancellor of the University of Toronto, 
where she had obtained her history doctorate with a thesis entitled “Call-
ing Canada Home: Canadian Law and Immigrant Chinese Women from 
South China and Hong Kong, 1860–1990.” Senator Poy has founded the 
Richard Charles Lee Canada–Hong Kong Library at the university, where 
a Hong Kong property tycoon has also endowed the Cheng Yu Tong 
Library for East Asian Studies.
Raymond Chan, who arrived from Hong Kong in 1969, was elected 
Member of Parliament on the Liberal Party ticket in 1993 and served as 
Minister of State for the Asia–Pacifi c region in the Department of External 
Aff airs from then until 2000. Th ere are now fi ve members of Hong Kong ori-
gin in the federal House of Commons, and quite a few Hong Kongers have 
been elected to provincial legislatures and municipal councils across Canada.
Paralleling the massive traffi  c in education and migration, trade, ser-
vices and investment also fl ow across the Pacifi c, testimony to Hong 
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Kong’s role as facilitator and bridgehead for Canada’s economic, social 
and cultural links to East Asia, with particular eff ectiveness as a launch 
pad for Canadian business entering the China market. Canada attracted 
130,100 visitors from Hong Kong in 2001 and 122,800 in 2002. Th e 
SARS epidemic caused a decline to 94,000 in 2003, but the total rose 
again to 121,000 in 2004, and reached 113,404 in 2007 and 128,139 
in 2008, making Canada the twelfth most popular destination for Hong 
Kongers. Hong Kong saw growth of 17.7 percent in the number of visi-
tors from Canada, which hit a record of 395,170 in 2007, then declined 
to 379,046 in 2008 because of the global recession, but still made 
Hong Kong Canadians’ twelfth most popular destination. Air Canada 
and Cathay Pacifi c run seventy-one weekly passenger fl ights across the 
Pacifi c, forty-two servicing Vancouver and twenty-nine Toronto, includ-
ing thirty-fi ve non-stop direct fl ights, often at full capacity.
Hong Kong is consistently among Canada’s top fi fteen trading part-
ners, and is Canada’s fi fth largest market for information technology and 
its third largest market for beef. Canada’s total exports to Hong Kong 
reached a value of 1.59 billion Canadian dollars in 2006 and increased 
to 1.77 billion Canadian dollars in 2008. In 2005, Canada ranked 
twenty-second among suppliers of goods to Hong Kong, with merchan-
dise imports from Canada valued at CA$ 1.5 billion. Th e value of Hong 
Kong‘s exports to Canada totalled CA$ 3.46 billion in 2008, while CA$ 
1.16 billion worth of Canada-made goods were re-exported by Hong 
Kong to the rest of the world. Cumulative investment from Hong Kong 
in Canada reached CA$ 6.3 billion in 2006, while Canadian investment 
in Hong Kong totalled CA$ 6 billion in 2008. Th ese fi gures exclude 
extensive local assets owned by Hong Kongers who became Canadian 
passport-holders. Hong Kong is Canada’s key spearhead into mainland 
China, which is Canada’s second largest trading partner, with bilateral 
trade valued at more than CA$ 50 billion in 2008.
According to offi  cial fi gures, as of August 2009 thirteen Canadian 
companies had located their regional headquarters in Hong Kong, while 
another thirty-two had regional offi  ces there, amid a pool of more than 
150 Canadian companies with offi  ces in Hong Kong. Another 600 fi rms 
had representatives there. Twelve Canadian brokerage and investment 
advisory fi rms were active on the fi nancial scene, and so too were eight 
Canadian insurance companies, including Manulife and Sun Life, and all 
of the big fi ve Canadian banks (Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 
Toronto Dominion, Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal and Royal 
90  Th e China Challenge
Bank of Canada). Th e Canadian Chamber of Commerce–Hong Kong, 
which has more than 1,200 members, is the largest such body outside 
Canada. A Canadian Trade Commission was fi rst established in Hong 
Kong in 1928, and now the Canadian Consulate General, with twenty-
three Canada-based diplomats and 117 local staff , is among Canada’s 
largest missions abroad. Refl ecting Hong Kong’s special importance, the 
Consulate General reports directly to the Department of Foreign Aff airs 
and International Trade in Ottawa while Canada’s other consulates in 
China, in Guangzhou, Shanghai and Chongqing, report to the Canadian 
Embassy in Beijing.
Being thus linked to Canada through extensive human ties, social and 
cultural exchanges, and substantial economic interests, Hong Kong has 
long been much more than a remote foreign policy item for Ottawa, 
which closely followed Hong Kong’s retrocession to China and the estab-
lishment of the Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region. Even before 
the retrocession Ottawa hosted such benign undertakings as the Canada 
Festival in Hong Kong in spring 1992 and the Hong Kong Festival in 
Toronto that autumn. Th e growth of the Hong Kong immigrant commu-
nities has also enhanced Canada’s search for opportunities in East Asia, 
especially mainland China. Th e maturing of the Hong Konger commu-
nity in Canada, as second- and third-generation descendants come of age, 
has provided a new crop of Canada-educated professionals blessed with 
a special empathy for Chinese culture and deeply rooted Hong Kong 
sensitivity. As Canada’s valuable Greater China assets, they function as 
powerful trans-Pacifi c human bridges.
Canadian Contributions to Hong Kong
It is to be expected that, as a mature democracy with high regard for civil 
liberties and the rule of law, Canada would wish to share with Hong Kong 
and the entire Chinese nation its vast knowledge and rich experience in 
the realms of human rights, social justice, constitutional reform, politi-
cal pluralism and environmental protection, as well as advances in science, 
medicine and technology.
In 2002 and 2003, the authorities of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region set out to pass a national security bill that would translate the 
provisions of Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law into local legislation, and 
clamp down on “any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion” against 
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Beijing, “prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting 
political activities” in Hong Kong, and “prohibit political organizations or 
bodies … from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bod-
ies.” Regina Ip, then Hong Kong’s Secretary of Security, complained to this 
author on March 16, 2003, about vocal Canadian offi  cial criticisms of the draft 
bill, claiming that the Canadians were acting as if they were “surrogates of the 
departed British colonialists.” By several estimates, around 50,000 Canadian 
passport-holders were among the 500,000 residents of Hong Kong who dem-
onstrated against restrictions on civil liberties on July 1, 2003. Concerned par-
ties in Hong Kong sought Canadian inputs into the drafting process, and the 
fi nal version of the law as sent to the legislature by the regime (that was later 
forced to shelve it after the mass protests) did draw extensively, if not always 
accurately, on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and other Cana-
dian legal studies and precedents. (see Chan and Lo 2006, pp. 47-49).
Canada’s society and economy have been enriched by inputs from Chinese 
who either hailed from Hong Kong or descended from Hong Kong immi-
grants. Likewise, many Hong Kongers have benefi ted from their Canadian 
upbringing, education, professional training and work experience, which 
have given them signifi cant head starts in their lives and careers. In their 
hearts and minds, and through their lives and work, many have attempted 
in good faith and with deep conviction to transfer to Hong Kong some of 
Canada’s fi nest attributes, institutions and processes, as well as its values and 
priorities. Th ey naturally wish to share with their fellow Hong Kongers all the 
positive aspects of Canadian society that they hold dear.
Ottawa and the Canadian people are keen to see the successful real-
ization of the “one country, two systems” formula in Hong Kong. Th e 
Toronto Globe and Mail, Canada’s leading daily, devoted more coverage to 
political stories than to economic news concerning Hong Kong between 
1997 and 2007 (see Salaff  and Greve 2007). Canadians’ vividly expressed 
concern for, and vocal public commentary on, Hong Kong matters should 
be regarded as friendly suggestions, to be received in good faith, as they 
mean no off ence and harbour no ill will.
Th e levels of economic attainment in Canada and Hong Kong are con-
verging fast: in 2006 GDP per capita in Canada was US$ 38,757 and in 
Hong Kong it was US$ 27,500, but in 2008 the fi gures were US$ 39,100 
for Canada and US$ 43,700 for Hong Kong. Yet economic indicators are far 
less crucial than the realm of values and ideals that Canada embodies and is 
willing to share with Hong Kong and the entire Chinese nation. Canadian 
values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, social and political pluralism, 
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and multiculturalism, as well as Canada’s traditions of striving for concilia-
tion and accommodation of diff erences with mutual respect, and promoting 
unity in diversity, should constitute the most magnifi cent gifts that Canada 
could bestow on the students, immigrants and citizens of Hong Kong origin 
who wish to share these with their homeland peers. Indeed, Hong Kong is 
a potent transmitter of Canada’s “soft power” toward Greater China. Per-
haps enlightened Chinese may prefer China to evolve eventually into a more 
Canada-like society, rather than becoming a replica of the United States as a 
stressful global superpower.
Links between Canada and Macao
Canada and Macao have been interacting for more than 200 years, mainly 
through trade and immigration. Canada’s Consul General in Hong Kong 
has served concurrently as Consul General to Macao since 1972. Enhanced 
by its common membership of the World Trade Organization, and rid-
ing on a booming economy driven by gaming and tourism, Macao is a 
promising market for Canadian products and services, and for cultural and 
academic exchanges.
Th e enduring and dynamic links between Canada and Macao were lit-
tle aff ected by Macao’s relatively smooth retrocession to China on Decem-
ber 20, 1999, after nearly 450 years of Portuguese rule. Unlike in Hong 
Kong, where the “1997 blues” triggered an exodus to Canada, Macao’s 
Chinese population adopted a calmer approach. A migratory trend did 
emerge among the minority Macanese, mixed-race descendants of Portu-
guese and Chinese or other Eurasian families, with Canada as their most 
popular destination after Portugal. Now there is a thriving network of 
social and cultural associations among Macanese immigrants across Can-
ada, including the Casa de Macao Vancouver, the Casa de Macao Toronto 
and the Macao Cultural Association of Western Canada, which has been 
based in Vancouver since 1989. Th ese form parts of the international net-
work of Casas de Macao, with sister organizations located in Lisbon, Rio 
de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Sydney, San Francisco and Hong Kong, though the 
Vancouver Boletim Macaense is the only monthly newsletter issued by any 
of the Casas de Macao.
In 2004 a Canadian Chamber of Commerce was set up to promote 
the interests of Macao’s burgeoning Canadian business community, as the 
city moves toward becoming a hub for leisure tourism, conventions, and 
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exhibitions, attracting an annual infl ow of more than twenty million tourists 
from Greater China and the rest of East Asia. In 2009, Canadian exports to 
Macao reached a value of CA$ 14,952,586, while Macao’s exports to Canada 
totalled CA$ 22,271,035, and 73,384 Canadians visited Macao, less than in 
2008, when 82,136 Canadians visited, due to the global recession.
Post-colonial Macao enjoyed double-digit economic growth and rapid 
transformation under the leadership of Edmund Ho, the fi rst Chief Execu-
tive of the Macao Special Administrative Region, who was in offi  ce from 
1999 to 2009. Ho attended high school in Ontario and graduated from 
York University in Toronto. Lawrence Ho, son of the casino tycoon Stanley 
Ho and founding President of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce in 
Macao, is a graduate of the University of Toronto, and runs his own Melco 
group of casino-hotel resorts. Another prominent community leader, Exec-
utive Councillor Vai Tac Leong, is a graduate of the University of Waterloo. 
Several dozen Canadian university graduates are faculty members at ter-
tiary institutions in Macao, and the Macao Associated Canadian Alumni 
Union, operating since 1998, acts as a bridging organization by hosting 
business and social events that foster alumni relations and Canadian link-
ages. Canadians are increasingly visible and play active roles in Macanese 
society, notably through the establishment in 2002 of the only interna-
tional school in Macao, which follows the Alberta curriculum. Cultural and 
arts exchanges include a permanent venue for Cirque du Soleil at the Vene-
tian Macao, the city’s largest casino, hotel and convention centre. Right 
next door, with a Maple Leaf fl ag fl ying at its entrance, is the Four Seasons 
Macao, managed by the Toronto-based hotel chain. Smaller than the US-
owned and operated Las Vegas-style ultra-opulent Sands, Wynn and MGM 
casino-hotels in Macao, this elegantly refi ned hotel aptly symbolizes the 
low-key yet much appreciated Canadian presence in Macao.
Undersides of Hong Kongers’ Canada Saga
Any nuanced overview of Hong Kong immigrant experience in Canada 
should include some account of the various undersides that have drawn 
public interest and media coverage. Th is section is informed by the insight-
ful fi rst-hand observations of a number of Canadian Chinese of Hong 
Kong origin with long professional and family experience in Canada.
Cross-border crimes, especially gang activities in major Canadian cities 
with large Chinese populations, have involved Hong Kong immigrants. 
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Some Hong Kong immigrants have also attracted resentment for their 
giant mansions, fancy cars and expensive tastes, and their speculative 
dealings that have driven up local property prices (see Matthews 1983, 
Cannon 1989 and DeMont and Fennell 1989). Some younger Hong 
Kong immigrants have shown an acute lack of interest in learning more 
about Canada, treating their Canada sojourn as a mere schooling inter-
lude while obtaining Canadian passports as political insurance before 
returning to Hong Kong. Th ere have also been some cases of broken mar-
riages, due to prolonged spousal separation as husbands work in Hong 
Kong while wives stay in Canada with children in school, and problems 
among youth due to inadequate parental guidance, resulting from the 
parents’ long absences from Canada.
Th e Hong Kong immigrant communities that sprouted in Canada in 
the 1980s and the 1990s have experienced stagnation or even shrinkage 
with the apparent success of the “one country, two systems” formula in 
Hong Kong since 1997. Many discontented immigrants have reverse-
migrated back to Hong Kong to take part in the Greater China economic 
boom or to enjoy the Hong Kong lifestyle that they fi nd diffi  cult to 
forego. Most of the mid-career immigrants who landed in Canada during 
the 1980s and 1990s are now in their late fi fties or sixties, approaching 
retirement. As their children come of age, it is less likely that one or both 
parents have to work in Hong Kong to support their decent living stan-
dards in Canada. Hence the problem of broken marriages and dysfunc-
tional families due to prolonged spousal separation and parental absence 
is now less prevalent among Hong Kong immigrant families. Rather, a 
new trend has emerged: while their Canada-educated children work in 
Hong Kong, many parents living in Canada regularly visit their children 
back “home.” Eventually, some of them move back to Hong Kong to join 
their children and grandchildren. Many immigrants who have returned 
to Hong Kong continue to collect Canadian social benefi ts, a windfall 
from their Canadian passport-holder status.
Refl ecting the pulling eff ects of their Hong Kong roots and Greater Chi-
na’s career prospects, numerous immigrant children have returned to Hong 
Kong, probably permanently, to pursue their careers upon graduation from 
Canadian universities instead of working in Canada. As a result, the growth 
of the Hong Kong immigrant communities in Canada has peaked. Fur-
ther growth will be much slower and will depend less on infl ows from 
Hong Kong than on whether Hong Kongers’ circles on both sides of the 
Pacifi c capitalize on the entrenched links between Canada and Hong Kong. 
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Some Hong Kong families have suff ered uneasy adaptation and downward 
economic mobility in Canada, so their longing for the “good old days” 
in Hong Kong is understandable. Other Hong Kongers with Canadian 
degrees and work experience have sought work in Hong Kong rather than 
in Canada because they perceive the prospects of promotion in Canada 
to be less promising, due to their minority status. Nevertheless, Canada 
remains Hong Kongers’ most favoured destination for migration and 
education. Among the professional bodies in Hong Kong there is a recent 
increase in membership of those with Canadian education, refl ecting 
the intimate links that will shape a proportion of the next generation of 
Hong Kong elites.
Perhaps the expansion of the Hong Kong/mainland Chinese communi-
ties in major Canadian cities does not promote the inculcation of “Canadi-
anness” among new immigrants. Th e concentration of Chinese immigrants 
and their descendants in a few major Canadian cities has resulted in almost 
cocoon-like communities, whose members have little need to interact with 
mainstream Canadian society. One Hong Kong immigrant banker in Van-
couver admits that he has felt no pressure from the local “old timers,” as 
Canada’s government and society have embraced immigrants so well that 
many new immigrants do not bother to become “Canadianized.”
Greater China immigrants today come from more diverse sources than 
Hong Kong and Guangdong, and have diff erent reasons for immigrating to 
Canada. Th e recent upsurge of immigrants from mainland China and Tai-
wan has intensifi ed the process of internal ethnic and cultural negotiation, 
making community politics among Chinese immigrants more layered and 
complicated. Th is infl ux of mainlanders has signifi cantly reshaped facets 
of Canada’s Chinese communities. Th e Canadian editions of Sing Tao and 
Ming Pao now publish sister newspapers in simplifi ed Chinese characters 
for mainland immigrant readers. Staff  in Chinese restaurants, shops and 
other businesses in Canada’s Chinatowns and “Hong Kong Malls” now 
speak Mandarin to serve their mainlander clients, adding to internal Chi-
nese diversities within Canada’s multicultural mosaic.
An interesting recent phenomenon is the decline in criticisms of some 
Hong Kong immigrants’ fl amboyant lifestyles. Th is may be attributable to 
greater Canadian openness and tolerance, but it could also be due to the 
“political correctness” adopted by Canada’s mainstream media after pro-
longed exposure to and interaction with Hong Kongers. Th e impact of 
Hong Kong immigrants has defi nitely altered the physical, social and cul-
tural landscapes of major Canadian cities and the global outlook of many 
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Canadians. After more than twenty years of adjustment and adaptation, 
mainstream Canadians have come to appreciate their country’s links with 
Hong Kong and Greater China. Th e saga of Hong Kongers in Canada 
should be studied in a contrasting perspective, not just as compared to 
their counterparts from mainland China and Taiwan, but through broader 
comparisons with other immigrants in Canada.
True Friends in Good Times and Bad
In a profound historical sense, the ties between the peoples of Canada 
and Hong Kong were cast in blood and tears when Hong Kongers and 
Canadians served together as comrades in arms. More than 550 men 
among the 1,975 Canadian soldiers of the Winnipeg Grenadiers and 
Quebec Royal Rifl es sacrifi ced their lives defending Hong Kong against 
Japanese forces at the outbreak of the Pacifi c War in December 1941 
(see Duff  1942, Ye 1984 and Greenhous 1997). Th ese brave young 
Canadians have forever left their hearts and bodies in the Sai Wan Bay 
War Cemetery on Hong Kong Island. With a heroic and tragic twist 
of fate, these Canadians’ unfulfi lled dreams, aspirations and hopes for 
education, career, family and well-lived lives have been transferred to the 
Canadian youth of Hong Kong descent, who should contribute their best 
for the good of their Canadian homeland, and their ancestral homeland 
as well, as a token repayment of an historical debt.
Th e future of Hong Kong may depend on its evolution as a unique Chi-
nese global city at the competitive cutting edge, contributing to China’s social 
and economic advancement. If Hong Kong continues to fl ourish as an eco-
nomically vibrant, politically open and socially free global hub, then, given 
Canada’s open arms toward overseas students, professionals and other immi-
grants, the extensive linkages between Canada and Hong Kong will continue 
to thrive. Th e multiple networks, cosmopolitan outlook and international 
exposure that have developed through migration between Hong Kong and 
Canada, as experienced by many of Hong Kong’s best and brightest, will be 
essential to Hong Kong’s role in China’s transformation. However, if eco-
nomic opportunities available in Canada lag behind those in other parts of 
the Asia–Pacifi c region, it is possible that there will be a bigger wave of reverse 
migration among Canadian Hong Kong Chinese, leading to signifi cant losses 
in the human capital that Canada has built up. It is imperative for Canada to 
retain the human resources that it has nurtured and benefi ted from.
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Th e next chapter in relations between Canada and Hong Kong is 
unlikely to involve a repetition of the large-scale infl ows of the 1980s 
and 1990s, but may well feature an intensifying of social, economic 
and cultural exchanges, reinforcing a mutually benefi cial relationship 
whereby Hong Kong enjoys the positive infl uence of free, tolerant, com-
passionate, progressive and democratic Canadian values, while Canada 
benefi ts from having an edge in its trans-Pacifi c outreach. Many wish 
that Hong Kong and the entire Chinese nation could have more true 
friends like Canada, which has time and again extended its hands across 
the Pacifi c as a good partner.
It is to be hoped that Canadians of Hong Kong origin will leave positive 
imprints on Canada’s society, politics, culture and economy, and become 
Canada’s spearhead into Greater China, as human bridges across the Pacifi c. 
Th eir eff orts will sustain the multiple connections between Canada and 
Hong Kong, which form an exceptionally enriching, fruitful and mutu-
ally benefi cial North American outreach to Asia. By developing its vibrant 
bonds with Hong Kong, Canada exemplifi es transnational partnership and 
cross-cultural collaboration. Indeed, endowed with unrivalled Hong Kong 
“assets,” Canada enjoys uniquely privileged and highly eff ective access to 
Greater China. Th rough its potent Hong Kong bonds, Canada is well-
positioned to engage and partner with a rising China, whose growing eco-
nomic might and expanding strategic infl uence are of global signifi cance. 
As Prime Minister Stephen Harper said during his visit to Hong Kong in 
2009, Hong Kong is defi nitely Canada’s most important Asian city, and 
in many ways is also a major Canadian city. Hence, Hong Kong’s special 
role as a gateway and bridge must not be neglected in discussions of rela-
tions between Canada and China. Hong Kong will remain an essential hub 
through which Canada’s links with mainland China and Greater China will 
continue to be fostered. Th e strengthening of the bonds between Canada 
and Hong Kong, as well as Greater China, will be a vital factor in the 21st 
century, which will be the Asia–Pacifi c century.
Perhaps one day the occupant of 24 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, will be some-
one of Hong Kong origin. Such a prospect is defi nitely not an impossible 
dream, and should constitute an uplifting aspiration for all Asians in Can-
ada. Blessed with a deep reservoir of friendship, buttressed by an impressive 
repertoire of trans-Pacifi c bonds, and harbouring versatile talents, gener-
ous outreach capacities and noble ideals, Canada should shine as a trusted 
global partner and cherished old friend, contributing to Greater China’s 
advancement in the years to come.
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Collaboration on education started shortly after Canada and the People’s 
Republic of China established diplomatic relations in 1970, although 
scattered exchanges of academic visits had occurred before that date. 
Collaboration after 1970 mostly took the form of Canadian development 
programmes, featuring a strong sense of “internationalism” but remaining 
largely unilateral until the late 1990s.
Th e Canada–China Scholars Exchange Program, starting in 1974, was 
operated and funded by the Canadian International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Coun-
cil (SSHRC). Th e Canada–China University Linkage Program (CCULP), 
launched in 1985, and operated and funded by the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), supported the linkage of thirty-one institu-
tions, and included the highly successful Canada–China Management Edu-
cation Program (CCMEP), which stimulated the renaissance of manage-
ment and business education in Chinese universities. Following the success 
of CCULP, the Special University Linkage Consolidation Program (SULCP) 
was created by CIDA within its Country Development Policy Framework for 
China, adopted in 1994. SULCP supported eleven linkage projects involv-
ing twenty-fi ve Canadian universities and more than two hundred Chinese 
universities, teaching hospitals, schools, other government agencies and non-
government organizations (NGOs). As the Association of Universities and 
Colleges of Canada has noted (2001, p. 3), the combined span of CCULP 
and SULCP, from 1985 to 2001, “coincided with a period of pivotal change 
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in Chinese society,” and the two programmes, encompassing disciplines rang-
ing from health to education, environmental studies, minority area develop-
ment, engineering and agriculture, assisted Chinese universities to “improve 
their capacity to respond to China’s development needs.”
A little more needs to be said about CCMEP, given its signifi cance to 
the resurgence of business education in China. Ten Canadian management 
schools were involved in Phase I of CCMEP, from 1983 to 1987, and the 
network was then expanded to twenty-four schools in Phase II, from 1987 
to 1996. Th e federal government contributed nearly CA$ 38 million to 
CCMEP, which produced many graduates who went on to lead the trans-
formation of business education in China. When the Chinese government 
created MBA programmes in nine universities in September 1991, they drew 
heavily from the experience gained through these CIDA-supported linkages, 
as did the seventeen additional MBA programmes created in 1993. Several 
of the Canadian universities that had been involved in CCMEP went on to 
develop other initiatives, mostly in Asia, based in part on their experience in 
China (see Anderson, Cooney and Langevin 2001).
Altogether CIDA has invested more than 250 million Canadian dollars in 
higher education for China since the early 1980s. Over the twenty-fi ve years 
since CCULP began, more than one hundred institutional linkages and sub-
projects were created and funded. In addition, more than 37,000 Chinese 
scholars, researchers and students were educated in Canada and have since 
become leaders in their disciplines and institutions (see Klabunde 2009). 
Indeed, apart from the Soviet Union in the 1950s, it is hard to fi nd any 
other country that has assisted development of China’s higher education to 
a comparable level of generosity, particularly in view of the unique approach 
of pairing universities within an overall strategic perspective. It seems that 
Canada’s contribution to higher education development in China is matched 
only by the World Bank’s education projects of the 1980s, through which a 
total of US$ 1.2 billion in loans supported the building of infrastructure and 
the development of human resources at eighty-eight national and provincial 
universities throughout China (see Hayhoe 1996).
Education Collaboration in the 21st Century: Opportunities 
and Obstacles
With the shift of economic power to the East, China has emerged as the 
world’s second largest economy and its principal international education 
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market. Since the early 2000s, educational collaboration between Canada 
and China has become a bilateral process.
Th e Canadian federal government has continued to provide educational 
aid to China, but on a much smaller scale than before. For instance, an aid 
project implemented in 2003–2007 enhanced basic education in China’s 
poverty-stricken western region, cost only CA$ 11.8 million, and in 2005 
China was offi  cially dropped from CIDA’s list of “countries of focus.” Th e 
Canada–China Scholars Exchange Program has continued, but has become 
more mutually benefi cial, with both Chinese and Canadian scholars being 
assisted to carry out research in each other’s countries. Th ere are now twice 
as many Canadian scholars supported by the Chinese government through 
this programme than there are Chinese scholars supported by the Canadian 
government.
At the same time, Canadian colleges and universities have started to be 
increasingly active and to dominate educational collaboration with China. 
Th e University of Regina pioneered the signing of an international partner-
ship agreement with Chinese institutions soon after China opened its doors 
to the outside world. Th e university signed its fi rst international partner-
ship agreement, with Shandong University, in 1981 and since then it has 
developed thirty-fi ve such agreements with Chinese institutions, more than 
with any other country. Many other Canadian colleges and universities 
have been providing academic and professional development programmes 
of various kinds for Chinese partners and professionals. Unlike the previous 
development projects, these programmes are now mostly contracted and 
paid for by the Chinese side.
In my own institution, York University, there are ample examples to 
illustrate this changing pattern. Th e high-profi le York University Asian 
Business Management Program (ABMP) was among the fi rst in Canada 
to provide professional development and management training services to 
both the public and the private sectors in China, and it has maintained this 
focus ever since its establishment. York University’s Faculty of Education 
is now contracted by the Department of Education of Jiangsu Province, 
which has been Ontario’s Chinese “twin” for twenty-fi ve years, to provide 
training for school teachers and administrators. In 2009 alone more than 
900 teachers and administrators from Jiangsu came to York University for 
training for periods ranging from a number of weeks to three months.
Th ese examples amount to a tiny proportion of the collaborative activities 
taking place between educational institutions in Canada and their counter-
parts in China, but they may give a sense of how Canadian institutions are 
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benefi ting from an increasingly mutual process. Th ey disseminate Canada-
based knowledge to China, and make some profi t out of the knowledge 
transfer. What still remain to be developed more fully are the collaborative 
research opportunities. China is now ambitious enough to lift a few dozen of 
its universities to world standing by pouring research funds in and intensify-
ing research activities. Th e research budgets of these universities, on average, 
are now approaching the average among the member institutions of the Asso-
ciation of American Universities (AAU) and, backed up by China’s foreign 
exchange reserves of US$ 3 trillion which are by far the world’s largest, and 
desperately looking for meaningful and signifi cant spending opportunities, 
there should be future possibilities for joint research projects between Chi-
nese and Canadian universities.
Institutional Opportunities for Canada
Canada has become both provider and benefi ciary in the process of educa-
tional collaboration with China. Th is change promises numerous opportu-
nities for Canada, and is in Canada’s long-term interest.
First of all, educational collaboration with China serves Canada’s geopo-
litical interest in China and the Asia–Pacifi c region. Educational collabo-
ration facilitates the fl ow and communication of people and ideas. Once 
the channels and mechanisms are in place, cultural and political barriers 
to mutual understanding are much easier to overcome. Th is is particularly 
true in the case of Canada and China, since the two countries have never 
been geopolitical rivals and in fact often have complementary interests, so 
that the rise of China can benefi t Canada as well. Specifi cally, Canada needs 
China, now perhaps the world’s largest market and manufacturer, to secure 
its ambitious Asia–Pacifi c Gateway and Corridor Initiative and to expand 
its export-oriented economy. For its part, China seeks not only Canada’s 
energy and natural resources to maintain its manufacturing capacity, but 
also an overall strategic partnership with Canada as an endorsement of its 
peaceful rise. Globally, Canada has the image of a well-liked country. Inter-
national opinion surveys conducted on behalf of the BBC World Service 
since 2005 indicate that Canada has consistently been among the most 
popular countries in the world (see BBC World Service 2010). With the 
world’s highest per-capita immigration rates and a fi rmly upheld ideology 
of multiculturalism, Canada may be taken as a model for the future of the 
planet in many ways. When the leaders of China and Canada met in June 
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2010, a clear message was sent out that they would seek a strategic partner-
ship. On his tour of Canada the Chinese President, Hu Jintao, extended 
invitations to one hundred local educational offi  cers and school principals 
to visit China in 2010, and to one hundred middle school students to 
attend summer camp in China in 2011, explicitly attaching political signif-
icance to educational collaboration. In this sense, educational collaboration 
serves to underpin the strategic partnership between Canada and China.
Almost as a footnote to this point, both the US and Chinese governments 
have recently endeavored to strengthen educational and cultural exchanges in 
order to boost the relations between the two countries. On May 25, 2010, 
the US and China signed an agreement to establish the High-Level Consul-
tation on People-to-People Exchange (CPE), and to launch the “100,000 
Strong” Initiative. Th e purpose of the CPE is to promote people-to-people 
engagement between the US and China in education and culture as well as 
other related fi elds by providing a high-level annual forum for government 
and private-sector representatives to discuss cooperation in a broad, strategic 
manner. Th e “100,000 Strong: US Students in China” Initiative, which was 
announced by the US President Barack Obama during his November 2009 
visit to China, promotes mutual understanding through encouraging pri-
vate-sector student exchanges and aspires to have 100,000 American students 
study in China over the next four years (US Department of State 2010). 
Th e US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hailed the importance of people-
to-people engagement by saying: “tens of thousands of Chinese and Ameri-
can young people study in each other’s country each year. We want to see 
those numbers rise.” “What we call people-to-people diplomacy has taken on 
greater signifi cance, as our world has grown more interdependent, and our 
challenges more complex. Government alone cannot solve the problems that 
we face…we have to tap in to the challenge of our people, their creative[ness] 
and innovation, and their ability to forge lasting relationships that build trust 
and understanding.” (Clinton 2010).
Second, Canada also benefi ts economically from educational collabo-
ration with China. Of course, economic interests are associated with the 
political interests elaborated above. Education, and higher education in par-
ticular, has moved to centre stage in the geopolitical contest for increasing 
shares of the global economic market, and China has emerged as the larg-
est single market for international education and training, being expected 
to have reached a value of US$ 200 billion in 2010 (see JLJ Group 2009). 
From 1978 to 2009, China sent a total of 1.6 million students of all kinds to 
undergo education or training in other countries. Ever since China opened 
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its doors to the outside world, the number of Chinese students going abroad 
has been increasing at an annual rate of 25.8 percent, and it is expected to 
have reached 300,000 in 2010 alone. Educational collaboration is crucial to 
enlarging Canada’s share of this market. In addition, due to demographic 
changes an increasing number of Canadian colleges and universities might 
have to attract international students to sustain their enrolments (see Hango 
and de Broucker 2007). Th us, for example, the government of Canada’s most 
populous province, Ontario, has recently pledged to make it a major destina-
tion for international students. In its fi ve-year Open Ontario Plan, unveiled in 
the Speech from the Th rone in 2010, a goal was set to “aggressively promote 
Ontario post-secondary institutions abroad, and increase international enrol-
ment by 50 percent,” on the understanding that an increase in international 
student enrolment would bring about an increase in revenues: “Th ese dollars 
could be reinvested to improve and expand our schools, and create more 
Ontario jobs” (see Ontario 2010).
Now that Canada and China have pledged to double their bilateral trade 
by 2015, Canadian colleges and universities will be part of the eff ort to bal-
ance Canada’s trade defi cit with China. In 2009 Canada exported slightly 
over CA$ 11 billion worth of goods and services to China, while importing 
close to CA$ 40 billion worth of goods and services from China. Indeed, 
apart from energy and natural resources, Canada has few other options to 
off set the fl ow of Chinese products into Canada. In particular, the export 
of educational services fi ts quite well with existing initiatives such as the 
Open Ontario Plan.
Th ird, academic and cultural internationalization is a catalyst for improv-
ing the diversity and quality of higher education. As Philip Steenkamp, 
then Deputy Minister of Training, Colleges and Universities for Ontario, 
nicely put it in 2008:
[i]nternational students bring valuable diversity to the classroom, the 
campus, and the larger community, enhancing the academic experience 
for all students. Diversity in the classroom enriches all students’ under-
standing of the world by allowing them to share diff erent perspectives, 
approach problems from diff erent angles, and discover diff erent cultural 
experiences.
A strong presence of Chinese scholars and students on Canadian campuses 
would enhance the possibility of integrating ideas and perspectives from the 
very diff erent Chinese epistemological tradition, and thus bringing greater 
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diversity to academic thought and discourse in Canada. Chinese scholars are 
also likely to add to Canada’s brain stock of doctorate-holders. China has been 
a major source of foreign-born PhDs in Canada since the late 1990s, replacing 
the United States and the United Kingdom, which were historically the domi-
nant sources: China’s share of Canadian PhDs reached twenty-fi ve percent in 
2000, having increased rapidly from just two percent in the early 1990s (see 
Gluszynski and Peters 2005). Th ere could be more room for growth if bench-
marked with what is happening in the United States, where, between 2004 and 
2006, two Chinese universities, Tsinghua and Peking, overtook the University 
of California, Berkeley, as the “most fertile feeder schools” for American PhDs 
(see Mervis 2008). Since the Chinese government started in 2006 to select 
5,000 doctoral students each year from the country’s leading universities and 
sponsor them to study in Western universities for up to four years, there seem 
to be plenty of opportunities for Canadian universities to attract a group of 
students of high quality.
Obstacles on the Canadian Side
Canada became among the fi rst countries in the West to recognize the 
People’s Republic of China when Pierre Trudeau’s government estab-
lished diplomatic relations with China in 1970, nine years ahead of the 
United States and almost three years before the United Kingdom and 
Australia. Ever since the early 1970s, successive Canadian governments 
have invested enormous eff orts and resources in educational collabora-
tion with China, which has led to hundreds of institutional linkages, as 
well as a positive attitude to Canada among the Chinese. Against this 
backdrop, it seems logical and natural that Canada should have gained 
a harvest from the plantings of these earlier years, now that China is 
emerging as a major international education market. However, this is not 
really the case, and Canada substantially lags behind its competitors—the 
United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand—in this 
market. Th ere are at least two identifi able reasons that may have contrib-
uted to this unfortunate situation.
First, there is no permanent agency at the federal level to trace the 
eff ects and outcomes of past educational collaboration programmes and 
projects, even though these have mostly been funded at the federal level. 
Over the years, diff erent federal agencies seem to have taken turns play-
ing the leading role in educational aid to China, but none of them has 
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been given a permanent mandate to follow up their initiatives. When 
programmes and projects end, their eff ects and infl uences start to fade 
away, and the resources accumulated during the process, in particular 
the networking resources, have gradually been lost. Th is approach was 
not particularly problematic in the era when educational collaboration 
chiefl y meant supplying development aid, but it has become dysfunc-
tional in face of the neoliberal current of internationalization of educa-
tion, which requires networking and niche determination. For Cana-
dian–Chinese educational collaboration to thrive, it is urgent to step out 
of the aid mentality, and shift to an approach based on marketing and 
service. Eff orts should be made to develop a good understanding of what 
is happening in China and what is in demand in the Chinese market, 
above all by creating and maintaining permanent links with Chinese 
scholars and their institutions.
I may use my personal experience to highlight this point. At a conference 
at Harvard University in 2009 I encountered a leading Chinese scholar in 
management studies, who now works at the frontier of internationaliza-
tion of higher education as the executive president of a joint campus oper-
ated in China by one Chinese university and one British university, each 
ranked high in their respective systems. He used to be a vice president of 
the Chinese university and, in order to qualify him for his current position, 
he was later appointed a pro-vice chancellor of the British university. Th en 
I assumed that he was a shining product of the British education system, 
but, unexpectedly, I discovered that he had actually started his academic 
pursuits at a Canadian university, through CCMEP, back in the 1980s. He 
unveiled this part of his story in a “by the way” manner. Over the years, 
he had never been contacted by any Canadian institution, and his memo-
ries of his Canadian experience had been covered with thick dust until I 
showed up as a sort of reminder. In contrast, having been sponsored by the 
British Chevening Scholarship Programme to study at the University of 
London in the mid-1990s, I have been kept connected to the network cre-
ated, maintained and updated by the British Council to facilitate contact 
and communication between former scholarship holders and their British 
sponsors. Th e rationale is evident and eff ective, when examined against the 
facts that, according to the British Council, “in 2009 over 85,000 Chinese 
students engaged in learning experiences in the UK,” increased by 40% 
from 2008 (see British Council 2010). Chinese students are now the larg-
est single group of overseas students in the UK, even compared with those 
from other member states of the European Union.
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Meanwhile, there are almost no eff orts devoted to branding Canadian 
education. As Carin Holroyd wrote nearly fi ve years ago, “While the Govern-
ment of Canada is constrained by its lack of constitutional authority in the 
delivery of educational services at home, it has been generally absent from the 
promotion of Canadian education overseas” (see Holroyd 2006). Th e “Pan-
Canadian Education Brand,” launched in 2008 and jointly managed by the 
federal Department of Foreign Aff airs and International Trade (DFAIT) and 
the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers of Education, Canada (CMEC), 
is evidence that both the federal government and the provincial governments 
have started to make an eff ort in this realm, although the branding of specifi -
cally Canadian higher education is still in its infancy. Consequently, many 
Chinese students regard Canadian higher education as largely a derivative 
enterprise of the US system, and a second choice when they have no oppor-
tunity to go to a university in the United States.
Th e United Kingdom and Australia, in contrast, do benefi t from and 
take advantage of strong promotional eff orts. Th e British Council manages 
a strong “Education UK” brand, which distinguishes the British system 
from its major competitors. In 1999, the government of Tony Blair declared 
international education a cornerstone of its plan for the “New Economy” 
and committed a huge amount of resources to international recruitment. 
Th e British Council now has 250 offi  ces in 110 countries, among which 
thirty have a particular focus on student recruitment. Part of the Council’s 
annual budget of around US$ 900 million, one third of which is a direct 
grant from the government, is for international education, and an addi-
tional US$ 13 million was earmarked specifi cally for marketing, promotion 
and branding of British education over three years in the early 2000s (see 
Holroyd 2006). Advertisements encouraging study in the United Kingdom 
can even be seen on buses in Beijing, and the British Council has built a 
strong relationship with the Chinese media to ensure that “Education UK” 
activities gain the maximum possible coverage. Australian International 
Education, primarily funded through the federal government, runs ten 
overseas offi  ces, while IDP Education Australia, a university-owned non-
profi t organization, operates an additional sixty-eight offi  ces in thirty-eight 
countries. Th e Australian federal government committed US$ 114 million 
between 2004 and 2009 to market Australian post-secondary institutions 
internationally (see Holroyd 2006). It is thus not surprising that education 
has become an export industry for Australia, worth US$ 14 billion, half of 
that in post-secondary education, and is essentially the third largest Austra-
lian export after coal and iron ore (see Hazelkorn 2008).
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Table 7.1  Numbers of Chinese Students in Selected Countries, with Annual 
Rankings, 2002–2004 
2002 2003 2004
United States 64,757 (1st) 61,765 (1st) 62,523 (2nd)
Australia 47,904 (2nd) 58,574 (2nd) 68,857 (1st)
Canada 26,312 (3rd) 33,188 (5th) 36,747 (5th)
New Zealand n/a 51,965 (3rd) 48,630 (3rd)
United Kingdom 20,710 (4th) 35,155 (4th) 47,740 (4th)
Source: Adapted from Holroyd 2006, p. 7.
Canada does not have a national coordinating body for national market-
ing or any sustained federal investment in marketing Canada as a destination 
for international education. Education is a provincial responsibility under the 
Canadian Constitution, yet the provinces do not necessarily view its market-
ing as a major concern. As a result, Canada has been struggling and even 
suff ering over recent years in the international education market. In 2007, 
the Canadian Bureau for International Education (CBIE) reported Canada 
had dropped out of the top fi ve destinations for international students (see 
Tibbetts 2008), to seventh place, with a share of less than three percent of the 
international market (as shown in Figure 7.2). Without renewed eff orts Can-
ada will not be able to compete with the United Kingdom and Australia for 
a suffi  cient share, whether in China or elsewhere. Canada’s Chinese students 
recruitment has been declining relative to these competitors and the number 
of Chinese students in Canada is also small in comparison. In 2004, Canada 
received slightly more than half of the number of Chinese students attracted 
to Australia, and around three quarters of the numbers of Chinese students 
enrolled in New Zealand and the United Kingdom (as shown in Table 7.1). 
As China is now the largest single source country for international student 
mobility (as shown in Figure 7.1), Canada needs to attract more Chinese stu-
dents in order to recover its position as a major destination of international 
education. Canada’s share of international students stagnated between 1999 
and 2007 (as shown in Figure 7.2). Now, as Canada is pledging to increase 
its share and rise to become, once again, one of the leading destinations for 
international students, it would have a better chance of success if its perfor-
mance in the Chinese market could be improved.
110  Th e China Challenge
Figure 7.1 Main Source Countries of Internationally Mobile Students, 2007



















































































































Figure 7.2 Main Destination Countries of Internationally Mobile Students, 
1999 and 2007
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Figure 7.3 A “Glonacal” Agency Heuristic














Suggested Policy and Strategy Framework
Despite the obstacles discussed above, it is not realistic to alter the Canadian 
constitutional arrangement that places educational aff airs under provincial 
jurisdiction, or to create a special federal agency, on the model of the British 
Council, in order to promote and brand Canadian education around the 
world. What Canadians can and should do is to become more practical and 
creative.
In this respect, the “glonacal” agency heuristic, a paradigm developed by 
two distinguished scholars, Simon Marginson and Gary Rhoades (2002), 
appears to be both suggestive and inspiring (see Figure 7.3). Th ough orig-
inally suggested for use in studying globalization and higher education, 
their paradigm is applicable and useful in the domain of international 
education policy and strategy in the Canadian context. Th e “glonacal” 
agency heuristic emphasizes the intersections, interactions and mutual 
determinations of all levels (global, national and local), as well as domains 
(organizational agencies and the agency of collectivities). Rather than a 
linear fl ow from the global to the local, it sees a simultaneity of fl ows. In 
other words, local entities and collective eff orts can undermine, challenge 
and defi ne alternatives to national and global patterns, and “they can also 
shape the confi guration of global fl ows” (Marginson and Rhoades 2002, 
p. 289). When it is applied to policies and strategies for international 
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educational collaboration, a “glonacal” agency approach can lead us to 
work from the local level and reach the national and global level.
Th is paradigm also suggests local adaptation as well as resistance. Tra-
ditionally, Canadians have had a tendency and strong potential to work 
from a local level. Th is is evident in the unique approach taken to execut-
ing CCULP and SULCP through the pairing of Canadian and Chinese 
universities. Such an approach made it possible to acquire good knowl-
edge of partners and of the target community’s conditions and needs, to 
ensure that the planned intervention would be appropriate and that the 
benefi ts of the project would eff ectively reach the intended benefi ciaries. 
Indeed, the CCULP and SULCP partnerships were eff ective in provid-
ing venues to adapt Canada-based knowledge and expertise to the Chi-
nese context. In this sense, this paradigm may inspire us to transform the 
apparent policy and strategy disadvantage determined by the Canadian 
context into a sort of practical model with a Canadian fl avour or Cana-
dian characteristics.
Th is notion is closely linked to ways in which the meaning of “agency” 
is incorporated into this paradigm. Two meanings of the word “agency” are 
used here. First, the paradigm uses agency “in the sense of an entity or orga-
nization that could exist at the global, national or local level,” with examples 
being the World Bank, the European Union, national ministries of educa-
tion, national legislatures and individual education institutions (Marginson 
and Rhoades 2002, p. 289). In this sense, the initiatives and practices of 
individual colleges or universities may have an impact and infl uence across 
an entire nation. Canada’s lack of a central policy or a central coordinating 
agency means that international outreach has been left to the provinces, 
and even more to individual institutions. Th erefore, it is useful and indeed 
imperative to take the alternative approach of identifying, demonstrating 
and disseminating good and successful local initiatives, strategies and prac-
tices, as models for others.
For instance, the China focus approach adopted by the University of 
Regina, as discussed above, may be an experience that other institutions 
could emulate. Similarly, Seneca College in Toronto has been particularly 
involved in the development of partnerships with Chinese institutions. Th e 
college has arrangements with twenty-three Chinese academic institutions 
involving forty-one programmes, and it has spearheaded the eff ort to set 
up joint diploma and degree programmes with Chinese partners. Typi-
cally, students spend a year or two in China and then fi nish their studies 
in Toronto. Seneca also off ers a complete training programme for fl ight 
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attendants at the Guangzhou Civil Aviation College in China. It is now 
taking the lead in building an off shore campus in China, which looks like 
a wise move, given the huge potential and demand in the Chinese mar-
ket. Following this lead, Simon Fraser University launched an innovative 
dual-degree programme in computer science with Zhejiang University in 
Hangzhou in 2007, in which students study at both institutions, providing 
an excellent opportunity for collaboration across cultural boundaries. More 
recently, York University partnered with Fudan University in Shanghai and 
began in 2009 to off er dual-degree programmes in history, fi nancial math-
ematics, computer science and design. Students spend two years at Fudan 
University, followed by two years at York University, and receive a joint 
degree from both institutions. Th is move marked York University’s fi rst 
such broad-based agreement with any university in the world.
Th ese few examples show the rich resources of good and successful local 
initiatives, strategies and practices that others may draw upon. A benefi t of this 
bottom-up approach may be the promise it embodies for institutional adapta-
tion. While the central policy approach may result in greater effi  ciency and 
more power, it may also lead to institutions reacting homogeneously, engaging 
in blind competition at the cost of precious resources, or even resisting change. 
Th e framework suggested here may warrant some sort of retention of institu-
tional individuality and capacity for niche determination. In the same sense, 
the concept of glocalization that is modeled on Japanese word dochakuka and 
adopted much earlier, fi rst by business professionals and then by sociologists, 
may better help to overcome the conceptual diffi  culties of global-local rela-
tionship, and therefore better capture this Canadian fl avor. “Th e problem of 
simultaneous globalization of the local and the localization of globality can be 
expressed as the twin processes of macro-localization and micro-globalization. 
Macro-localization involves expanding the boundaries locality as well as mak-
ing some local ideas, practices, institutions global…While in this view local is 
the provider of the response to the forces that are global, we argue that local 
itself is constituted globally” (Khondker 2004, p. 4).
Th ere is a second meaning of agency in the “glonacal” agency perspec-
tive, which “refers to the ability of people individually and collectively 
to take action at the global, national, and local levels” (Marginson and 
Rhoades 2002, p. 289). For example, there are international professional 
groups that extend across national boundaries, and help to shape national 
policies and local practices. Th ere are also national groups that work to 
infl uence those policies and practices. Further, “there are local collectivi-
ties, such as professors and administrators in a department or institution, 
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that infl uence local practice and undertake initiatives for their units to 
compete in international education markets” (Marginson and Rhoades 
2002, p. 289). In short, at each level, global, national and local, there 
are collective human actions that are central to understanding, planning 
and undertaking international educational collaboration. It is the notion 
of human agency that appears to be most interesting and appealing in 
this paradigm. Once human agency is mobilized and motivated, it is 
possible that local entities can eff ectively infl uence, defi ne and challenge 
alternatives to national and global patterns, which is particularly true in 
Canada’s decentralized context. Ultimately, it is people who can carry 
ideas and experiences around, and make them available nationally and 
internationally. As a matter of fact, individual faculty have been reported 
most infl uential in terms of setting international linkages, among all the 
internal and external stakeholders of Canadian universities (Metcalfe et 
al. 2010). Given the absence of a national coordinating agency, it is cru-
cial to bring human agency into full play, in order to push forward the 
frontiers of Canadian–Chinese educational collaboration and broaden 
the horizon of policy initiatives and strategy choices.
Th e most signifi cant example along this line might come from Univer-
sity of Alberta. Its China Opportunity Funds was created in 2005, and sup-
ports University of Alberta’s Joint Research Laboratories (JRL) program with 
China’s State Key Laboratories (SKLs) and National Laboratories (NLs). Ini-
tially the idea came from a community-based group, Association of Chinese 
Canadian Professors (ACCP) at University of Alberta, and was piloted by 
some of its members. Th en it was adopted as a university initiative, and fur-
ther supported by Alberta provincial government through Alberta Advanced 
Education and Technology, and then the Chinese government via the Min-
istry of Science & Technology (MOST), which funds State Key Laboratories 
(SKLs) and National Laboratories (NLs). So, the University of Alberta case 
illustrates a typical alternative approach advocated by the “glonacal” agency 
heuristic: a good initiative started with the local human agency, and then 
helped to mould policy and practice of the local organizational agency. When 
it was proven successful, it further infl uenced and impacted the policy at the 
provincial and national level across the countries. Now University of Alberta’s 
China Opportunity Fund gives priority to research areas of energy, environ-
ment, nanotechnology, and life sciences, and supports 3 types of collabora-
tion between its researchers and SKLs/NLs: to initiate contact with SKLs/
NLs; to nurture an existing research partnership with SKLs/NLs; to support 
technology commercialization.
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It is in this sense that Canada must give priority to, and make full use 
of, the longstanding but often ignored advantages it has already acquired, 
in terms of the rich legacies of educational collaboration with China, and 
in particular the people associated with these legacies, as well as the large 
Chinese communities in Canada. Th ere are nearly 1.6 million Canadian 
Chinese, who have made Chinese the third language in the country, after 
English and French, and who hold promise of endless possibilities for 
Canadian–Chinese educational collaboration.
Refl ections and Recommendations
Th ere is a broad consensus in Canada that the rise of China is gener-
ally positive, that engagement has been useful and sustainable, and that 
“China’s role in the development of Asian-centred international institu-
tions is likely to be of value to Canada and the world order, rather than a 
threat to them” (Evans 2006, p. 292). Given this consensus, it is impor-
tant to further Canadian–Chinese collaboration, and educational collabo-
ration certainly has a big role to play. To this end, I would like to make a 
number of concrete recommendations.
First, it is necessary to reopen the old fi les concerning Canadian–Chi-
nese educational collaboration in the 1980s and 1990s, in particular those 
concerning university partnerships, and to conduct follow-up studies to 
trace both the legacy and the effi  cacy of these programmes. By design, 
CCULP and SULCP provided venues to adapt Canadian expertise and 
approaches to the Chinese context in areas where Canada is a world leader, 
such as minority education, bilingual education, agriculture, energy, health 
and environmental assessment. Ten years after they were all closed, it is 
important to fi nd out what long-term eff ects these Canadian programmes 
had on the transition of Chinese society, which has gone through dramatic 
changes in recent years. Th is work would also, to a large extent, to re-
establish the network among Canadian and Chinese universities as a sort of 
extension from the past. From there, diligent work must be done to explore 
opportunities for collaborative research in the new context. Canadian uni-
versities have contributed a great deal to China’s development through 
CIDA and other linking institutions, and have long played a unique role 
in connecting Canada and China. With this signifi cant shift in patterns 
of Canadian–Chinese educational collaboration, Canadian universities 
should take advantage of the historical linkage with Chinese partners, as 
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well as the increasing capacity on the Chinese side, and see this shift as an 
opportunity to collaborate with their Chinese partners in joint projects that 
seek innovative science- and technology-based solutions to some of the 21st 
century’s biggest challenges, including clean energy and climate change, 
food security and agriculture, and public health. Th e complementary skills 
and strengths of Canada and China in research in these fi elds would create 
a “synergy” benefi ting both countries.
Second, as an emerging economy, China has been dropped from CIDA’s 
list of “countries of focus” for development aid, yet it is essential to continue 
to provide projects in the domains of social and cultural development in 
China. Th ese domains have been suff ering tremendously under the impact 
of the “GDPism” prevailing in China, which gives by far the highest prior-
ity to economic development. Governments at all levels have aggressively 
pursued rapid economic development, as measured by GDP growth rates, 
disregarding the social, cultural and environmental eff ects resulting from 
such rapid economic growth. Related to this, the Canadian government 
should consciously support collaborative research and development work 
with China in the social sciences and the humanities. Th ese eff orts, in turn, 
would eff ectively help to exert Canadian infl uence on Chinese society, and 
ultimately contribute to China’s peaceful rise as a responsible global power. 
For instance, the Chinese government’s programme of sponsoring doctoral 
students to study abroad provides a potential opportunity. Canadian uni-
versities may seize such an opportunity to work out some sort of exchange 
programme with selected Chinese universities, ideally those with historical 
connections, and host a certain number of Chinese doctoral students in the 
social sciences and the humanities. Such a move could create a “win–win” 
situation, attracting a group of students with great potential, on the one 
hand, and creating opportunities for Canadian students to study in China, 
on the other. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the recent US–China 
Consultation on People-to-People Exchange has a strong focus on the 
social sciences and humanities, and that the US government supports more 
students studying abroad in China than in any other country, the majority 
of them in the social sciences and the humanities. Universities are places 
of teaching and learning where new generations form their knowledge base 
and values. Universities also draw on extensive networks of alumni and 
benefactors, including personnel in government agencies, private enter-
prises and NGOs. Th rough these networks and links, study programmes 
can often disseminate their results and infl uence far more broadly than may 
have been originally planned, and thus help to forge lasting relationships, 
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exchange and cooperation between peoples. Indeed, universities are highly 
eff ective agents of change and innovation.
Last but not least, given the absence of a federal agency to facilitate and 
coordinate policies and strategies, it is imperative to use NGOs and private 
think tanks to identify good policy initiatives and practices in educational col-
laboration with China, as well as the unique aspects and overall strength of 
Canadian higher education. Notably, Canadian universities are exclusively 
public, and Canadian policies emphasize developing a network of comprehen-
sive post-secondary institutions of approximately comparable standards, rather 
than specialized institutions or stratifi ed systems. Canadian higher education 
has a reputation for “providing a wide range of opportunities to its diverse and 
geographically dispersed population” (Skolnik 1991, p. 1079), and even “[I]f 
Canada has fewer Harvards and Chicagos than the U.S., it also has fewer insti-
tutions of dubious standards” (Skolnik 1986, p. 21). From the perspective of 
securing equality of access and experience, this seems to be a better solution 
than a set of highly dispersed and diverse institutions. In general, Canadian 
higher education is excellent in quality and very aff ordable, and can also be a 
catalyst for social justice. Indeed, some NGOs, such as the Asia Pacifi c Foun-
dation of Canada, have begun to promote Canadian education, and a Mon-
treal-based private branding company, Bang Marketing, is behind the “Pan-
Canadian Education Brand” mentioned above. More such groups should be 
brought in to make the eff ort truly successful. Even more importantly, edu-
cational collaboration between Canada and China should seek to encourage 
greater involvement by the private sector, which would not only broaden the 
horizon of policy initiatives and strategy choices, but also enlarge the pool of 
resources and opportunities available for people-to-people engagement.
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Th is week marks the fi rst anniversary of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
the unoffi  cial starting date of a global fi nancial crisis unlike any we have 
seen in a generation. As we welcome the prospect of the Canadian econ-
omy emerging from recession, perhaps sooner than expected, the biggest 
danger we face is to assume that the world will be more or less the same as 
it was before the economic downturn. Th e temptation to be complacent 
is exacerbated by self-congratulatory pronouncements about Canada’s 
relatively strong performance compared to other G8 members and the 
fact that our fi nancial institutions were well supervised and therefore did 
not face the kind of meltdown that was seen south of the border. It is in 
some respects inconceivable that Canadians could believe that the world 
has not changed. But habit, wishful thinking, narrow-mindedness and 
vested interests have a powerful way of combining to resist change. Th e 
unwillingness of our political and business elites to show leadership fur-
ther compounds the problem.
I am, of course, referring to the shift in global economic and political 
power that is taking place as a result of the US fi nancial crisis. We should 
be clear that this power shift did not begin with the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers. Th e rise of so-called emerging markets has been discussed for 
many years. Th e economic crisis did, however, expose some fundamental 
weaknesses in the US economy and it has, I believe, accelerated the shift in 
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global economic weight away from North America and Europe to Asia, and 
to China and India in particular.
I remember that when the crisis fi rst erupted a parade of commentators 
and analysts in North America confi dently predicted that China would not 
be immune from the downturn, that “decoupling” was a fantasy and that 
the recession would in fact be the undoing of China’s export-led economy. 
One columnist in the Globe and Mail even mused on the prospect of wide-
spread social unrest in China, leading to the collapse of the Chinese govern-
ment. What these analysts failed to understand was that there is a huge dif-
ference between an economic downturn due to a fi nancial sector crisis and 
a downturn caused by weak external demand. Crudely speaking, the US 
problem is one of excessive spending, whereas the Chinese problem is one 
of excessive saving. You don’t need a PhD in economics to understand that, 
interdependence notwithstanding, the Chinese problem is preferable to the 
US one. Th e solution to what are euphemistically called “global imbal-
ances” is for the United States to spend a lot less and for China to spend 
a lot more. It is no wonder, therefore, that the Chinese stimulus package 
unveiled in November 2008 was the largest of any major economy’s as a 
share of total output. Th e fact that there is enormous pent-up demand in 
China for infrastructure, capital equipment and, above all, consumer goods 
has simply made the stimulus package more eff ective.
But all is not rosy in China. Th e collapse in US and EU demand has 
meant sharp declines in Chinese exports and massive layoff s. Despite the 
attractive headline GDP growth numbers, Beijing faces a very serious 
unemployment problem in the rural areas and the attendant risk of social 
unrest. Th ere is no triumphalism, therefore, among the Chinese political, 
business and intellectual elites about the relative rise of China’s infl u-
ence in the world economy. On the contrary, what I am hearing over and 
over again from Chinese colleagues is the need to rebalance the economy 
towards a greater emphasis on domestic demand. Th ey are convinced that 
the US economy is headed for a period of sub-par growth because of the 
huge debt overhang, with all its implications for interest rates and infl ation. 
Th is sentiment is shared across much of East Asia, which has also relied 
on exports to industrialized countries as a principal source of economic 
growth. Th ere is a palpable anxiety across the region about how to generate 
growth if not by exporting to the United States.
What astonishes me is how much less this anxiety seems to have taken 
root in Canada, which is overwhelmingly more dependent on exports 
to the United States, and which does not have the option of turning to 
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domestic demand as an alternative engine of growth. It has, of course, 
become popular again to talk about diversifying our export markets so 
that we are less reliant on the US market. Diversifi cation is important, 
but selling more to China or India is only part of the story. Th e point 
about a fundamental power shift in the world economy is not simply 
about rapidly growing markets in Asia and other developing regions, it 
is about the impact of the Chinese economy and Chinese enterprises on 
every link in the supply chain, about upward pressure on the prices of raw 
materials and downward pressure on the prices of fi nished goods, about 
the global competition for talent, about research and innovation, and, 
above all, about the deployment of capital globally.
In recent years we have seen Chinese companies and sovereign wealth 
funds spend billions of dollars to secure access to natural resources around 
the world, through a combination of equity investment, loans for oil and 
long-term contracts. Th e pace seems to have picked up recently with major 
deals announced in Latin America, Russia and Australia. For a while, Can-
ada was conspicuously missing from the list of destination countries. Th at 
changed last month with a succession of megadeals, including a $1.7 billion 
investment by China Investment Corporation (CIC) in Teck Resources, 
followed by a $1.9 billion bid by PetroChina for a majority share of two 
Athabasca Oil Sands Corporation projects. Anyone wondering if Petro-
China has used up its fi nancial war chest should wonder no more: China 
Development Bank announced last week that it had agreed to provide a 
loan of $30 billion to PetroChina, at a discounted interest rate, to fund the 
oil and gas company’s “going global” strategy.
Recent Chinese investments in Canadian companies are a very good 
sign that we are on the Chinese outward investment radar, and that Chi-
nese companies perceive Canada to be open to investment from the People’s 
Republic. But we can do more to encourage and facilitate investment from 
China. An important test ahead will be the Government of Canada’s review 
of PetroChina’s bid for the oil sands projects. Mr. [Jim] Flaherty was in Bei-
jing recently, where he was widely quoted as saying that Canada welcomes 
Chinese investment. His words are currently being put to the test, and the 
results will be watched very closely by the global investment community.
Th e Asia Pacifi c Foundation of Canada is releasing today the results of a 
major survey of Chinese outward investment intentions. Working with the 
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, the co-organizer 
of this Forum, we asked 1,100 Chinese companies about their existing over-
seas investments and their plans for future spending abroad. While I do not 
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have time to go into the detailed fi ndings, I can leave you with this overall 
message: Chinese outward investment is on the rise, not just in energy and 
mining, but also in the manufacturing, agrifood and services sectors. While 
Canada hitherto has not ranked highly as a destination for Chinese invest-
ment, respondents rated Canada very well as a potential destination for 
outward investment. Th e most promising sectors for investment in Canada 
were identifi ed as agrifood, information and communications technology, 
energy, and natural resources. I invite you to have a look at the full report, 
which is available at www.asiapacifi c.ca. Th ere are also a limited number of 
copies at our display table outside the conference hall.
Allow me to conclude on a note of optimism. Canada’s relative resilience 
during the economic crisis has not gone unnoticed in China. For a change, 
we are seen by the Chinese as a bastion of fi nancial stability and not just as a 
vast source of natural resources. Th e ease with which the CIC investment in 
Teck sailed through the review process stands in stark contrast to Chinalco’s 
failed bid for Rio Tinto of Australia and Sinopec’s aborted attempt to pur-
chase Unocal of California a few years earlier. Relations between Ottawa 
and Beijing are improving, and it appears that Messrs. Harper and Ignatieff  
are in a race of sorts to visit Beijing, if not before an election, then likely 
soon after. Th is warming of relations could not come at a better time, since 
Canada and China celebrate forty years of diplomatic relations in 2010. 
Th ere is much to celebrate about the past forty years, but the best way to get 
ready for the coming anniversary is to think about the role that China will 
play in the world economy over the next forty years, and to prepare for it.
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Many Canadians believe that we are regarded as friends of China because 
of Pierre Trudeau, and because of the sacrifi ces of Norman Bethune, and, of 
course, Dashan is our best cultural ambassador to China. So why is it that, 
when Canadians travel to China today, we are asked by ordinary people, 
such as taxi drivers, why we hate them? Th is morning I will present an over-
view of the relationship between our two countries since the establishment 
of the People’s Republic of China, within the ever-changing economic and 
political dynamics of Greater China. You will notice that I will not be men-
tioning Macau, and that is purely because of my ignorance of that Special 
Administrative Region.
Canada was the leading Western country in building a relationship with 
China in the early days. Despite the lack of formal economic or political 
ties, Canada started to sell wheat to China in 1958. Sales grew from $9 
million in 1960 to $147 million two years later. Until the end of the 1960s 
the total exports from Canada varied from $100 million to $185 million 
annually, and they almost entirely consisted of wheat.
In October 1970, China and Canada established formal diplomatic 
relations, and in 1973 the two countries signed the Canada–China Trade 
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Agreement, which allowed for the mutual extension of “most favoured nation” 
status. By 1973, Canadian exports to China had doubled. After the death of 
Chairman Mao in 1976, the Open Door Policy was introduced, and it led 
to further improvements in Canadian access to Chinese markets. In 1978, 
the Canada–China Trade Council was established: it was later renamed the 
Canada China Business Council. In 1980, Canada granted preferential trade 
status to China, reducing tariff s on imports from China by over one third 
from the regular “most-favoured nation” tariff  rate. However, many prod-
ucts were excluded from this agreement. Between 1978 and 1988, Chinese 
exports to Canada grew, averaging an increase of twenty-six percent a year, 
while Canadian exports grew only by an average of eighteen percent a year.
As early as the 1960s, Britain began to diff erentiate passports carried by 
Hong Kong residents. Th is was a prelude to the negotiations between Mar-
garet Th atcher’s government and Beijing on the return of sovereignty over 
Hong Kong to China, which subsequently led to an exodus of Hong Kong 
residents, many of whom came to Canada. Emigration from Hong Kong was 
on many people’s minds. I remember hearing of the fear of change when-
ever we visited Hong Kong. Many were sure that it would be for the worse. 
On the other hand, Canada, like many other immigrant-receiving countries, 
opened its doors to attract wealthy immigrants by making it easier for busi-
nesspeople, entrepreneurs and investors to immigrate to Canada.
Th e infl ux of immigrants from Hong Kong was due to fear of political 
change, but the movement of people also coincided with changes in the eco-
nomic situation in Canada and Hong Kong. Th is, we will see, in subsequent 
years, was the reason why so many returned from Canada to Hong Kong or 
mainland China. During those years I watched with great interest as many 
members of my extended family immigrated to Canada. Th e only person 
who said he would never leave Hong Kong was my father. He passed away 
before the fi nal agreement was signed between Britain and China.
Th e return of sovereignty at the end of the 1990s had far-reaching con-
sequences for Canadian relations with that part of Asia. Th e number of 
Canadians of Chinese heritage suddenly swelled, and Chinese became the 
third most spoken language in Canada. In the mid-1990s the economy 
boomed in Hong Kong, which seemed to overshadow the fear of Com-
munism. Many immigrant heads of households returned to Hong Kong 
to work while leaving their families in Canada, and the children attended 
school here. Th ese children grew up being bicultural, with one foot in 
Canada and one in Asia. As Greater China fl ourished economically, many 
Canadians of Chinese heritage born or raised in Canada were drawn by the 
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opportunities there. Now, about 250,000 Canadians live in Greater China 
and 1.3 million Canadians in Canada claim Chinese heritage. As a result 
Canada’s relations with Greater China have grown closer, largely through 
the movements of people who feel equally at home in both worlds.
Ideally, this should mean that Canada has increased its ties with and 
infl uence over Greater China, but this is not the case. Ironically, just as 
Greater China has grown in importance as a global economic power, Can-
ada has decreased its infl uence and presence. Relations between our two 
countries, like that of China with other western nations, were strained after 
the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, even though trade continued to 
grow. By 1994, the two-way trade exceeded $6 billion. In the same year, 
Canada established its “four pillar” policy on China, comprising economic 
partnership, peace and security, sustainable development, human rights, 
good governance and the rule of law.
In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization, and in the fol-
lowing six years Chinese exports worldwide quadrupled, rising twenty-nine 
percent a year. By 2007, globally, China accounted for more than eight 
percent of exports and almost seven percent of imports. Over the past ten 
years, China has expanded its international trade dramatically and trans-
formed many of its cities into vibrant fi nancial and manufacturing cen-
tres. Th e Chinese growth rate averaged about nine percent over the past 
two decades, and was often in double digits. As a result of this astonishing 
growth, many millions have climbed out of poverty and joined the middle 
class. Despite all the problems China still has to overcome, this phenom-
enon cannot be ignored by the rest of the world.
Appearing before the Senate’s Standing Committee on Foreign Aff airs 
on April 29 this spring, China’s Ambassador to Canada, His Excellency 
Lan Lijun, said, “Over the past few years, we have seen a downturn in our 
relationship. Th ere has been no active exchange of high-level visits. Th e 
approach taken on certain issues is not conducive to developing a sound, 
better relationship.” So what happened? Successive Canadian governments, 
and many companies, have failed to understand the extent of China’s trans-
formation. Canada’s dependence on trade with the United States has paid 
dividends in the past, but, as we can see, we are dragged under when there 
is an economic crisis in the United States. Some individuals in the current 
government still seemed fi xated on the Cold War dichotomy, fearing Com-
munism in any form. Th is is ironic because, when I am in Hong Kong 
or on the mainland, I recognize how socialistic we are in Canada. Some 
in our government feel that closer economic ties would mean condoning 
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China’s labour conditions and its poor record on human rights. Th ere are 
also national security and other concerns that state-owned Chinese compa-
nies, using sovereign wealth funds (pools of government-owned fi nancial 
assets), should be limited in their ability to acquire foreign assets. Much of 
the tone from the present government has been judgmental and negative, 
and we all know that this approach does not work, whether between people 
or between governments.
With the recent economic crisis, the dramatic changes in Greater China 
over the past decade are now being recognized more widely. China sur-
passed Germany as the third largest economy in the world at the begin-
ning of this year. As America’s banker, with huge savings among its many 
citizens, and as a global trader, it is roughly fi ve times more involved in the 
global economy than other emerging economies such as India, Russia or 
Brazil. Th e recent Chinese contribution of US$ 40 billion to replenish the 
International Monetary Fund was an international triumph for China. It 
is, therefore, not surprising that Hillary Clinton said, “some believe that 
China on the rise is by defi nition an adversary. To the contrary, the US 
and China benefi t from, and contribute to, each other’s successes.” Th is 
certainly off ers China’s leaders strategic opportunities. It was no surprise 
when in April, at the G20 summit in London, many were musing about a 
“G2,” a China–US duopoly to guide world aff airs. Th is came as a wake-up 
call to Prime Minister Harper.
Nationalism is on the rise in China. Th e Beijing Olympics in 2008 were 
a huge source of pride for both China and the Chinese diaspora around the 
world. Th e next big international event is the Shanghai Expo. Criticism of 
China at these international events will only serve to spur on this nationalism.
Many have overcome poverty in China, but many more have yet to be 
swept up by the wave of progress. Despite its economic miracle, there is 
huge disparity between the coastal regions and the vast hinterland. With 
the recent economic crisis, millions of university graduates are joining the 
tens of millions of migrant workers among the unemployed. Economic 
decline of this magnitude could lead to the destabilization of Chinese soci-
ety. China faces huge environmental issues as well, which will aff ect us 
all if climate change continues unabated. As a global citizen, despite its 
economic power, China has a long way to go in assuming a leadership role 
because of its human rights record. It can, however, be an arbiter of con-
fl icts, such as that with North Korea.
On the positive side, despite early fears of repression, citizens of Hong 
Kong were able to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square 
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Massacre without incident. It is also not surprising that, in the Fraser Insti-
tute’s annual report of 2008, Hong Kong retained its status as having the 
greatest degree of economic freedom in the world. Recently, Shanghai 
hosted its fi rst gay pride festival, which would have been unthinkable a 
mere decade ago.
With respect to Taiwan, since the election of Ma Ying-jeou as President, 
China’s cross-Strait relationship has improved dramatically. In late April China 
Mobile announced that it would acquire twelve percent of the third largest 
provider in Taiwan, Far EasTone, in the amount of US$ 525 million, which is 
the fi rst-ever investment from China in Taiwan. Another signifi cant develop-
ment this May was when Beijing agreed to let Taiwan have observer status at 
the World Health Assembly in Geneva, using the name “Chinese Taipei.”
In 2006, when the Harper government discontinued Canada’s dialogue 
with China on human rights, citing ongoing concern over China’s lack 
of progress, President Hu Jintao snubbed Prime Minister Harper at an 
economic summit in Vietnam. So why, with Colombia’s dismal record on 
human rights and its violent past as a narco-state, did the government con-
clude a free trade deal with that country this March? I don’t want to sug-
gest that the previous Liberal government had suffi  cient foresight to move 
from its dependence on US trade to recognize the economic importance 
of China. Th ere was dialogue, and there were a few Team Canada mis-
sions, but it is only recently that the Liberals have recognized Canada’s need 
to look towards the emerging economies in Asia. Th e Harper government 
has taken pains to criticize China’s human rights record publicly at every 
opportunity, meeting with the Dalai Lama at the Prime Minister’s Parlia-
ment Hill offi  ce. Th e Prime Minister also refused to attend the Beijing 
Olympic Games. Th ere has been little contact at senior political and dip-
lomatic levels. Th is is a major impediment to engagement, since Chinese 
culture places great importance on long-term personal relationships.
Members of our present government seem to be ignorant of the fact 
that, while we need China, China does not need us. China has a global 
reach and has also negotiated a free trade pact with ASEAN countries. 
China is Canada’s second largest trading partner overall, and our third 
largest market for Canadian merchandise exports, just behind the United 
States and the United Kingdom, and yet eighty percent of our merchandise 
exports still go to the United States, with only about two percent going to 
China. Despite the tremendous commercial potential of China, Canada 
lags behind in foreign direct investment there, which is less than one per-
cent, and China’s investment in Canada is at a similar level.
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Canada is also failing to take advantage of its biggest long-term asset, the 
250,000 Canadians, many of whom are young professionals, who live in 
Greater China. Particularly regressive is the new citizenship law that took 
eff ect this April, and created a two-tiered citizenship that will aff ect the 
Canadian diaspora. Th e Asia Pacifi c Foundation of Canada urges Ottawa 
to update its understanding of the global knowledge-based economy and to 
“embrace Chinese transnationalism.” Chinese civilization has been around 
for thousands of years and we have long memories, so I am very puzzled by 
the government’s recent about-face regarding restarting dialogue with China. 
Th e visits of Ministers Stockwell Day and Lawrence Cannon to China, with 
an upcoming visit planned for Prime Minister Harper, seem like a good start, 
but not nearly enough to build any kind of permanent relationship.
Th e Harper government has done some things right. Th e signifi cant 
appointment of David Mulroney as Ambassador to China will, I hope, 
enable a more sustained approach involving high-level offi  cials in the 
Department of Foreign Aff airs and International Trade. Another positive 
recent appointment was that of Dashan as the Canadian Commissioner 
General for the Shanghai Expo.
Canada has fi nally identifi ed China as one of the priority countries in its 
Global Commerce Strategy and has stated that it wants to double the level of 
bilateral trade by next year. As of 2008 we suff ered from a substantial trade 
imbalance with China, with imports surpassing exports by a ratio of four to 
one. Given the diminishing opportunities for exports to the United States, it 
is important that Canada revitalizes our relationship with China. However, it 
will take more than stated goals on paper. Canada is not spending very much 
on the Global Commerce Strategy, just $50 million, an amount that many of 
our competitors would direct towards one single country.
Unlike Australia, Canada has failed to have a “whole government” strat-
egy toward China. Australia has had this approach since the 1980s, involv-
ing immigration, post-secondary education and trade with an Australian 
brand. Australia’s approach emphasizes a constant fl ow of positive visits 
between senior-level offi  cials. For example, in 2008 the Prime Minister of 
Australia visited China twice, the Governor General went to China, the 
Minister for Trade visited China three times, and no less than fi ve other 
ministers with various portfolios went to China. Australia also maintains a 
number of ongoing bilateral dialogues with China on trade, resources, aid, 
defence, human rights, climate change and regional security, and is working 
actively towards a free trade deal with China. On human rights, Australia’s 
policy revolves around dialogue, technical assistance and an incremental 
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approach. Its Department of Foreign Aff airs and Trade notes that, “though 
progress is slow, this approach is preferable to the alternative—public con-
demnation of China—which is often counterproductive.” Th e policy notes 
that while diff erences on human rights exist, substantial progress has been 
made by China over the past thirty years. Australia’s overall two-way trade 
was more than AU$ 67 billion in 2008, an increase of 28.3 percent year on 
year, and more than fourteen percent of Australia’s merchandise exports go 
to China. Needless to say, our government has much to learn.
Given Canada’s status as an exporter of natural resources, our leader-
ship in scientifi c research and environmental technology, and our role as 
the Asia–Pacifi c gateway, China should be our natural ally. For Canadian 
corporations, Hong Kong, and now increasingly, Taiwan can be our gate-
ways into China. China’s Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, was in Ottawa this 
Tuesday, taking the initiative to turn the page on the rocky relationship that 
exists between the Harper government and China. I am sure that all of us 
will be watching to see what follows.
As is often the case, the Canadian public is ahead of the government. A 
poll by the Asia Pacifi c Foundation of Canada, taken three years ago, found 
that most Canadians identifi ed China as the export market with the great-
est potential, way ahead of the United States, and sixty percent of Canadi-
ans believed that the rise of China was more of an economic opportunity 
than a threat. Th e Canadian government needs to make China a priority, 
so that other countries will not continue to realize substantial gains at our 
expense, and Canada will not become irrelevant on the world stage.
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I am very grateful for the invitation to join you for this meeting of the Hong 
Kong Canadian Business Association. Hong Kong is a true symbol of the 
new global economy and the key location where East meets West. It boasts an 
impressive resume: the world’s eleventh largest trading economy, the world’s 
sixth largest foreign exchange market, the world’s thirteenth largest banking 
centre, and Asia’s second biggest stock market. Hong Kong is one of the 
world’s top exporters of garments, watches and clocks, toys, games, electronic 
products and certain light industrial products. Ho ng Kong was the world’s 
tenth largest exporter of services in 2004. Civil aviation, shipping, travel and 
tourism, trade-related services and fi nancial and banking services are the 
main components of its trade in services. Th e prices of many services are 
among the lowest in the world. Mo re than 3,800 international corporations 
have established regional headquarters or offi  ces in Hong Kong. Th e major 
types of business include the wholesale/retail and import/export trades, other 
business services such as accounting, advertising and legal services, fi nance 
and banking, manufacturing and transport and related services.
Ho ng Kong advocates and practises free trade—a free and liberal invest-
ment regime, the absence of trade barriers, no discrimination against over-
seas investors, freedom of capital movements, a well-established rule of law, 
transparent regulations, and low and predictable taxation. In 2002, it was 
ranked the world’s freest economy in the Heritage Foundation’s Index of 
Economic Freedom as well as the Cato Institute’s Annual Report on Eco-
nomic Freedom of the World.
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My fi rst trip there was twenty years ago, when I was the fi rst minister in 
the newly elected Mulroney government to visit Hong Kong. I saw many 
things during my short visit, but the impression that lasted was of millions 
of people living in an area not much larger than my constituency whose 
only resources were geography and ingenuity, but who had become world 
leaders in a wide range of areas. It left me feeling that, if Canadians could 
combine the advantages that come from our natural bounty and diverse 
population with the creativity and work ethic that typify Hong Kong, the 
result would be a world-beater. Fast forward to 2006, and still, for many of 
us, the fourteen-hour fl ight makes it seem that Canada and Hong Kong are 
worlds apart, when in fact, the exact opposite is true. Canadians are well 
aware that many of our citizens have come from Hong Kong, but we are 
less conscious of the fact that there are about 250,000 Canadians living and 
working there today, and more than 150 Canadian companies operating in 
Hong Kong, ranging from Canada’s big banks and insurance companies 
to locally incorporated service companies. Direct investment from Canada 
reached CA$ 2.9 billion last year.
Hong Kong off ers excellent commercial opportunities to Canadian fi rms. 
Last year Canada exported almost CA$ 2 billion in goods to Hong Kong, 
making it our fourteenth largest export destination for goods and likely 
higher in terms of services. Hong Kong companies have cumulative invest-
ments in Canada of CA$ 5 billion. Th e Canadian presence can be felt almost 
everywhere. As you drive in from the airport, you cross the magnifi cent Tsing 
Ma Bridge. Th at state-of-the-art engineering marvel was built with the help 
of Canadian expertise. Similarly, it is impressive to walk into the Hong Kong 
Convention and Exhibition Centre where last December’s WTO meetings 
were held, and see where the University of Western Ontario’s Richard Ivey 
School of Business became the fi rst business school in North America to 
establish a campus in Asia, the Cheng Yu Tung Management Institute. When 
you look at the windows and glasswork in the magnifi cent Convention Cen-
tre, you should know that much of it was done by Fulton Windows, an SME 
and CME member from Mississauga.
I believe that the Canada–Hong Kong relationship today symbolizes 
business around the globe in the 21st century. Geography is no longer a bar-
rier. Technology, much of it Canadian, like the BlackBerry in my pocket, 
has bridged that gap. It is great to see that made-in-Canada technology for 
sale in the shops there. Technology has created a 21st-century reality with a 
world of new opportunities at your fi ngertips, where your customer can be 
found with just the click of a mouse.
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However, this new opportunity has also spawned a host of new challenges. 
For my organization, Canada’s largest trade and industry organization, we 
live it every day. No other sector has weathered as many storms over the past 
few years as Canada’s manufacturing and exporting sector, and it does not 
look as if it is going to get any easier in the future. Industry is changing at a 
relentless pace in Canada, in North America and around the industrialized 
world. Business practices employed only fi ve years ago will not work today. 
New, emerging Asian economic and industrial powerhouses like China and 
India are fuelling this “next-generation industrial revolution” and rewriting 
the rules of the game. Simply put, business as usual is not an option.
China is fast becoming the world’s manufacturing and exporting giant. 
China’s gross domestic product now exceeds US$ 1.3 trillion, about forty 
percent more than Canada’s. After discounting for price changes, it is thir-
teen times larger today than it was thirty years ago. China’s offi  cial economic 
growth rate last year was nine percent and economic growth has exceeded 
seven percent annual rates since 1999. Th e growth in actual economic 
activity is probably much higher than that. In 2003, China accounted for 
sixteen percent of the growth in the world economy, second only to the 
United States. Th e Asian giant’s exports are now eight times larger than 
they were only ten years ago. Th ey amounted to US$ 380 billion in 2003, 
giving China six percent of the global export market as compared to 3.9 
percent only three years before. But China is also a key source of demand 
for goods and services from around the world. China is now Canada’s third 
largest trading partner and Canada is China’s tenth. Two-way trade totalled 
more than $8 billion last year, fi fty times higher than it was in 1970.
Many Canadian businesses see China as a huge challenge, the land of out-
sourced Canadian production, but with a population of more than 1.3 billion, 
the Asian giant represents a potentially colossal market for Canadian compa-
nies. It all depends on whether you consider the glass half-full or half empty. 
CME believes that it is half-full and, with some imagination and hard work 
on our part, we can fi ll it the rest of the way. China is a land of opportunity 
for Canadian companies, and Hong Kong is positioned as the gateway to this 
emerging economic powerhouse. We speak the same language, have a better 
appreciation for the Western-infl uenced culture and share similar values.
Th e Asian tiger has a voracious appetite for almost everything. China 
absorbed more than two fi fths of the world’s cement output last year and over-
took Japan as the world’s second largest importer of oil after the United States, 
partly due to a boom in car sales. Additionally, in 2003 it bought over eight 
percent of global oil supplies. In 2004 there was an eighty-seven percent surge 
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in commodity prices. Foreign direct investment in China totalled US$ 65 bil-
lion, while outward investment in China topped US$ 85 billion. One of Chi-
na’s largest trading partners is not a country, but a company, Wal-Mart, which 
accounted for fourteen percent of all exports in 2004. China now has a whop-
ping thirty-eight percent of the world’s electronics production and chances are 
that the refrigerator in your home has a “Made in China” sticker on it.
China’s nine percent per annum compounding growth over the past two 
decades has already had a profound eff ect on Hong Kong, where people 
now talk not about goods being “made in Hong Kong,” but about goods 
being “made for Hong Kong.” While the actual production of goods may 
be taking place across the border, in the Pearl River Delta or beyond, Hong 
Kong manufacturers have focused on high-value-added elements of their 
business, such as design, distribution, promotion, sales, fi nancing, service 
and brand management. Hong Kong’s manufacturing community, which 
once saw China’s growth as a threat, now sees it as the key to prosperity.
Here in North America businesspeople and policy-makers are less cer-
tain of the impact. For many, the threat of China obscures the opportuni-
ties the country presents. It would be foolish to pretend that China is not 
already a powerful competitor, one that will become even more formidable 
in the future. But forward-looking manufacturers believe that it is pos-
sible to see China as a competitor, as a partner and as a customer. Here is 
how Jim Owens, the CEO of Caterpillar, recently described what American 
businesses need to do:
We have work to do to compete with the world’s best. Th ere are steps we 
must take to get our own house in order. For starters, American man-
ufacturers must focus on designing and producing the highest-quality 
products, incorporating the most up-to-date technology. We have to stay 
aggressive with our product development programmes, and ensure that 
the goods we manufacture are desired the world over.
Second, we must continue to embrace lean manufacturing principles, 
increase the use of robotics and automation, and focus on just-in-time 
delivery. Th ese tools will enable us to keep costs low and productivity high.
Th ird, we must invest in our people, providing the education and 
workforce development training they need to help us succeed. Over time, 
our international competitors will work to produce better products and 
adopt world-class processes, but they cannot replicate our market size and 
proximity. Th e ideas and competitive spirit that our people bring to the 
workplace must be nurtured.
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Fourth, we must believe that we can compete on the world stage. We 
must look at globalization and international competition as an opportu-
nity to make ourselves stronger and more effi  cient, and not, as some are 
proposing, as a reason to turn inward, and put up barriers to trade and 
investment.
Th e formula for success is no diff erent for Canadian manufacturers. 
During our Manufacturing 20/20 initiative, the largest public consultation 
in history on the future of Canadian industry, more than 3,000 Cana-
dian manufacturers told us that today their industry is heavily dependent 
on technological knowledge and skills, ever more customized and service-
oriented, and increasingly integrated into international markets and global 
supply chains. Th e future for manufacturers is one of global customers, 
global supply chains and business networks, and the potential to source 
from the best companies, the best technologies, and the best skills, not just 
from across the continent, but from around the world.
Our customer base must be global. As a result, our trade agreements must 
refl ect the changing needs of Canadian companies in this new international 
reality, and ensure that Canadian industrial and services companies can enjoy 
more secure and open access to major global markets. As a parent who wor-
ries about the society our children will inherit, it is clear that their standard of 
living will depend on how well we perform in the global economy.
Future prosperity hinges on our business strategies and public policies mov-
ing beyond a model in which Canadian companies are simply exporting to, 
importing from, or investing in other countries. Th ey must focus instead on the 
requirements of the global enterprise, on businesses, supply chains or business 
networks in which all aspects of commercial activity take place concurrently in 
a number of countries around the world, and on what is necessary to capture 
the highest economic benefi ts of that activity for Canadians. More markets, 
better access, freer trade: when you have a well-educated and highly motivated 
public, those are the key ingredients in the recipe for future success.
Canada is the world’s fi fth largest exporter and importer. It is the most 
trade-dependent nation in the developed world, with exports of goods and 
services representing about forty percent of gross domestic product, about 
four times as much, in percentage terms, as the United States or Japan. In 
that regard, the greatest diff erence between Canada and most other coun-
tries in the world is that we are even more trade-dependent. We are not a 
superpower that can dictate the terms on which the rest of the world must 
do business with us. Th at is why the rule of law is critical. Canadian pros-
perity hinges on the existence of an international regulatory framework that 
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facilitates access to expanding world markets, and that can adapt to changes 
in technology, trade practices and social systems. Th e World Trade Organi-
zation provides the cornerstone of our nation’s trade policy and the foun-
dation for Canada’s relations with its trading partners, including emerging 
markets and developing countries.
In this uncertain and tumultuous economic era we must enhance our 
relationship with Hong Kong. For well over a century, Hong Kong has 
served as the gateway to mainland China. Obviously, there is nowhere bet-
ter to obtain the expertise, information and facilities needed to tap into the 
Chinese market, especially as economic expansion is fuelled through trade 
due to its entry into the WTO.
One project that CME has been championing has been the Pacifi c Gate-
way Initiative, which will have immense economic benefi ts and spin-off s for 
the whole of Canada. Many of you probably know that we like to boast that 
we are Hong Kong’s closest neighbour in North America in terms of nautical 
miles. Prince Rupert is approximately 5,286 miles across the Pacifi c, while 
Seattle and Los Angeles are 5,768 and 6,380 miles respectively. Construct-
ing not only a state-of-the-art superport, but a high-tech intermodal logistics 
network that includes ships, trains and trucks, begins in Western Canada and 
unfolds all over North America, will benefi t not only North America and 
China, but the entire global supply chain system as well.
Looking to the future, it is a safe bet to say that Canada and Hong Kong 
will enhance their relationship as more and more of our businesses develop 
new business partnerships. Remember RIM? Th e company—a CME 
member, I may add—that revolutionized communication in the West has 
now headed East. Just yesterday China Mobile Communications Corpora-
tion began off ering BlackBerry mobile e-mail service to some of its existing 
corporate clients in Asia. China is the world’s biggest mobile communica-
tions market, with more than 400 million cellphone users, most of whom 
are China Mobile customers. Hong Kong has a few thousand BlackBerry 
subscribers registered since the service was started in 2002. When I was 
in Hong Kong last December, my BlackBerry functioned as seamlessly as 
if I were in Ottawa. Some analysts are predicting that in three years’ time 
more than 3.9 million Chinese will be using the BlackBerry as the preferred 
mode of communication. Currently RIM has fi ve million subscribers. Th at 
type of creativity, innovation, leadership and vision must stand as a model 
for success for all Canadian companies moving forward.
We may be thousands of miles apart geographically, but Canada and 
China are just a mouse-click away, and Hong Kong remains the gateway to 
the opportunities that wait for us in the world’s fastest-growing economy.
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It is a special privilege for me to deliver this address in the great city of 
Shanghai on the occasion of the 2009 meeting of the International Business 
Leaders’ Advisory Council. I am pleased that among the very talented group 
of Advisory Council business leaders is my colleague and friend Laurent 
Beaudoin, whose company, Bombardier, is a global leader in rail equipment 
and civil aviation manufacturing, a company that exemplifi es the commit-
ment of Canadian business to China.
Mayor Han, you have vividly demonstrated to us in your address this 
morning and in the events you graciously included us in yesterday that 
you are no ordinary Mayor and that Shanghai is no ordinary city. We were 
all moved, I am sure, by the drama of the new Yangtze River tunnel and 
bridge, by the tenderness in the release of birds at Dongtan Wetland Park, 
and by the beauty of last night’s performance in the splendid architecture 
of the Oriental Art Center.
As we meet in Shanghai, the impact of the most severe global eco-
nomic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s continues to rever-
berate. One of the notable aspects of the crisis is its global reach. People, 
businesses and governments in every part of the world have felt its sting. 
Th is surprised some observers, who argued that parts of the world could 
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somehow be isolated from one another, that the crisis could in eff ect be 
quarantined. Th is turned out to be impossible. Regardless of where we 
live, we are all actors on a global stage.
I am a believer in the benefi ts of globalization, as I know you are, Mayor 
Han, and as I know are the outward-looking people of this dynamic city. 
It is a plain fact that globalization has accelerated economic progress, lifted 
hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, spurred innovation and scien-
tifi c advancement, and brought people, cities and countries closer together, 
ensuring that we are better able to confront challenges that touch us all, 
whether the challenge be a fi nancial crisis, a devastating earthquake, a killer 
tsunami or a raging pandemic. Understandably, not everyone is convinced 
of the virtues of globalization, especially in diffi  cult economic times. Look-
ing around the world, we know that the benefi ts of rapid globalization 
are not equitably shared. Th is takes time, to be sure, but the forces that 
are propelling globalization, spurred on by ground-breaking networking 
technologies, are stronger than ever. United Nations Secretary General Kofi  
Annan once off ered a telling perspective: “Arguing against globalization,” 
he said, “is like arguing against the laws of gravity.”
Th ere are signs of hope that the worst of the economic crisis has passed. 
Output has stopped shrinking in the world’s largest economies, stock mar-
kets have rallied, company inventories are being replenished, fi nancial mar-
kets are beginning to thaw, and confi dence is re-emerging. It is heartening, 
for example, that the International Monetary Fund is now predicting that 
global GDP will expand by 3.1 percent next year. However, we cannot 
ignore that in most parts of the world unemployment is still on the rise, 
business continues to face tough conditions, a large amount of global man-
ufacturing capacity remains idle, many fi nancial institutions are still shaky, 
and governments are saddled with huge and growing fi scal obligations. As 
our Chinese hosts know fi rsthand, China has not been immune. Th e global 
nature of the recession, the pullback of consumers in the United States and 
elsewhere, and the precipitous fall of international trade volumes, the worst 
since the Great Depression, have meant job losses and industrial contrac-
tion even in this country, where growth continues to be impressive.
Looking ahead fi ve years, even ten years, what will the global economic 
landscape look like? I believe that the answer, in large measure, will depend 
on how the major developed and emerging economies face up to a number 
of critical challenges. I am going to mention fi ve of them.
In dealing with these challenges, China is destined to play a key role. 
Th is country’s remarkable transformation of the past three decades in 
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political, economic, trade and fi nancial power continues without signifi -
cant interruption. GDP over this period has multiplied more than eighty 
times and, according to the People’s Bank of China, China’s foreign 
exchange reserves now are approaching US$ 2.3 trillion. Forecasts point 
to China achieving 8.1 percent growth in 2009, a more than respectable 
showing against a backdrop of global recession. Data released in recent 
days point to momentum in China that could very well lead to even higher 
growth this year. However bright China’s prospects are, Chinese leaders 
have rightly identifi ed the need to achieve a recovery from the eff ects of 
the crisis that is sustainable. Last month, in a speech to the World Eco-
nomic Forum in Dalian, Premier Wen Jiabao acknowledged that China’s 
economic recovery “is not yet steady, solid and balanced.” Th e Premier’s 
frank assertion underscores a growing consensus among thought leaders 
in China that urgent priorities need attention. Key among them are the 
need to accelerate unfulfi lled economic reforms, to deal with widespread 
poverty and widening income disparity, to respond to serious environ-
mental problems, and to foster expanded domestic consumption.
As China and the world look beyond the economic crisis, what are the 
most urgent challenges that need to be addressed? Th e fi rst is to gain a proper 
perspective on the crisis itself. While it is true that the direct causes of the 
crisis—the combustible mixture of excess leverage in both consumer and 
fi nancial markets, the bank failures, the credit collapse and the contagion to 
the broader economy—have led to painful consequences, it would be folly 
to conclude that the foundations of market economics have been irreparably 
damaged. A serious failure in the conduct of global fi nance should not result 
in the wholesale condemnation of a market system that in large measure 
functions responsibly, a market based on the rule of law and ethical princi-
ples, a market that promotes competition and innovation. As has been amply 
demonstrated in recent decades, a market that functions responsibly off ers 
the best hope to people who seek a better and more secure life, wherever in 
the world they may live. Th is is absolutely fundamental.
A second challenge facing the global community is how to deal intelli-
gently with the huge fi scal challenges ahead. Th e robust response of central 
banks and governments to the economic crisis may very well have averted 
a global catastrophe. Th eir actions certainly stemmed public panic, helped 
to restore the conditions for an eventual return to stability and confi dence, 
and launched a healthy debate about a wide range of possible fi nancial 
reforms. At the same time, however, governments have assumed massive 
fi scal obligations that will take many years to unwind. Th e IMF points out 
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that, in the G20 as a whole, defi cits have grown from 1.1 percent of collec-
tive GDP in 2007 to 8.1 percent in 2009. Th e Fund further predicts that 
government debt in the advanced G20 countries will rise from a pre-crisis 
average of seventy-nine percent of GDP to 120 percent in 2014. Th ese are 
staggering numbers. As governments face up to this fi scal challenge, two 
risks must be carefully balanced. On the one hand, it is vital that fi scal 
stimulus measures not be withdrawn too quickly, for fear that the slowly 
emerging recovery will be snuff ed out. On the other hand, fi scal stimulus 
that is sustained for too long will fuel already abundant fears of a massive 
spike in infl ation, and the emergence of new and ever more dangerous 
asset bubbles. Countries with looming demographic pressures and unaf-
fordable entitlement programmes face additional risks. What is needed is 
for countries to develop and execute smart “exit” strategies. Th is requires a 
determined pullback in government spending as the private sector returns 
to growth. Not an easy task: as we all know, the politics of unwinding gov-
ernment programmes can be daunting. Here political courage and good 
public policy go hand in hand. Given the interdependence of the global 
economy, close coordination on this front by the G20 nations is crucial.
A third challenge that must be addressed if the global economy is to return 
to stable growth is protectionism. Despite exhortations by G8 and G20 lead-
ers to stop growing protectionism in its tracks, examples abound throughout 
the world as political authorities off er preferences to home-based businesses 
and seek ways to cushion rising unemployment. Th e severity of the prob-
lem was underscored recently by the Geneva-based World Trade Alliance. It 
claims that, on average, a G20 country has violated the “no new protection-
ism” pledge once every three days since it was made last November.
Last week’s report of the authoritative Netherlands Bureau for Economic 
Policy suggests that the dramatic contraction in global trade, estimated at 
close to twelve percent this year, may not be reversing itself as quickly as 
hoped. In the face of these gloomy statistics there is much that should con-
cern us. Trade rules are being fl outed regularly in developed and emerging 
countries alike. Again and again, short-term political expediency is trump-
ing the rule of law and common sense. Th e world continues to spin away 
from the goal of a single, credible and eff ective set of multilateral trade 
rules. Th e Doha Round is paralyzed and its prospects are dim. In its place, a 
patchwork of bilateral and regional trade agreements is growing in size and 
complexity. Th e time for action is long overdue. Here it would be apt to 
refl ect on the teachings of Confucius, who said, “Looking at small advan-
tages prevents great aff airs from being accomplished.”
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Let me turn now to a fourth challenge that deserves urgent attention. 
In Pittsburgh this past September G20 leaders acknowledged that the 
global economy is out of balance and that this is one of the reasons for 
the fi nancial crisis. Excessive reliance on external demand carries with it 
real consequences, as does excessive reliance on foreign investors to fi nance 
consumption and defi cits for long periods of time. As we have found, such 
imbalances can cause serious and long-lasting economic damage. Over the 
past year these imbalances have started to unwind. For example, the current 
account defi cit of the United States has dropped from about fi ve percent 
of GDP in 2008 to less than three percent in the second quarter of 2009. 
Meanwhile, China’s current account surplus has declined from about ten 
percent of GDP in the fi rst half of 2008 to 6.5 percent in the fi rst half of 
2009. With these trends moving in the right direction, I would argue that 
a return to ever-increasing imbalances in global trade and capital markets 
must be avoided at all costs. Otherwise, we risk precipitating yet another 
crisis, with even greater negative consequences for the global economy.
So what should we do? Put simply, Americans in particular are going to 
have to save more of their income and consume less, and Asian economies 
will have to foster greater domestic demand. In both cases, this is far easier 
said than done. Th ere is no magic set of policy prescriptions to motivate 
individuals to change their habits so as to dramatically increase savings on 
the one hand and consumption on the other. In the case of the United 
States, with recovery, the federal government must put in place a cred-
ible exit strategy. Th is means achieving balanced budgets over an economic 
cycle. Th is goal will be out of reach unless health care costs are contained, 
taxes on consumption are raised, social security reforms are implemented 
and “pay as you go” spending is embraced. In the case of the Asian econo-
mies, and especially China, the shift towards expanded consumption should 
focus on strengthened pension schemes, and increased government spend-
ing on health care and education. Earlier this year, McKinsey & Company 
reported that the development of service industries and easier access to 
consumer products and credit could increase domestic demand in China 
by more than US$ 2 trillion by 2025.
In my view, China, in addition, will have to come to terms with the issue 
of exchange rate fl exibility. With the global recovery, China’s exports are 
growing once again and more capital is fl owing back into the country, rais-
ing expectations for currency appreciation. Th e alternative is future price 
infl ation in certain asset classes. Chinese central bank Vice Governor Ma 
Delun recently highlighted the risk that asset bubbles could begin to build 
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within China as the economy roars back to life. Th ere needs to be an outlet, 
and that outlet should be to allow the currency to appreciate.
Th ere is also the challenge, or opportunity, of what to do with China’s 
immense foreign exchange reserves. A Chinese think tank has come up 
with an intriguing idea: that the reserves could be put to good use through 
the development of a “Marshall Plan” for Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
Such a development fund, or loan facility, would increase living standards 
in the targeted countries. Th ese funds would ignite new engines of global 
growth and recovery to off set lower American and European consumption. 
Perhaps China’s leadership will consider such a bold move. Indeed, Presi-
dent Hu Jintao has acknowledged the role of global imbalances as a key 
contributor to the fi nancial crisis and to negative impacts on “global wealth 
distribution, resource availability and consumption, and the international 
monetary system.” Putting the enormous supply of China’s foreign reserves 
towards greater development would go some way to answering the chal-
lenge of imbalances in the global economy.
Let me turn now to a fi fth enormously complex challenge that deserves 
attention. In a few weeks the world’s eyes will turn to Copenhagen, as 
some 190 governments attempt to negotiate a more robust global plan 
to tackle climate change. I sometimes feel that we have loaded so many 
expectations onto the climate change agenda, and the Copenhagen sum-
mit in particular, that it cannot help but fail. To listen to the rhetoric, 
you would think that tackling this issue will give us vast new sources of 
cleaner energy, spawn whole new industries of clean technology, almost 
single-handedly cure unemployment through the growth of millions of 
“green” jobs, and allow for the transfer of massive amounts of fi nancial 
and technological aid to emerging economies. I have always believed 
that we should have lofty aspirations and continually challenge ourselves 
to do better, but in the politically charged and confusing debate around 
climate change it is easy to forget fundamental realities. For example, 
that climate change aff ects every man, woman and child on Earth, and 
therefore we must fi nd new ways for all nations to contribute, accord-
ing to their capabilities and strengths, to a lower carbon future. I know 
that some of you will say that the developed world has had 200 years of 
industrial activity and wealth accumulation, and therefore must act fi rst. 
Th is is undoubtedly true, but the simple fact is that, going forward, the 
developing world will account for signifi cantly more than half of annual 
global emissions. Unless the rapidly emerging economies become key 
players, there can be no solution.
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China’s leadership is pivotal. Having recently overtaken the United 
States as the world’s largest producer of greenhouse gases, your country has 
a vital stake in achieving a global consensus on tackling climate change. 
Your leaders have acknowledged the primacy of improving environmental 
quality at home. Th e simple fact is that the health of China’s citizenry, the 
liveability of China’s cities, and the competitiveness of China’s workforce 
and industries will depend heavily on embracing advanced environmental 
standards and green technologies.
Th is leads me to some relatively simple propositions about the role 
of business going forward. First, we must encourage our political leaders 
to work harder to forge an international climate change plan that is fair, 
eff ective, aff ordable and sustainable. In each of our countries we can do 
more to foster policy that integrates economic development, energy and 
the environment. We must push our governments to adopt policies that 
incent new technologies, rather than encouraging them to hide behind 
green protectionism or the false hope of weakened intellectual property 
rights. Whatever the outcome in Copenhagen, we need a framework that 
will unleash the creativity of the market, whether it be in renewable energy, 
advanced materials with a much lower environmental impact, or leading-
edge technologies such as clean coal or carbon sequestration. Businesses 
themselves, throughout the world, have to step up to the plate. Even in 
challenging times, we need to greatly enhance our investment in research 
and development and commercialization of lower-carbon energy, products 
and services. We need to build direct business-to-business engagement, and 
foreign investment and technology partnerships. As we already see happen-
ing here in China, such partnerships create innovative capacity in both the 
developers and the adopters of new technologies. Th e centrality of these 
new technologies to long-term prosperity cannot be overemphasized. Th is 
is a point that President Obama made last week in an address to the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology when he said: “From China to India, from 
Japan to Germany, nations everywhere are racing to develop newer ways to 
produce and use energy. Th e nation that wins this competition will be the 
nation that leads the global economy.”
Mayor Han, responding decisively to the fi ve challenges I have out-
lined this morning, I believe, is essential if we are to build a prosperous 
and peaceful world. Success will require a degree of cooperation among 
countries and peoples unprecedented in our lifetimes. Th e global economic 
crisis has been a powerful catalyst and, in one respect at least, it has been 
benefi cial. In shaking our confi dence and our institutions, it has compelled 
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us all to think about how we can create a better world. Th is indeed is a crisis 
that must not be wasted.
Th e response to the crisis is taking many forms. It has given prominence 
and momentum to the G20, signalling a seismic shift in the architecture 
of global governance. While the G20 may lack the cohesion of the G8, 
its greatest virtue is that it brings to the table the most important global 
players. Th e hard truth is that the challenges I have outlined—restoring 
faith in the market, balancing growth and fi scal responsibility, defeating 
protectionism, bringing balance to world fi nances and achieving a cleaner, 
more sustainable environment—cannot be realized without a new consen-
sus among the global heavyweights. In recent public debate, some have 
argued that the task of building such a consensus should fall primarily on 
China and the United States, the so-called G2. Th is, in my view, would 
be a mistake. While cooperation between China and the United States is 
essential in dealing with a host of political, economic and security issues, I 
believe that the interests of China, the United States and the global com-
munity as a whole would be better served in a multipolar world guided by 
eff ective multilateral institutions.
In such a world, one in which the ideas and vitality of many countries 
and peoples interact, the role of cities is central. We are here today as your 
guests, Mayor Han, because we share your view that Shanghai is destined to 
be among the greatest of cities in the 21st century. Shortly, we will hear the 
views of various business leaders from around the world on what it takes to 
aspire to the front ranks of urban achievement and excellence. In my view, 
“quality of life” should be the ultimate determinant of rank.
In June the Economist Intelligence Unit released its Liveability Rank-
ing of 140 cities around the world. It rates more than thirty factors across 
fi ve categories: stability, health care, culture and environment, education 
and infrastructure. We Canadians are pleased to fi nd that Vancouver 
once again was ranked fi rst, and two other Canadian cities, Toronto and 
Calgary, were among the top ten. Shanghai is making progress on these 
fronts. With an international trade volume of some US$ 600 billion in 
2008, its fi nancial strength and its strategic position in the Yangtze River 
delta, it has staggering potential. Th e city government’s plan to build 
four centres for international economics, fi nance, shipping, and trade and 
services by 2020 signals a wise selection of priorities for moving forward. 
Th is plan and your speech this morning, Mayor Han, signal a continuing 
shift from labour-intensive to capital- and knowledge-based industries. 
Th is entails the need to attract diverse and world-class skilled workers at 
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the same time as devoting more resources to education and training. It 
implies improvements in infrastructure. It implies “going green” in a mas-
sive way, embracing the most advanced sustainable technologies. It makes 
clear the need for a sound legal system and best practices in accounting, 
regulation and governance. Most fundamentally, it implies an open econ-
omy, where capital, goods, services and people move freely. In the pursuit 
of all these objectives the citizens of Shanghai and the people of China 
will be greatly inspired by World Expo 2010. So will the approximately 
70 million visitors who are expected to witness fi rsthand the meaning of 
the Expo motto, “Better city, better life.”
Mayor Han, I wish you, and the hard-working and creative people of 
Shanghai, every success as you continue your impressive eff orts to make 
your city a 21st-century leader. I have no doubt that you will succeed. China 
and the world will be a better place for it.
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Th e rights of minorities are an arena that is becoming perhaps the principal 
battle ground for human rights in the 21st century. Recent history seems to 
off er the stunning paradox that federal states may not be the best form of 
human governance for societies with multiethnic populations. Th e former 
Soviet Bloc had nine states, six of which were unitary states, while three 
were federal in structure. With the unifi cation of Germany, the six uni-
tary states are now fi ve, but the three federal states—Yugoslavia, the Soviet 
Union and Czechoslovakia—are now twenty-three independent states (see 
Stepan 1999 and Malesevic 2000). Most of these newly independent states 
were forged by minorities who did not feel that their rights were suffi  ciently 
protected by the federal structures they previously existed within. I suggest 
that ethnic identities are not predetermined to be in confl ict with those of 
other groups and that the causes of ethnic confl ict are infl uenced not only 
by history, but also by the ways in which such groups are treated. As one 
Bosnian Muslim teacher is reported to have said (by Jentleson 2007, p. 
19): “We were Yugoslavs, but when we began to be murdered because we 
are Muslims, things changed. Th e defi nition of who we are today has been 
determined by our killing.”
At fi rst sight, this does not bode well for federations being particularly 
good structures for the protection of minority rights. Yet the orthodox 
thesis is that it is federations, rather than unitary states, that can best 
protect minorities across diverse populations or across large territories. 
Perhaps this view is outdated and should be replaced with the thesis that 
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it is only multiethnic societies, whether federations or not, that develop 
the appropriate constitutional and legal frameworks for the substantive 
equality rights of their minorities, together with an appropriate method 
of balancing individual and collective rights, that can hope to remain 
united and avoid the human rights catastrophes that we see today in so 
many multiethnic societies.
More controversially, I suggest that the protection of such minority 
rights is even more important than instituting the procedural elements of 
democracy in a multiethnic society, as the tragedy unfolding in Iraq argu-
ably demonstrates. In another tragic example, Sri Lanka, a democratic mul-
tiethnic state, has stood accused of violating the human rights and equality 
rights of its Tamil and other minorities, and found itself in a devastating 
civil war that has left more than 70,000 dead and with no resolution of 
the underlying causes of the confl ict, even though the Sri Lankan army 
defeated the rebels in May 2009 and took over all the areas previously 
held by them (Tiruchelvam 2000, p. 198; it is worth noting that Neelan 
Tiruchelvam, a friend and colleague, was a moderate Tamil scholar and 
jurist who was killed by a suicide bomber on July 29, 1999, paying with 
his life for his belief that constitutional reform in the direction of regional 
autonomy could resolve Sri Lanka’s ethnic confl ict). Similarly, other for-
mally democratic multiethnic states, such as the Russian Federation, are 
still being condemned in the annual reports of Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch for gross violations of human rights and lack of 
eff ective democratic institutions, and are, in practice, refusing to go down 
the road of an eff ective constitutional and legal framework that respects 
the substantive equality of its minorities—with similar disastrous conse-
quences. Th e future for authoritarian non-democratic multiethnic states 
is even bleaker. We only have to look at the genocidal carnage in Sudan to 
understand this horrible future.
Substantive Equality in the Context of Minority Rights
I suggest that at the core of what substantive equality means for minority 
groups is the acceptance that treating minorities identically in all respects 
with the dominant population can lead to a sense of oppression that can 
fuel civil confl ict (for a discussion of equality, and the accommodation of 
diff erences between minority groups and majorities, see Kymlicka 1995a, 
pp. 108–16). Substantive equality, I suggest, would promote treating all 
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groups in a multiethnic society with equal concern and respect, which 
often requires diff erential treatment to respect their human dignity, while 
formal equality would promote identical treatment of all minorities, 
regions and citizens (for further discussion of this hotly contested view, 
see Milne 1991, pp. 285–307). Indeed, in some cases equal treatment can 
often result in discrimination, even for those disadvantaged groups that 
may not belong to national minorities. For example, it would be rampant 
discrimination to treat the disabled equally with everyone else as regards 
access to public transportation.
Canada could provide a global template, albeit one that is not per-
fect, of appropriate striving to attain the foundational value of sub-
stantive equality for its minorities and indigenous populations within 
a multiethnic federation. Th at being said, it must also be accepted that 
we have been far from perfect in treating our minorities and indigenous 
populations with substantive equality during the course of our history. 
Canada is both a very new country, less than 200 years old, and also a 
very old country, since its fi rst inhabitants, the Aboriginal peoples, have 
lived here from time immemorial. We have, in comparison to many 
European nations, a very diverse population. Over one third of Cana-
dians can trace their origins from France and are concentrated in the 
province of Quebec, where they form a powerful majority. However, 
more than one million francophones live outside Quebec in minority 
linguistic communities spread across the country. Increasingly, Cana-
dian society is becoming a mirror of the global society as we welcome 
immigration from all over the world. In the near future our major cities 
of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver will have majority populations 
that are non-European in origin (see Statistics Canada 2005), creating 
calls by racial and ethnic minorities for collective rights to non-discrim-
ination and equality. Eventually demands for equality by these groups 
may lead to a push for representation in elected bodies, as an exten-
sion of the principle of federalism that regions should be represented in 
national institutions (see Kymlicka 1995a, p. 137).
Th e Chinese Canadian diaspora has had a long and important history in 
the development of Canada, including being an indispensable part of the 
labour force that built the Canadian Pacifi c Railway and thus set the stage 
for the creation of the country itself. It is important to regard the Chinese 
Canadian population as being comprised not only of recent immigrants 
but also of the many early settlers who helped to establish the country, 
along with their descendants (see Innis 1971).
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Th e Recognition of Collective Rights in the Canadian 
Constitution
Th e founding document of the Canadian state, the British North America 
Act 1867 (retitled the Constitution Act from 1982), is replete with provi-
sions related to diversity. However, what is particularly interesting about 
the evolution of the Canadian constitution is that it contains critical provi-
sions that sometimes allow diff erential (or “asymmetrical”) treatment and 
sometimes mandate identical (or “symmetrical”) treatment for national, 
linguistic and some religious minorities, which allows diff erences to fl our-
ish. Examples include:
• the guarantee of seventy-fi ve seats for Quebec in the Canadian 
House of Commons in Section 37, a critical asymmetrical provi-
sion;
• the entrenchment of the provinces’ jurisdiction over property and 
civil rights in Section 92(13), a critical symmetrical provision that 
allows diff erences between the provinces to fl ourish;
• the asymmetrical protection of denominational schools in Ontario 
and Quebec under Section 93; and
• the offi  cial use of English and French in the Canadian and Quebec 
legislatures under Section 133, another important asymmetrical 
provision.
Th e maintenance of the civil law system in Quebec is another example 
of asymmetrical federalism entrenched in the constitutional history of the 
country. Th e genius of the founding architects of Canadian nationhood 
was to entrench asymmetry up to the limits of the politically possible, but 
then to permit diff erences to fl ourish under other symmetrical provisions 
(see Beaudoin 1990).
Leading US theorists of federalism, such as the late William H. Riker 
(1975), have argued that it is only symmetrical federalism that is truly com-
patible with democratic federalism. However, where multiethnic nations 
have large and historically settled national ethnic, linguistic or religious 
minorities, an insistence on symmetrical federalism or constitutional 
frameworks would be a denial of the substantial equality of these minori-
ties. Absolute symmetrical federalism and formal equality can often lead to 
the assumption of uniformity where it does not exist, and could lead to the 
coercive institutions of the federal state attempting to impose uniformity 
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and assimilation that national minorities will resist. Th e result can be disas-
trous, as we have seen in the case of the former Yugoslavia.
Asymmetrical constitutional provisions in multiethnic federations are 
especially important to promote the essential features of cultural self-deter-
mination of such minorities in areas such as language, education, culture, 
religion and, as in the case of Canada, the legal traditions and systems. 
Eff ective participation in decision-making at the central level and at the 
highest levels of political decision-making, which may be asymmetrical 
to the proportions of the minorities within the federation’s population, is 
essential to protect against the “nationalizing” tendencies of the dominant 
population in a multiethnic federation (see Kymlicka, ed., 1995b). Th is is 
the chief rationale for providing the guarantee of seventy-fi ve seats to Que-
bec, regardless of what proportion of the total Canadian population the 
population of that province may comprise. It also accounts for the fact that 
three of the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada must be from Quebec, 
and the tradition of ensuring regional and national minority representation 
in the governing party’s federal cabinet.
To reiterate, substantive equality diff ers from formal equality in that it 
recognizes that identical treatment can lead to discriminatory treatment of 
minorities, and impose uniformity and coercive assimilation that would 
threaten the existence of such minorities (Kymlicka 1995a, pp. 10–130). 
Democratic multiethnic federal states such as India and Canada (some 
would add Spain) have learned that asymmetrical federalism has been criti-
cal to the survival of their countries (see Stepan 1999, p. 53).
Th e dilemma of how to fi t minority rights within a constitutional frame-
work that respects both individual and collective rights is being addressed 
in theory and practice by Canadians within the Canadian constitutional 
framework. Will Kymlicka argues that “group-specifi c” rights are compat-
ible with liberal fundamental tenets that uphold the supremacy of indi-
vidual rights. Th e fundamental premise of these theorists (and I include 
myself in this group) is that it is because the rights and liberties of indi-
vidual citizens include the right to associate that most such rights have a 
group-related or group-specifi c dimension. Th us, belonging to a minority 
based on common cultural, linguistic or religious heritage is an important 
factor of identity and indeed of human dignity for most members of such 
minorities. Where individuals thus freely associate, no central or state gov-
ernment or majority, however large, may deny the right of such groups to 
cultural self-determination within the limits of the supremacy of individual 
and universal rights, and the rule of law (Kymlicka 1995a, pp. 75–106).
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Some of the collective rights within the growing diversity of Cana-
dian society have been guaranteed in the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, which was entrenched as Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 
1982 (through Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 (UK); see Beaudoin 
and Mendes, ed. 2005). In the Constitution we recognize the collective 
rights of Aboriginal peoples. Th rough provisions of the original Consti-
tution and the Charter, and court decisions, we recognize the collective 
rights of linguistic minorities and, in the case of Quebec, a linguistic 
majority that wishes to preserve its language within a predominantly 
English-speaking continent.
Protection of minorities has been confi rmed as one of four foundational 
principles of Canadian federalism by the Supreme Court in its landmark 
ruling on the right of Quebec unilaterally to secede from Canada (in Refer-
ence re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217). However, the Charter 
and Canadian society also recognize the equal value of civil and political 
rights based on the dignity of the individual human being. I suggest that 
through Section 1 of the Charter a mandate was given by the Parliament 
of Canada to the judiciary, in particular the Supreme Court of Canada, to 
work out a legal framework for adjudication between collective and indi-
vidual rights. Section 1 of the Charter allows governments in Canada to 
infringe rights if they can demonstrate that such infringements are “reason-
able limits prescribed by law,” and “can be demonstrably justifi ed in a free 
and democratic society.” In the rather complex interpretations of Section 
1, it should never be forgotten that one of the most pre-eminent jurists in 
Canadian history, the late Chief Justice Brian Dickson, focused (in R. v. 
Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103) on the fi nal words of Section 1, just quoted, 
as they formed “the ultimate standard against which a limit on a right or 
freedom must be shown, despite its eff ect.” Chief Justice Dickson argued 
that, because Canada is a free and democratic society, the courts must be 
guided in interpreting Section 1 by the values inherent in concepts such as
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to 
social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, 
respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political 
institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and groups 
in society.
Th ere can be no better statement of the fundamental values that must 
underpin multiethnic states if minority rights are to be protected.
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What China Could Learn from Th is Canadian Experience
While minorities amount to only around nine percent of the total pop-
ulation of China, that fi gure represents more than 110 million individ-
uals, and their numbers are growing. Th e territories where most minori-
ties live contain most of China’s natural resources. While offi  cial China 
often talks of the grim struggle with separatist or “splittist” forces, in 
the long run the strength of China’s territorial integrity will, in my view, 
in large measure depend on how the government enhances ethnic rela-
tions and minority rights. While many in China would argue that the 
constitutional and legal structures for minority rights in China—with 
the provisions for limited autonomy and ethnic self-rule, and the pro-
liferation of preferential policies—already do benefi t minorities, some 
experts, both within and outside China, point out three critical weak-
nesses (see Sautman 1997).
First, the law and the Constitution of China have yet to provide 
unquestionable genuine autonomy to minority areas. Such autonomy 
involves fewer powers than are minimally required to ensure cultural self-
determination. Article 4 of the Constitution refers to regional autonomy 
for minorities living in compact communities who are free to “preserve 
or reform their own ways and customs.” Th e Law on Regional Autonomy 
both sets out and also restricts that autonomy, which must be “under 
unifi ed state leadership” and under the principle of “democratic central-
ism,” in other words, under the discipline of the Chinese Communist 
Party. In addition, under Article 4 all self-governing organs of minorities 
must implement the laws and policies of the state. Under Article 118 of 
the Constitution and Article 19 of the Law on Regional Autonomy, laws 
and regulations made by autonomous areas that govern the exercise of 
autonomy must be approved by higher bodies. Th e laws and regulations 
of the fi ve autonomous regions—Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, 
Ningxia and Tibet—must be approved by the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress (Sautman 1997, pp. 22–23).
Second, policies and laws are not suffi  cient to allow for the degree of 
economic autonomy that would help minority areas to meet the challenge 
of bridging the gap between the Han majority and the various minorities. 
Th ere is a large and growing income disparity between minorities and 
the Han majority population. Th ere is a wealth gap, estimated at twenty 
to one, between the rapidly developing coastal areas and the minority 
northwestern provinces, and within the minority areas there is a wage gap 
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between the minority peasants and the majority Han peasants. Some call 
this an “ethnic psychological imbalance,” which can threaten the unity of 
the country (Sautman 1997, p. 5).
Th ird, there is insuffi  cient protection against the encroachment of 
cultural self-determination by the Han majority. In particular, minor-
ity leaders accepted by the Chinese government as legitimate represen-
tatives, such as Adbulahat Abdurixit, Governor of Xinjiang, or Tomur 
Dawarnat, a Vice-Chair of the National People’s Congress, have argued 
strenuously against unlimited migration by members of the Han major-
ity into minority areas. Th ese leaders voiced opposition, for example, to 
the plan to move 100,000 people, mostly from the Han majority, from 
the site of the Th ree Gorges Dam to Xinjiang, and accurately predicted 
that interethnic tensions would result. Such cultural encroachment is also 
worsened by what some leading Chinese scholars call the aff ront to the 
dignity of minority peoples posed by the discriminatory attitudes of the 
Han majority, and of Han minorities in autonomous areas, which regard 
many minorities as backward and uncivilized in culture and education 
(see Sautman 1997, pp. 6 and 15–21).
In conclusion, both Canada and China have struggled with the evo-
lution of minority rights in their multiethnic societies. In Canada our 
constitutional, legal and societal evolution has led us to recognize that 
minority rights constitute a central part of Canadian identity, unity, and 
competitive advantage in a globalized economy. In China, I suggest, 
much of the constitutional, legal and societal evolution of minority rights 
that occurred in the 1980s was premised on a planned economy, where 
minority rights and preferences were regarded as part of the centrally 
organized development of the state. Today, with globalization making 
non-minority areas of China, such as the Special Economic Zones, more 
autonomous than the autonomous regions, with all the attendant benefi ts 
of economic and social development, some have suggested that it may be 
time to contemplate off ering the minority autonomous regions the status 
of “special cultural zones,” in which there could be suffi  cient enlarged 
economic and cultural autonomy for China’s national minorities to feel 
that their very existence is not threatened (Sautman 1997, p. 39). Th is 
could, in time, become not only the solution to the problem of separat-
ist movements, but also a competitive advantage for China in the global 
economy, as the Canadian model has demonstrated.
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THE CHINESE DIASPORA 
AND IMMIGRATION IN 
CANADA
158
Th e movement of people across international borders has signifi cant 
implications for international relations. Today the fl ow of people between 
Canada and China has become varied and complex, refl ecting changing 
economic and social circumstances in the two economies, and the evolving 
relationship between Canada and China.
China is a major source country for immigrants to Canada. Th e concen-
tration of Chinese immigrants in Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal and other 
major cities has implications not only for their settlement and integration 
but also for the shaping of foreign policy. Diaspora politics and transna-
tional business networks have the potential to aff ect relations between 
Canada and China in ways that are generally not well understood. Further, 
a sizeable community of Canadian citizens has moved to live in Greater 
China (comprising mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan). Th e 
push and pull factors of Canadians abroad, who number around 600,000 
in Asia and around 2.8 million globally (see Zhang and Woo 2006 and 
DeVoretz 2009), are also not well understood, but have profound implica-
tions for citizenship, consular services, public fi nance, health care, border 
security, international business, research and innovation, and more.
Rather than following the tradition of analyzing the economic perfor-
mance of Chinese immigrants in Canada, this paper is aimed to addressing 
how Chinese communities in Canada and Canadians in China are shaping 
a human platform for stronger relations between Canada and China, and 
the policy challenges associated with this human platform.
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Redefi ning Canada’s Chinese Communities
Th e Canadian Census of 2006 reported that more than 1.3 million people 
in Canada claimed that their ethnic origin was Chinese. (Th is fi gure does 
not include those who self-reported mixed ethnicity, having been born of 
interethnic marriages, nor does it include the 17,705 who self-identifi ed 
as Taiwanese or the 4,275 who self-identifi ed as Tibetan.) Th is made the 
Chinese community the eighth largest ethnic group in Canada and the 
largest of Asian origin (see Figure 13.1). Chinese languages, including 
Cantonese and Mandarin, formed the third largest mother tongue group 
in the country after English and French, and three percent of the popula-
tion reported that their mother tongue was one of the Chinese languages.
Th e Chinese community in Canada has changed, is changing, and will 
continue to change in many ways (see Li 2005 and 2010, Wang and Lo 
2005 and Guo and DeVoretz 2006), which will ultimately have an impact 
on relations with China (see Woo and Wang 2009 and Zhang 2010a). 
Th ere is no longer a homogenous Chinese community in Canada: the com-
munity has become very heterogeneous despite common places of birth, 
mother tongues, educational background, citizenship, and so on.
Figure 13.1 Canada’s Top Ten Communities by Ethnic Origin, 2006
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People of Chinese ethnic origin are not necessarily newcomers to Can-
ada. Some of them were born in Canada and their families may have lived 
in Canada for more than two generations. Th e Canadian-born Chinese has 
become a signifi cant phenomenon within the Chinese community. Th e 
Census of 2006 reported that 27.4 percent of respondents who claimed they 
were ethnic Chinese had been born in Canada. Th e Census also reported 
that 14.3 percent were second-generation and 2.3 percent were third-gen-
eration or more. However, 83.4 percent were fi rst-generation Canadians.
According to the Census, forty-nine percent of the Chinese immigrants 
had arrived in Canada from the People’s Republic of China, twenty-three 
percent came from Hong Kong, and others came from the Caribbean and 
Bermuda, the Philippines, India and other countries in Asia (see Figure 13.2).
Members of ethnic Chinese groups have achieved diff erent skill levels 
in Canada’s two offi  cial languages. Th e Census found that nearly eighty-six 
percent had some knowledge of English, French or both, and only fourteen 
percent claimed they had no knowledge of English or French. Th ey may also 
speak diff erent dialects. Nearly one in fi ve ethnic Chinese reported English 
or French as their mother tongue. Seventy-nine percent indicated that nei-
ther English nor French was their mother tongue. One third reported that 
they spoke English or French most often at home, with about sixty percent 
saying that they spoke other languages most often at home.
Figure 13.2 Origins of Chinese Immigrants Admitted to Canada, 2006
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Among those whose mother tongues were non-offi  cial languages, the 
number of respondents with a Chinese language as their mother tongue 
grew from fewer than 100,000 in 1971 to nearly 900,000 in 2001 and 
more than one million in 2006 (see Table 13.1). However, respondents 
who reported a Chinese language as their mother tongue may actually have 
spoken diff erent dialects. In the Census of 2006 “Chinese languages” were 
broken down into seven major languages—Mandarin, Cantonese, Hakka, 
Taiwanese, Chaochow (Teochow), Fukien and Shanghainese—as well as a 
residual category, “Chinese languages not otherwise specifi ed.”
Chinese immigrants have been admitted to Canada under diff erent entry 
categories. Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act establishes three 
categories of permanent residents, which correspond to the major objectives 
of reuniting families, contributing to economic development and protect-
ing refugees. Around two thirds of all immigrants to Canada from mainland 
China are admitted as economic immigrants, including skilled workers, pro-
fessionals, investors and entrepreneurs. Nearly a quarter of immigrants from 
mainland China gain entry as relatives of persons already living in Canada. 
Only a small number are admitted to Canada on humanitarian grounds. Th is 
pattern contrasts with thirty years ago, when around two thirds of immi-
grants from the mainland were relatives of people resident in Canada, around 
a quarter were in the humanitarian category, and only seven percent were 
economic immigrants (see Figure 13.3).
Figure 13.3 Immigrants from Mainland China to Canada by Entry Category, 
1980–2008
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Diff erences in educational background and citizenship status have also con-
tributed to the diversity of Canada’s Chinese community. Th e Census of 2006 
reported that fi fty-fi ve percent of the ethnic Chinese population fi fteen years 
of age and over had a post-secondary certifi cate, diploma or degree, compared 
to fi fty-one percent of all Canadians in the same age group; more signifi cantly, 
nearly half of all Chinese, compared to only sixteen percent of all Canadi-
ans, had received post-secondary education outside Canada (see Table 13.2). 
In addition, seventy-seven percent of the Chinese population held Canadian 
citizenship only, while fi ve percent possessed both Canadian and at least one 
other citizenship, and another eighteen percent had not yet become Canadian 
citizens (see Table 13.3).
Th e Wide-ranging Visibility of Chinese Canadians
As one of the largest visible minority groups in Canada, the visibility of the 
Chinese community varies considerably from province to province, from 
city to city, and from federal election district to federal election district. In 
2006 ethnic Chinese were most visible in the provinces of British Columbia 
(ten percent), Ontario (fi ve percent) and Alberta (four percent), while in 
other parts of Canada the odds of seeing a Chinese person were close to or 
less than one in a hundred (see Figure 13.4). Chinese were concentrated 
in Toronto, Vancouver, Montreal and, more recently, Calgary, and their 
visibility varied from nearly one in fi ve in the Census metropolitan area 
(CMA) of Vancouver, to one in ten in the Toronto CMA, one in twenty in 
the Calgary CMA and one in fi fty in the Montreal CMA (see Figure 13.5).
Th e ethnic Chinese vote is important in some ridings, but overall it has had 
little impact on the Canadian House of Commons. In 2006, the proportion of 
ethnic Chinese in federal election districts varied considerably, from as high as 
fi fty percent in Richmond, British Columbia, to four percent in Calgary and 
just 0.2 percent in parts of Prince Edward Island (see Statistics Canada 2006b).
Th e visibility of ethnic Chinese also varies in schools and job markets. Like 
other Canadians, Chinese Canadians typically select four areas as their major 
fi elds of study in post-secondary education: business, management and pub-
lic administration; architecture, engineering and related technologies; health, 
parks, recreation and fi tness; and social and behavioural sciences and law. How-
ever, Chinese students are more visible than average Canadians in three areas 
of applied science and business-related studies: mathematics, computer science 
and information sciences; business, management and public administration; 
and physical and life sciences and technologies (see Table 13.4).
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Figure 13.4 Visibility of Chinese Canadians in Populations of Canada, 
Provinces and Territories, 2006 
 





























Figure 13.5 Visibility of Chinese Canadians in Populations of Four Major 
Cities, 2006 
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Chinese Canadians are more likely to work in occupations related to 
applied sciences and business, such as natural and applied sciences, and 
related occupations; processing, manufacturing and utilities; business, 
fi nance and administrative occupations; and sales and services. However, 
Chinese Canadians are underrepresented in certain fi elds, including equip-
ment operation and related occupations, primary industry, education and 
government services (see Table 13.5).
Perhaps not surprisingly, Chinese Canadians are more visible than 
average Canadians in accommodation and food services (restaurant jobs), 
professional, scientifi c and technical services (accountants and lawyers), 
fi nance and insurance (jobs in banking), manufacturing (general labour) 
and wholesale trade (import and export). However, Chinese are less likely 
than average Canadians to work in construction, agriculture, forestry, 
fi shing and hunting; health care and social assistance; or public adminis-
tration (see Table 13.6).
Th e image of Chinese Canadians today is vastly diff erent than it was for 
much of the past 200 years, when Chinese immigrants were stereotyped as 
railway coolies, laundrymen or waiters. Hollywood exaggerated the stereo-
type with movies about opium dens, “celestials” in pigtails with knives hid-
den up their silk sleeves, or slant-eyed beauties with bound feet and ancient 
love potions (Lee 1984, p. 178). What the Chinese Canadian community 
looks like today is as diversifi ed as Canadian society is as a whole.
Emerging Canadians in China
Canadians historically have travelled widely, and today an estimated 2.8 mil-
lion Canadians live and work abroad (see DeVoretz 2009). Th ere have always 
been large numbers of Canadians living outside the country for extended 
periods, especially but not only in the United States. One of the prominent 
Canadian pioneers in China, for example, was Dr. Norman Bethune (1890–
1939), whose spirit of service, courage and innovation continues to inspire 
innovative partnerships between Canada and China today.
Th e Asia Pacifi c Foundation of Canada has classifi ed Canadians living 
in China into the following groups (see Guo 2009 and Zhang 2010b): (1) 
owners or employees of Canadian or multinational businesses; (2) Chi-
nese Canadian returnees, including members of the fi rst, second and later 
generations; (3) teachers of English as a second language (ESL); and (4) 
students and others.
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First, as China increasingly becomes a global economic powerhouse and 
the biggest recipient of foreign direct investment, more than ninety percent 
of the top 500 multinationals have set up in China, and thirty percent of 
those have established regional headquarters there (see China Radio Inter-
national 2008). Canadian businesses are among those active in China, and 
there are increasing numbers of native-born and naturalized Canadian execu-
tives, engineers and other professionals and specialists working in China.
Second, in 2008 a study by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development found that, depending on the country of destination and 
the time frame, twenty percent to fi fty percent of immigrants return home 
or move to a third country within fi ve years of their arrival (see Migration 
Policy Institute 2008). A recent report from Statistics Canada demonstrated 
that a signifi cant number of male immigrants to Canada of working age, 
especially skilled workers and entrepreneurs, are highly mobile, suggesting 
that a substantial part of migration to Canada is temporary. Th e estimated 
out-migration rate twenty years after arrival is around thirty-fi ve percent 
among young working-age male immigrants. About six out of ten of those 
who leave do so within the fi rst year of arrival, which suggests that many 
immigrants make their decisions within a relatively short period after arriv-
ing in Canada. Controlling for other characteristics, out-migration rates are 
higher among immigrants from source countries such as the United States 
and Hong Kong (see Aydemir and Robinson 2006). Despite these general 
conclusions, the return of Chinese Canadians to China remains under-
documented. What we do know is that many are not actually returning to 
China forever, but are what we may call “transnational,” often moving back 
and forth between two countries at diff erent periods in their lives.
Transnational parenting is not uncommon among young Chinese Cana-
dian families. High child care costs, the lack of family support in Canada and 
a volatile job market have led some families to send their children back to 
China, so that grandparents or other relatives can look after them. A study 
in 2002 of Chinese immigrants in fi ve prenatal programmes discovered that 
seventy percent of the female respondents said they planned to send their 
children back to China to be raised by relatives (see Ng 2007). Transnational 
schooling is also quite common. Many Chinese Canadian families who want 
their children to be bilingual and well-schooled in mathematics send their 
children back to China for certain years of their education.
Transnational entrepreneurship also plays a key role in connecting Can-
ada and China. A report commissioned by the Asia Pacifi c Foundation 
of Canada in 2008 revealed that foreign-educated Chinese transnational 
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entrepreneurs make up a distinct segment of the immigrant community 
(see Lin, Guan, and Nicholson 2008). Key characteristics distinguish them 
from classic middlemen traders, returnee entrepreneurs, or those who have 
returned to their home countries permanently. Instead, the characteristics 
of Canada-based Chinese transnational entrepreneurs include a greater 
likelihood of multinational experience, a higher level of establishment 
within their professions, a deeper degree of entrenchment in Canada, and 
a stronger desire to engage Canada in cross-border entrepreneurial endeav-
ours. Th e same report also identifi ed a variety of mechanisms used by trans-
national entrepreneurs to link Canada and China through innovation.
Transnational retirement allows senior Chinese Canadians to enjoy 
the pleasure of two homes. Like many Canadian “snowbirds” migrating 
into the United States, these senior citizens move across the Pacifi c as 
the season changes.
Th ird, Canadian ESL teachers are another signifi cant group of Canadi-
ans in China. Th ey are in high demand, not only because of the importance 
of learning English as a second language, but also because some Chinese 
students seem to prefer “Canadian” English. One contemporary Canadian, 
Mark Rowswell, known in China as Dashan, has even been described as 
“the most famous foreigner in China,” where he has worked as a performer, 
television host and cultural ambassador for more twenty years (see Row-
swell 2010). Although he is relatively unknown in the West, it is hard to 
fi nd anyone in China who does not know of Dashan, and his success story 
has also helped to raise the profi le of Canadian English in China.
Th e growing body of Canadians, whether Canadian-born or natural-
ized, living and working in mainland China and Hong Kong suggests that 
there is an emerging Canadian diaspora. What policy areas does the Cana-
dian government need to develop to recognize this diaspora, maintain and 
enhance Canada’s international ties, and maximize the benefi ts of those ties 
to Canada? Th e size and importance of Canada’s diaspora in China suggests 
that Canada should revisit its foreign policy toward China.
Understanding China as a Source and a Destination
When Stephen Harper’s Conservative government came into offi  ce in 
2006 many people in Canada expected a new China policy that would 
take Sino-Canadian relations to a new level, although some China watch-
ers in Canada suggested that Ottawa actually does not have a China policy 
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(see, for example, Ottawa Citizen 2008). So far Canada has emphasized four 
foreign policy goals or “pillars” in relations with China (see Government 
of Canada 2009): (1) to work with Beijing towards China’s greater adher-
ence to internationally accepted standards on human rights and the rule of 
law; (2) to ensure that China’s economic rise benefi ts Canada by increas-
ing two-way trade and investment in goods and services; (3) to work with 
China to advance shared interests in areas such as health, the environment 
and regional peace and security; and (4) to position Canada as a preferred 
destination for Chinese immigrants, students and visitors. Th is four-pillar 
China policy appropriately refl ects a multifaceted relationship between the 
two countries and recognizes the importance of cooperation with China. 
However, it overlooks some of the complex trends that have emerged in the 
fl ow of people between the two countries. As a result Canada’s China policy 
faces a number of challenges.
Th e fi rst of these challenges is understanding China as both a source and 
a destination. It is easy for Canadians to see that China is a major source 
country for immigrants, students, and visitors to Canada. While Canada is 
still in a position to promote itself as a preferred destination, the magnitude 
of China as a source country also needs to be better understood. China has 
become the leading source of newcomers to Canada since 1998, particu-
larly for economic migrants, such as skilled workers and investors. China 
has become the second largest source country for annual arrivals of interna-
tional students in Canada since 2000, and is currently the largest source of 
total student stock studying in Canada. China is currently the ninth major 
source country for overnight travellers to Canada, with the highest average 
spending per trip in Canada among all international travellers (see Citizen-
ship and Immigration Canada 2009).
In addition to the importance of China as a source of infl ows to Canada, 
it is equally important to realize that China is becoming an economic mag-
net for human capital. Although China is not a country of immigration, 
it is increasingly being seen as one of the few economies in the world with 
brighter job prospects. China has issued increasing numbers of work per-
mits to foreign workers. In Shanghai alone the number of work permits 
issued has increased thirteen times over the past thirteen years, and Canada 
is the seventh largest source country for foreign workers in Shanghai (see 
LaowaiZaiZhongguo 2007 and Oriental Morning Post 2008).
Tourism and education are also increasingly important transnational 
activities. According to Statistics Canada (2005), China was the tenth 
most visited international destination for Canadians. By 2008, China 
Chinese in Canada and Canadians in China 175 
had surpassed Canada as the sixth major destination for international stu-
dents at the post-secondary level, and it is likely to attract more Canadian 
students in the future (see Institute of International Education 2010).
Looking ahead, it is unrealistic to predict that the immigration fl ow 
from China to Canada will remain the same as it has been over the past 
ten to fi fteen years. Th is should not be regarded as making these fl ows 
less important for Canada, however, even if China is no longer the top 
source country of immigration. In fact, many Chinese may still consider 
emigrating to Canada for lifestyle reasons rather than purely economic 
reasons (see Anderssen 2009). Canada has to be prepared to leverage this 
new trend for Canada’s economic and social benefi t, rather than just for 
the benefi t of its labour market. With the conclusion of an agreement on 
“approved destination status,” more Chinese visitors are likely to come to 
Canada as tourists.
Further, Canada is not only competing for international students with 
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Australia, 
but also has to compete with emerging education markets, including China 
itself. While China retains its importance as one of the major source coun-
tries for many types of human fl ows to Canada, perhaps more signifi cant 
is that Beijing is increasingly seen as a destination for international human 
fl ows, including those from Canada. With eff orts by Beijing to attract 
global talent and to promote Chinese culture and language globally, inter-
est in learning Chinese, visiting China and working and living there is on 
the rise among Canadians with or without Chinese heritage.
Only if more Canadians understand the importance of China as both 
a source and a destination of fl ows of people will policy be changed to 
refl ect the importance of these two-way fl ows. Canada needs to position 
itself as a preferred destination for Chinese immigrants, students, and vis-
itors. It is equally if not more important that Canada also prepares more 
Canadians to “go East” to study and work. A broadened China policy 
could ensure that China’s economic rise benefi ts Canada by increasing 
two-way trade and investment in goods and services, as well as by increas-
ing two-way fl ows of people.
Understanding Chinese Communities in Canada
Th e second major policy challenge is to understand the importance of 
Chinese communities in Canada, which has been underestimated for a 
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long time. As a country of immigrants, Canada has been accustomed to 
looking at immigrants almost exclusively from an economic perspective. 
Chinese immigrants, like all immigrants, have traditionally been seen pri-
marily as suppliers of needed manpower. All too often, when people try to 
measure the contribution of Chinese communities to Canada they refer to 
their higher unemployment numbers and lower earnings due to insuffi  cient 
English-language skills or the fact that their foreign credentials are not rec-
ognized here. Th ey also tend to focus on the concentration of Chinese com-
munities in Vancouver or Toronto, or the fact that they may not integrate 
fully into Canadian society.
In 2008, when Beijing was gearing up for the 29th Summer Olympic 
Games, the fi rst Olympic Games ever to be held in China, the loyalty 
of Chinese communities to Canada was brought into question by some 
commentators, for example by Joanne Lee-Young (2008) writing in the 
Vancouver Sun: “Members of Vancouver’s large overseas Chinese commu-
nity will face a complex set of dual loyalties during the Beijing Summer 
Games, rooted in a simple quandary: whether to cheer for Chinese or 
Canadian athletes, or both.” Questioning the loyalty of Chinese Cana-
dians during a major international sporting event was unjustifi ed, for 
a number of reasons. First, as the Census of 2006 showed, about 27.4 
percent of all ethnic Chinese in Canada were actually born in Canada and 
16.6 percent were of the second or earlier generations. Th eir education 
and experience, and the degree to which they are Canadian, is likely no 
diff erent than any other citizens born in Canada. Second, seventy-seven 
percent of all ethnic Chinese in Canada as of 2006 held Canadian citi-
zenship only. In other words, nearly half of all ethnic Chinese in Canada 
were naturalized citizens, with Canadian identity and values created and 
shaped during the process of immigration and naturalization. For these 
individuals Canadian citizenship is a formal recognition that Canada has 
accepted them as Canadians. Naturalized Chinese Canadians should be 
treated equally with other naturalized citizens. Th ird, more than half of 
all Chinese immigrants in Canada come from countries other than the 
People’s Republic. In other words, nearly half of all Chinese immigrants 
in Canada are likely to have nothing to do with mainland China. Finally, 
cheering for Chinese or Canadian athletes has nothing to do with one’s 
political loyalty. When a Chinese team led by a Canadian coach, Dan 
Raphael, defeated its opponents, including a Canadian team, and claimed 
the gold at the World’s Women’s Curling Championships in 2009, should 
Canadians have questioned Raphael’s loyalty to Canada? When Raphael 
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brought this Chinese team to the Vancouver Winter Olympics in 2010, 
should this still have been an issue?
Statistical evidence provides more meaningful measures with which to 
judge the loyalty of Chinese communities to Canada (see Lindsay 2007). 
According to the Ethnic Diversity Survey conducted by Statistics Canada, in 
partnership with the Department of Canadian Heritage, in 2002 seventy-six 
percent of Canadians of Chinese origin felt a strong sense of belonging to 
Canada, and fi fty-eight percent said that at the same time they had a strong 
sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group. Th e survey also showed 
that Canadians of Chinese origin are active in Canadian society. For example, 
sixty-four percent of those who were eligible to vote reported doing so in the 
federal general election in 2000, while sixty percent said that they had voted 
in the most recent provincial election. In addition, about thirty-fi ve percent 
reported that they had participated in an organization such as a sports team 
or a community association in the twelve months preceding the taking of 
the survey. However, 34 percent of Canadians of Chinese origin reported 
that they had experienced discrimination or unfair treatment based on their 
ethnicity, race, religion, language or accent in the past fi ve years or since their 
arrival in Canada. Of those who had experienced discrimination, sixty-three 
percent said that they felt it was based on their race or skin colour, while 
forty-two percent said that the discrimination had taken place at work or 
when applying for a job or promotion.
Victor Odlum (1880–1971), who spent most of his life in Vancouver 
and, in the course of a long career in public service, was Canada’s Ambas-
sador to China from 1942 to 1946, once looked forward to the day when 
Chinese Canadians would “not be distinguished from other Canadians” 
(Lee 1984, p. 169). Th at wish remains as relevant today as it was during 
Odlum’s lifetime.
Understanding Canadian Communities in China
Th e remaining policy challenge is to understand Canadian communities 
in China, which have been growing for many reasons. Although the exact 
number remains unknown, the best estimate puts the number of Canadians 
in mainland China and Hong Kong at between 250,000 and 300,000, and 
thus signifi cantly larger than the population of a medium-sized Canadian 
city such as Saskatoon or Windsor, Ontario (see Zhang 2009 and Guo 
2009). Canada cannot aff ord to ignore the fact that so many Canadians live 
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in China. How Canada can turn its diaspora in China into an advantage is 
at the core of this huge challenge.
First, how should Canadians living in China or other parts of the world 
be recognized as part of Canada, rather than as foreigners who happen 
to hold Canadian passports? Canadians have to change their mindset to 
accept the fact that the fl ow of people moves in two directions. Canada 
must learn to respect the fact that Canadians, native-born or naturalized, 
are more internationally mobile than ever before and that many wish to live 
abroad. When they settle down in Beijing or in another city, Canada must 
learn to treat them the same as any other Canadians in terms of their rights 
and obligations.
Second, how should Canada encourage the political and civic participa-
tion of its citizens abroad? For one thing, Ottawa should consider changing 
the current rules that do not allow overseas citizens to vote in Canadian 
elections after they have lived abroad for fi ve years. Canada should also 
consider creating political mechanisms that would represent overseas citi-
zens at the federal and provincial levels. Th is would signifi cantly encourage 
political and civic participation by all Canadians, including citizens resid-
ing abroad. Th e views of Canadian communities in China should also be 
taken into account in Sino-Canadian policy-making.
Th ird, how can Canada better communicate with its overseas commu-
nities? Canada must develop a consultation and communication process 
with Canadians living overseas, to keep them involved and informed of any 
changes in citizenship laws or rules regulating their movement across bor-
ders, and listen to their needs, including their need for consular protection 
and other services. Th is would also ensure that any risks associated with 
Canadians abroad are properly assessed and addressed.
Fourth, how should Canada better leverage its expatriate communi-
ties in China to enhance opportunities for trade, investment and busi-
ness between the two countries? Traditionally, diaspora communities 
have contributed signifi cantly to their home countries through remit-
tances (India, Mexico and the Philippines), trade and investment (China 
and South Korea), and technology transfers (Taiwan, South Korea and 
China). Th is is a new task for Canadian policy-makers and members of 
the business community.
Finally, in pursuing such policy agendas and addressing the new chal-
lenges, a major eff ort must be made to bring together interests from across 
a range of government departments and organizations, including those at 
the provincial level.
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Conclusion
Th e turn of the 21st century witnessed growing fl ows of people from China 
to Canada. Greater freedom of movement in and out of China, and the 
growing affl  uence of Chinese citizens, are combining to bring about rapid 
changes in the pattern of these fl ows, broadening them to include tourists, 
students and professional workers. Th e fl ows of people between the two 
countries have also become two-way fl ows. Th e same economic forces that 
have transformed China’s place in global production, trade and fi nance have 
also aff ected human resources. China is no longer an exporter of labour, but 
has become a magnet attracting foreign talent. Th e popular perception that 
immigrants to Canada who return to their native countries have “failed” or 
are “opportunistic” is outdated.
Th e Chinese community in Canada has changed, is changing and will 
continue to change in many aspects that will ultimately have profound 
impacts on relations between Canada and China. Chinese Canadians are 
as diversifi ed within their groups as Canadian society is overall, though 
Chinese Canadians remain more visible in certain locations, schools, 
occupations and industries. Th is poses new challenges for Canada and all 
Canadians as they come to an understanding of Chinese Canadians, not 
as a distinctive or homogeneous group, but as an integral part of Canada’s 
multicultural society. Nor can Canada aff ord to ignore the growing body 
of Canadians, native-born or naturalized, who choose to live in China, 
an emerging global powerhouse. More fundamentally, Canadian com-
munities in China can play an important role and potentially be of great 
benefi t to Canada.
People fl ows between Canada and China will increasingly be character-
ized by two-way movements and by transnational citizens with personal, 
business and emotional attachments on both sides of the Pacifi c. While 
there are many challenges that arise from the growth of such diaspora-like 
populations at home and abroad, the phenomenon of international labour 
mobility, especially of the most talented (and, sometimes, the most notori-
ous), is here to stay. Th e challenge for policy-makers is to take a holistic 
and multi-generational view of transnational citizens, rather than to treat 
international mobility as a problem.
Of all the reasons for Canada to have a robust and forward-looking 
China policy, people-to-people linkage is arguably the most fundamen-
tal. Currently the fl ow of people between Canada and China is unmatched 
by that between China and any other member state of the Organization for 
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Economic Cooperation and Development. Seen in this light, the human 
capital nexus is a unique focal point for relations between Ottawa and 
Beijing. While other countries are lining up to sign trade and investment 
deals with China, Canada can go a step further and investigate the pos-
sibility of an agreement in the arena based on this human platform. Such 
an agreement could encompass issues such as citizenship, visas, education 
and training, professional accreditation, social security, taxation and even 
extradition. Given the large number of Canadians and Chinese with deep 
connections across the Pacifi c, it is a certainty that these bilateral issues will 
become bigger policy challenges for both Beijing and Ottawa in the years 
ahead. Th ere is an opportunity now to address these issues in a comprehen-
sive fashion and to turn potential problems into competitive advantages for 
the bilateral relationship.
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Th is chapter explores the potential impacts of population aging in mainland 
China on patterns and experiences of caring among Chinese immigrants in 
Canada, particularly women. (Th roughout the rest of this chapter, refer-
ences to “China” are to mainland China, excluding Hong Kong, Macau or 
Taiwan, except where otherwise stated.) We situate the study in the litera-
ture on transnational, globalized and fl exible families, concepts that refer 
to the separation of family members who preserve a sense of familyhood 
across national borders, and to the internationalization of the household 
(see Bryceson and Vuorela 2002 and Douglass 2006). Defi nitions of the 
transnational family and of global householding are suitably broad, and 
encompass multiple family forms, including families with adult children in 
Canada, and their own children and aging parents in China.
Over the past twenty years we have observed the burgeoning of the lit-
erature on Chinese “astronaut” families and “parachute” children, demon-
strating how this transnational family form aff ects family relationships and 
individual members in both positive and negative ways (see Alaggia, Chau, 
and Tsang 2001, Aye and Guerin 2001, Gardner 2006, Ho 1999, Irving, 
Benjamin, and Tsang 2000, Lam 1994, Landolt and Da 2005, Man 1995a 
and 2007, McKeown 2000, Ong 1992 and 1998, Preston, Kobayashi, and 
Man 2006, Preston, Kobayashi, and Siemiatycki 2006, Pribilsky 2004, 
Salaff , Shik, and Greve 2008, Siemiatycki and Preston 2007, Skeldon 1994, 
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Tsang et al. 2003, Waters 2002, 2003, and 2005, Wong and Ho 2006, and 
Zhou 1998). However, more recently, the Chinese transnational family has 
shifted to a pattern in which working-age immigrants leave aging parents 
in China and also leave, or send back, their young children (see Da 2003, 
Liu 2008, and Man 2002, 2004, and 2008). It is their experiences that 
form the focus of this chapter. In particular, we examine intergenerational 
relations among Chinese immigrants, focusing on the evolving gamut of 
mutual care and support mechanisms that take place across borders.
Population Aging in China
Th e proportion of seniors in the population of China has been increasing 
rapidly since the beginning of the 21st century (see Table 14.1). While this 
demographic change is happening in almost every country, in China it has 
been more marked due to the decline in fertility as a result of the one-child 
policy, combined with the impact of rapid improvements in health care facili-
ties on increased longevity. Between 1970 and 2010 China’s population has 
increased from 816 million to 1.35 billion, that is, by around a little over 
530 million. While the child population (between zero and fourteen years) 
declined from forty to twenty percent, the working-age population (between 
fi fteen and sixty-four years) increased from fi fty-six to seventy-two percent. 
Th e population of seniors also increased from 4.3 to 8.2 percent. Th e decline 
in the child population is explained by the decline in the number of births, 
from an estimated annual average of 25 million in the early 1970s to the 
current annual average of 18 million. Th e increasing proportion of seniors is 
explained by the increase in life expectancy at birth from sixty years in 1970 
to seventy-three years in 2010 (see United Nations 2008).
Th e demographic trends during the next forty years are projected to be 
quite diff erent. Population is projected to increase at a much slower rate, and 
to start declining after 2030. Th e total population is projected at 1.42 billion 
in 2050, that is, at only around 70 million more than the total as of 2010. 
By 2050, the number of births is projected to decline to an annual average of 
14 to 15 million. Th e long-drawn decline in the birth rate is fi nally projected 
to start aff ecting the size of the working-age population, the proportion of 
which is projected to decline from seventy-two percent in 2010 to sixty-one 
percent by 2050. Seniors are the only section of China’s population whose 
proportion within the total population is projected to increase over the next 
forty years, from eight percent in 2010 to more than twenty-three percent by 
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Table 14.1 Trends in Age Groups within the Population of Mainland China, 
1970–2000, with Projections for 2010–2025
Population Proportion in age groups 
(%)
(thousands) 0 to 14 15 to 64 65 and over
Offi  cial Figures for Past Years
   1970   815,951 39.7 56.0  4.3
   1980   980,928 35.5 59.8  4.7
   1990 1,142,089 28.4 66.1  5.5
   2000 1,266,954 25.7 67.5  6.8
Projections for Future Years
   2010 1,354,148 19.9 71.9  8.2
   2020 1,431,156 18.7 69.6 11.7
   2030 1,462,468 16.9 67.2 15.9
   2040 1,455,057 15.3 63.0 21.8
   2050 1,417,044 15.3 61.4 23.3
Source: United Nations 2009.
2050. Th e number of seniors in China increased from 35 million in 1970 
to 111 million in 2010, and is projected to increase to 330 million by 2050: 
the increment during the next forty years is thus projected to be almost three 
times the increment during the past forty years.
Th e increasing proportion of seniors in the total population and their 
increasing numbers can be explained by further increments in life expec-
tancy, which is projected to increase to almost eighty years by 2050 as a 
result of continuing improvements in lifestyle and health services. Both the 
proportion of the total population expected to survive to age sixty-fi ve years 
and the number of years a senior is expected to live on average are projected 
to increase over the next forty years (see Table 14.2). Within the cohort of 
seniors the percentage of those reaching eighty years and the average num-
ber of years they can be expected to live after reaching age eighty years are 
also projected to go up (see United Nations 2008).
Th ese projected demographic trends, if the projections are realized, 
would result in a larger number of seniors leading longer and healthier 
186  Th e China Challenge
Table 14.2 Indicators of Longevity in Mainland China in 2007, with 
Projections for 2025 and 2050
2007 2025 2050
Life expectancy at birth (years) 72.6 75.3 78.7
Proportion expected to reach age 65 (%) 79.3 82.2 87.3
Life expectancy at age 65 (years) 15.2 16.9 18.3
Proportion expected to reach age 80 (%) 39.9 47.8 56.1
Life expectancy at age 80 (years)  6.8  7.7  8.6
Source: United Nations 2008.
lives. One remarkable refl ection of this projected trend is the projected 
increase in the population of centenarians, from an estimated 33,000 in 
2010 to 450,000 in 2050 (see United Nations 2009).
Th e signifi cance of these projected changes in the age structure of China’s 
population for the family structure is refl ected in changes in the parent–
support ratio, which is the ratio of the number of seniors aged eighty-fi ve 
years or more per 100 persons aged between fi fty and sixty-four years (see 
Figure 14.1). Th ose aged eighty-fi ve years and more are assumed to be the 
hypothetical parents of the population aged fi fty to sixty-four years, that is, 
those who were born to them when they were in their twenties and thirties. 
Figure 14.1 Parent–Support Ratios in Mainland China, 1970–2000, with 
Projections for 2010–2050 (%)
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Th e parent–support ratio indicates the approximate trend in the percent-
age of the population aged fi fty to sixty-four years whose parents are living.
Th e increase in the parent–support ratio over the forty years from 2010 to 
2050 is projected to be much larger than the increase over the preceding forty 
years from 1970 to 2010 was. While the proportion of those aged fi fty to sixty-
four years having elderly parents increased from 1.4 percent in 1970 to 3.4 per-
cent in 2010, it is projected to increase to 14.9 percent by 2050. Demographic 
evidence thus strongly indicates that increasing proportions of the Chinese 
already in Canada and of future immigrants will have elderly parents.
Another characteristic of the population of elderly parents is the higher 
proportion of women than of men, because women have longer life expec-
tancy. In 2010, among China’s population of those aged eighty-fi ve years 
and older, there were 170 women for every 100 men, and this ratio is pro-
jected to remain almost unchanged until 2050. Further, a majority of these 
elderly people, and a larger majority of the women, are widowed. Th e Cen-
sus of China conducted in 2000 showed that fi fty percent of the men and 
eighty percent of the women aged eighty years and over were widowed (see 
China Center for Research on Aging 2007). A much higher proportion of 
senior women than of senior men is therefore projected to become depen-
dent on off spring and other relatives.
Chinese Immigration to Canada after 1947
Chinese immigration into Canada was banned by the Canadian govern-
ment under the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923, which remained in 
force until 1947. Following its repeal, while Chinese immigrants came to 
Canada from Taiwan, Hong Kong and other countries, emigration from 
China itself remained restricted as a result of the “closed door” policy of the 
newly established Communist regime. Two signifi cant events during the 
1970s paved the way for a resumption of migration from China to Canada: 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and China in 
1970, and the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, following the death 
of Mao Zedong. Although emigration from China to Canada started fol-
lowing the establishment of diplomatic relations, it was not until after the 
rise of Deng Xiaoping to power in 1978 that China moved towards an 
“open door” policy, which eased the mobility of its citizens.
During the fi rst ten years following the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions between Canada and China, only 600 citizens from China emigrated 
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Figure 14.2 Chinese Immigrants to Canada by Place of Origin, 1980–2006 
 
Source: CIC 2009.
to Canada (see Rafael 2007). Immigration then gathered pace during the 
1980s and continued to increase after that (see Figure 14.2). Since 1998 
China has been the single largest source country of migrants to Canada. Th e 
second highest number of immigrants to Canada has been from India, and 
the gap between the two has been narrowing, but the number of migrants 
from China exceeded those from India by more than 34,000 during the 
period from 2005 to 2008 (CIC 2009).
Th e growing infl ows of migrants have contributed to a rapid increase 
in the population of Chinese in Canada. From a total of 119,000 in 
1971, the number of Chinese in Canada increased to 289,000 in 1981 
and to 634,000 in 1991 (see Li 2007). Th e Censuses of 1996 and 2001 
showed that the Chinese population in Canada had increased to 860,000 
by the former year and to 1.03 million by the latter year, while the Census 
of 2006 gave a total of 1.22 million Chinese in Canada based on visible 
minority counts. Given that 557,000 immigrants from China entered 
Canada between 1970 and 2006, migrants from China constituted 
roughly forty-fi ve percent of the total Chinese population in Canada in 
2006, and their proportion has presumably increased since then, as more 
than eighty percent of Chinese immigrants who entered Canada in 2007 
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According to the Census of 2006, the population of immigrants from 
China in Canada stands at more than 450,000 (see Table 14.3). Around sev-
enteen percent are under the age of twenty-fi ve years and a slightly higher 
proportion, nineteen percent, are aged sixty-fi ve years or older, giving the Chi-
nese immigrant population in Canada a much older age structure than that 
of China itself. Th ese immigrants are geographically concentrated in Toronto 
(forty-one percent), with Vancouver being a close second destination. While 
Montreal is the third largest city of immigrants from China in Canada, it has 
attracted a much smaller number, with just over 16,000 immigrants.
A large proportion of this immigrant population as of 2006 were recent 
arrivals, with well over half having arrived since 1996. Most had arrived 
as working-age adults (forty-nine percent were aged twenty-fi ve to forty-
four years), but the relatively large presence of immigrants forty-fi ve years 
or older (twenty-one percent) suggests that many immigrants from China 
were sponsored family members, given that very few points are awarded to 
applicants over the age of fi fty years in Canada’s immigration point system.
While this profi le informs us of the general characteristics of the Chi-
nese immigrant population, it does not provide detailed information on 
migration trends by age groups. For data on this matter we may turn to 
the Public Use Microdata File of Individuals, a 2.7 percent sample of the 
Canadian Census of 2006. Cross-tabulating age at arrival with period of 
arrival (see Table 14.4) shows how the ages of immigrants from China have 
changed over time.
It seems clear that since 1970 Canada has attracted older immigrants, 
who are likely to have fewer children of their own; that since 1981 there 
has been a steady increase in the arrival of working-age adults (twenty-fi ve 
to forty-nine years); and that since 1990 fewer seniors as a proportion have 
been migrating. Th ese trends suggest that more and more immigrants may 
belong to the “sandwich” generation, that is, they are adults supporting 
both children and elderly parents, and face various challenges while caring 
for aging parents (and sometimes children) in China.
Given the strong family structure, intergenerational relations and fi lial 
piety in Chinese culture, one can expect that an increasing number of immi-
grants coming to Canada will have to maintain strong links with elderly 
parents in China. Further, as the off spring of the one-child policy come 
of age, an increasing proportion of China’s adult population migrating to 
Canada will fi t into the “four–two–one” family pattern of one adult sup-
porting two parents and four grandparents. Being the only child increases 
the responsibilities of fi lial piety.
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   Male 213,950 45.8
   Female 252,995 54.2
Age group
   Under 25 years  78,695 16.9
   25 to 44 years 178,330 38.2
   45 to 54 years  66,945 14.3
   55 to 64 years  52,750 11.3
   65 years and over  90,225 19.3
Period of immigration
   Before 1991 133,910 28.7
   1991–1995  69,635 14.9
   1996–2000 108,290 23.2
   2001–2006 155,105 33.2
Age at immigration
   Under 25 years 140,935 30.2
   25 to 44 years 229,800 49.2
   45 years and over  96,215 20.6
Citizenship
   Only Canadian 303,045 64.9
   Dual  13,895  3.0
   Only non-Canadian 150,005 32.1
Destination
   Toronto 191,120 40.9
   Vancouver 137,245 29.4
   Montreal  16,180  3.5
   Other 122,400 26.2
Source: Statistics Canada, 2006a.
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Table 14.4 Age at Arrival of Samples of Immigrants from Mainland China 











Under 25 years 64.6  34.5  24.3  27.4  33.2
25 to 49 years 35.0  52.6  47.8  51.8  57.0
50 years and over  0.5  13.0  27.9  20.8   9.8
Total sample 661 1,100 1,564 4,459 3,840
Source: Statistics Canada, 2006b, Public Use Microdata File on Individuals, Persons Born 
in the People's Republic of China, 25 Years and Over.
Continuing Intergenerational Relations
Th e interaction between the Chinese diaspora in Canada and their elderly 
parents in China can be expected to manifest itself in various ways. First, 
an increasing number of Chinese residents in Canada will likely be called 
on to provide support to elderly parents in China. Th is could include 
remittances as well as more frequent visits to China than would other-
wise be the case. Second, cases of newly arriving immigrants from China 
sending infant off spring back to China to be taken care of by grandpar-
ents, so that both the husband and wife can work towards settling down, 
can be expected to increase. An increasing number of immigrants will 
have aging parents who are suffi  ciently active and healthy to look after 
the infants, who would more likely than not be their only grandchildren. 
Th ird, given that their parents are active and in good health, Chinese in 
Canada may well be encouraged to bring them to Canada as visitors, as 
well as under family sponsorship arrangements.
Th e extent to which immigrants from China in Canada have ties to 
China can be gleaned from public use data from the Ethnic Diversity Sur-
vey conducted by Statistics Canada, in partnership with the Department of 
Canadian Heritage, in 2002. Th ese data reveal that seventy-eight percent 
of immigrants from China aged twenty-fi ve years and older had relatives 
in China, and that sixty-four percent had visited China since immigrating 
to Canada. While the survey uses a broad defi nition of “family,” it suggests 
that the majority of immigrants continue to have family ties in China. Th e 
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Figure 14.3 Chinese in Canada with Family in Mainland China by Gender 
and Marital Status, 2002
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existence of family ties in China, and potential intergenerational relation-
ships by extension, also diff er by gender and marital status, as the survey 
data show that more married females and single males than single females 
and married males had families in China (see Figure 14.3).
When we examine trips to China for those who had family in China by 
gender and period of arrival (see Table 14.5), it is clear that women who 
had family in China were more likely to have visited at least once compared 
to men, regardless of when they arrived in Canada, and women were far 
more likely to visit China than males who arrived during the same period. 
Th ese data suggest that women, particularly married ones, bear the chal-
lenges associated with maintaining transnational family relationships, since 
not only are women more likely to have family in China, but those women 
with family in China are also more likely to travel there.
Caring for Elderly Parents in China
Some of the challenges in Chinese immigrant women’s lives are examined 
in this section, which in part is based on research data from a study on 
Chinese immigrant women and precarious work conducted in 2004–2005 
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(Man 2005). Th e research included two focus groups, one with immigrant 
women from (mainland) China, and the other with immigrant women 
from Hong Kong, and individual in-depth interviews were carried out with 
seven women from China and four from Hong Kong. Th e women had 
arrived in Canada between 1998 and 2004. Th ey were all married and had 
at least one child, either in Canada or in their home country. Th ey were 
also highly educated. All the women from China had bachelor’s or master’s 
degrees, and more than half of the women from Hong Kong had univer-
sity or other post-secondary education. Th e women from China ranged in 
age from twenty-fi ve to thirty-six years, and had young children who were 
pre-schoolers and required child care. Th e women from Hong Kong were 
older, ranging from twenty-nine to fi fty-three years. While the focus of the 
analysis is on women from China, the experiences of some of those from 
Hong Kong are also described for comparative purposes.
New immigrants from China have typically immigrated to Canada in 
nuclear family units. Members of their extended families, such as parents or 
in-laws who are often elderly, have been either unable or unwilling to emi-
grate with their adult children and grandchildren (see Da 2003 and Man 
2009). Immigration policy makes it diffi  cult for such members of extended 
families to come, and some elderly parents are reluctant to move to a for-
eign country where they face social, cultural and linguistic challenges.
In China, the Confucian belief in fi lial piety obliges children to care for 
elderly parents, and in return grandparents, especially grandmothers, often 
Table 14.5 Number of Trips to China by Chinese in Canada since Arrival (% 
of Samples)
Before 1991 1991–2001
Female Male Female Male
Never 19.7 26.5 40.1 52.4
Once 24.7 19.3 31.4 25.8
Two to four times 30.0 40.3 19.2 13.9
Five to nine times 17.6  8.5  8.7  5.1
Ten or more times  8.0  5.4  0.7  2.7
Total sample 91 83 123 100
Source: Statistics Canada, 2003.
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help to care for grandchildren (see Man 1995b, Liu 2008 and Spitzer et al. 
2003). While some men do participate in care-giving, in both Western and 
Asian cultures, the bulk of caring work is still done by women (see Corman 
and Luxton 2001, Devault 1991, Luxton 1990 and Waring 1999). Despite 
their household and employment diffi  culties, cultural ideology also informs 
immigrants from China to care for their parents or in-laws in China (see 
Man 1997 and Spitzer et al. 2003).
Since it is expensive and time-consuming for new immigrants to visit 
their elderly parents in China, many cannot engage in the day-to-day phys-
ical work of caring, but the work of emotional and economic caring contin-
ues. Th e Chinese immigrant women in this study phoned their parents long 
distance on a regular basis. Other studies have also found that immigrants 
from Hong Kong used the telephone and internet to communicate with 
their relatives transnationally (see Kobayashi et al. 2005 and Liu 2008).
Some immigrants send remittances to their family members in the home 
country, a practice that is also common among other immigrant groups 
(see Wong 2003). Periodically, when their budget permits, they pay visits 
to their elderly parents in China, or send money for their parents to visit 
them in Canada. Th e task of caring for family members in the home coun-
try always falls on the women. When the elderly parent is ill, the daughter 
or the daughter-in-law is the one who arranges for their care and calls them 
long distance from Canada (see Liu 2008 and Man 2008). When the fam-
ily can aff ord it, the daughter or daughter-in-law typically travels to China 
to visit and care for elderly parents or in-laws. Gender ideology and cultural 
imperative prevail even when a professional Chinese woman in her forties 
has followed her husband to Toronto and may compromise her own career 
by travelling back and forth between Canada and China (see Man 2008). 
Her class status aff ords her the fi nancial freedom to do so since transconti-
nental airfares are costly.
For Chinese immigrants who have aging parents and elderly in-laws 
residing in diff erent geographical spaces, it is a constant struggle to accom-
plish the work of caring. As a woman from Hong Kong confi ded: “[M]y 
mother-in-law and my father-in-law are very old. We live with them [in 
Toronto]. We don’t feel comfortable leaving them behind if we go back 
to Hong Kong. ... Well, if I do decide to go back to Hong Kong, it would 
be because I want to take care of my parents.” Th eir struggle is not unlike 
that of those members of the “baby boomer” generation in Canada whose 
parents do not live in the same city or province as they do, and have to fl y 
back and forth between cities in Canada.
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Transnational Care of Grandchildren in China
In China it is customary for retired grandparents, particularly grandmoth-
ers, to take care of their grandchildren, alleviating the child care burden 
on their adult children, male and female, to enable them to pursue their 
career aspirations and economic advancement through participation in the 
labour force. A Chinese woman refl ected on the support she was able to 
procure from her parents, and the ingenuity of extended family members in 
cooperating in the accomplishment of social reproduction in China: “My 
daughter lived with her grandma. My husband and I had our own place, 
but we would go over to my mother’s place for dinner and to see our daugh-
ter every evening. After dinner we would go back to our own place.”
Although the prevalence of grandchildren living with and being cared 
for by grandparents is not known, the general acceptance of this arrange-
ment provides a space for the development of transnational parenting/
grandparenting practice. It reveals the cultural and organizational processes 
in China that allow for this pragmatic approach.
Previous studies have asserted the interpenetration of household work and 
paid work, and women’s primary responsibility for this work (see Armstrong 
and Armstrong 2002, Man 2002, Luxton 2006, Neysmith and Chen 2002 
and Duff y, Mandell and Pupo 1989). For new immigrants in Canada, par-
ticularly women, the task of juggling paid work, housework and child care 
is intensifi ed (see Man 2002, Preston and Man 1999, Salaff  and Greve 2006 
and Wan 2003). Some Chinese immigrant couples who are unable to obtain 
subsidized child care, and who have had diffi  culties juggling child care and 
paid work, have resolved to send their children back to China to be taken care 
of by their grandmothers or other family members.
It has been well-documented that Chinese immigrants encounter diffi  -
culties in employment (see Basran and Zong 1998, Li 2000, Wang and Lo 
2003, Man 2004, Preston and Man 1999 and Reitz, 2003). Employers’ 
lack of recognition of the previous experience and credentials of immi-
grants makes it very diffi  cult for them to fi nd employment commensu-
rate with their qualifi cations and experience. Immigrants, particularly the 
Chinese immigrant women who were interviewed, have a propensity to 
be channelled into menial and precarious positions. Compounded with 
the lack of aff ordable child care, this has prompted some women to send 
their children back to China to be cared for by grandparents so that they 
can focus on job search and pursue better job opportunities. As this 
woman explained:
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My son was sent back to China already. I feel it’s very stressful doing the 
job search and taking care of the kid at the same time, both mentally and 
physically. Sometimes this aff ected my attitude towards my son, and he 
would feel confused when I easily lose my patience. After sending my son 
back to China, I have more time studying and working, so I think it’s a 
right decision to make.
For many immigrants from China, the deterioration of their mate-
rial conditions in the new country necessitated transnational practices to 
continue their productive and reproductive processes, that is, maintaining 
employment and the raising of children in separate geographical spaces 
through transnational familial networks and linkages.
Care and Support between Chinese Immigrants and 
Th eir Elderly Parents in Canada
Many immigrants found it diffi  cult to care for elderly parents in China. 
While the telephone was used frequently, and was a relatively convenient 
and inexpensive way to connect with family members, it is inadequate 
compared to face-to-face interaction. Visits to China prove to be costly, 
exhausting and time-consuming. Chinese immigrant women therefore 
expressed their desire for their parents to join them in Canada. A woman 
from China whose mother was laid off  from her job in a factory wanted 
to apply for her to come to Canada so that she could provide for her. At 
the same time she also hoped to benefi t from her mother’s help with child 
care: “My mother works in a factory that was not run very well. Many 
workers were dismissed…. I want my mother to come. She can help me 
with child care.”
Chinese immigrants who came to Canada without extended family 
members lose the household and childcare support they obtained from 
their parents when they were in China. Th e absence of this support has led 
to the transformation of gender relations and household division of labour 
between spouses in the new country. Another Chinese woman reminisced 
about the support she was able to procure from her parents when they were 
in China:
In China I didn’t have to worry about the housework. We went to our 
parents’ to have dinner every working day, and did some cleaning at our 
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own home during the weekends. My parents helped take care of my chil-
dren too. Now we have changed a lot. We need to cooperate very well to 
fi nish all the housework and take care of our daughter.
In a study that focuses on immigrants from China coming to Toronto, 
the majority of female seniors interviewed admitted that they were moti-
vated to come to Canada in order to reunite with family members (see 
George et al. 2000). Th e vast majority of the senior participants who made 
the decision to emigrate had children living in Canada. Some elderly Chi-
nese came to Canada to provide household help and child care for their 
grandchildren while their adult children went out to work. Chinese immi-
grant families who are fi nancially qualifi ed to sponsor their elderly parents 
to come to Canada are able to recreate in Canada the extended family sup-
port network they enjoyed in China.
In another study, a Hong Kong woman whose parents had also immi-
grated to Canada and lived close by was able to obtain child care assis-
tance from her mother. Her daughter went to the grandparents’ place after 
school, and stayed there until she and her husband got off  work. Th e whole 
family then ate dinner at the grandparents’ place every evening, and on the 
weekends they all went out for dinner. It was in this way that this family 
was able to replicate the mutual care and support they had provided for 
each other when they were in their home country (see Man 2009).
At the same time, some seniors reported experiencing diffi  culties with 
the English language and the isolation that ensued (see George et al. 2000). 
Th ey commented on the ramifi cations of the lack of interpretation services 
in hospitals for their health care, since they were unable to describe their 
health problems fully to doctors, nor could they understand the doctors’ 
advice (see George et al. 2000). Often, children were unable to accompany 
elderly parents to their medical examinations because they were engaged in 
two or more part-time jobs to make ends meet.
While intergenerational mutual support is common for many seniors and 
their children, intergenerational confl ict within the family also occurs. Th e 
stress of unemployment of adult children is often seen as a major cause of a 
family’s problems. Some elderly parents moved out of their children’s home 
because of family confl icts and/or fi nancial problems. Elder abuse, although 
very much underreported due to the shame perceived within the Chinese 
community, is also a reality for some (see George et al. 2000). Th e same study 
found that those elderly Chinese who are able to participate in seniors pro-
grammes at community centres found a reduction in their sense of isolation.
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Conclusion and Recommendations
Th e analysis of data and research presented in this chapter suggests that 
transnational intergenerational support among the Chinese diaspora in 
Canada may become considerably more widespread. Given that the pro-
portion of the elderly in the population of China is rapidly increasing, 
the mechanisms of support between the Chinese diaspora in Canada and 
their elderly parents in both Canada and China are expected to become 
more entrenched and prolonged. It is not certain what potential long-
term eff ects the diff erent sectors of the Chinese population (adults, chil-
dren and the elderly) will encounter as a result of demands for intergen-
erational support. Given the increasing size of the Chinese population in 
Canada, it would be prudent for the governments of both Canada and 
China to take account of the situation by cooperating in a concerted 
eff ort to formulate measures to alleviate the hardship of families engaged 
in transnational intergenerational support.
In light of the above analysis, a multi-pronged approach is recom-
mended. On the Canadian end, government policies that enable new 
immigrants to achieve social and economic integration and independence 
in the new country, while at the same time recognizing and support-
ing family and extended family commitments both at home and over-
seas, would be welcome. On the one hand, this would entail introducing 
measures that would enhance the labour market integration of Chinese 
immigrants, such as working with employers and regulatory bodies to 
recognize international credentials and experience, and making profes-
sion-specifi c language courses available to all immigrants. On the other 
hand, it would also mean providing aff ordable and culturally sensitive 
child care programmes to accommodate new immigrant families’ needs, 
facilitating the sponsorship of extended family members and introducing 
incentives to employers to allow fl exible family leaves, including leaves 
for caring for family members overseas.
More specifi c measures geared toward Chinese seniors in Canada are also 
warranted. Chinese seniors would benefi t directly from initiatives such as 
facilitating and expediting sponsorship arrangements, providing language 
courses for seniors visiting family, making health services more culturally 
sensitive, and regularizing the most frequently used traditional Chinese 
medicines. Further, in view of the aging population in Canada, there is a 
need to put more emphasis on health care reform already in process, with a 
focus on encouraging Chinese immigrants to access health services so as to 
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avoid more serious health problems, disability and the need for long-term 
care in the future.
At the same time, the government of China could, on its part, facilitate 
the emigration of Chinese seniors sponsored by their adult off spring in 
Canada, and off er support to seniors in China whose adult children have 
emigrated, particularly if the seniors are caring for their grandchildren. It is 
recommended that the government recognize grandchildren left in China 
in the care of seniors as dependents eligible for state benefi ts. Th e liberaliza-
tion and facilitation of pension benefi t payments to seniors emigrating to 
Canada would also greatly benefi t those who made contributions during 
their years of employment in China. Together with the Canadian govern-
ment, the government of China might be encouraged to negotiate a social 
security agreement, which would mean that eligible seniors would receive 
social security benefi ts from China or Canada. To date, Canada has signed 
social security agreements with fi fty-four countries, including three in East 
Asia: Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. Again, in terms of priori-
ties the government of China should extend support to seniors looking 
after grandchildren whose parents are abroad and initiate negotiations for a 
social security agreement with Canada.
According to Canada’s Department of Foreign Aff airs and Interna-
tional Trade, one of Canada’s four main policy goals in China is “to work 
with China to advance shared interests such as health, the environment, 
and regional peace and security” (see Holden 2008). Given that the Chi-
nese populations in both China and Canada are aging, population aging 
could be identifi ed as a “shared interest,” and the two governments should 
jointly tackle issues relating to seniors and transnational intergenerational 
support. Th ere is a need to promote dialogue and information exchange 
on aging-related issues between the two countries, as well as collaborative 
research and exchanges between Canadian and Chinese geriatric specialists, 
to enable them to obtain fi rsthand experience of how best to cater to the 
needs of Chinese seniors.
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Successful cultural and commercial exchanges often depend on the ability 
to function in a common language. Personal knowledge of two or more 
languages represents a form of human capital that enhances opportunities 
for interaction across cultural boundaries. Despite the expansion of English 
as a second language, global communication barriers persist. Even where 
translation resources abound, the presence of substantial majorities each 
speaking only one language can be an important barrier to bilateral and 
multilateral interaction. In Canada there has been much attention directed 
at the level of knowledge and acquisition of English and/or French on the 
part of the population whose mother tongue, the fi rst language learned and 
still understood, is neither of the country’s two offi  cial languages. Th ose 
individuals in Canada whose fi rst language is Chinese and who acquire 
English and/or French, those whose fi rst language is English and/or French 
and who have learned Chinese languages, and residents of China who have 
learned either of these languages collectively strengthen the capacity for 
cultural bridging between people in the two countries.
Some observers contend that the persistence of minority languages and 
ethnic cultures detracts from identifi cation with Canada. An inability to 
speak an offi  cial language can be an important barrier to accessing certain 
public services and for this reason most Canadians regard the acquisition 
of English and/or French as essential towards integration. To the extent 
that such persistence facilitates ethnic bonding it presumably undercuts the 
“good” social capital arising from interaction that transcends ethnic ties. 
Chapter 15
The Bridge Too Far?: 
Language Retention, Ethnic Persistence 
and National Identification among the 
Chinese Diaspora in Canada 
Jack Jedwab
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Measuring the loss of non-offi  cial languages across generations is seen as 
an indicator for adaptation to the host or majority culture. Nevertheless, 
little attention has been paid to the use of non-offi  cial languages by immi-
grants and or their retention by their descendants. Th is chapter looks at the 
extent to which Chinese languages are being preserved in Canada, and the 
potential impact of their retention on ethnic Chinese and Canadian identi-
ties. Does the retention of the non-offi  cial language diminish identifi cation 
with Canada?
Canada’s Changing Non-Offi  cial Language Landscape
In 1969, the Canadian Parliament legislated to make English and French 
the nation’s two offi  cial languages. However, it refused to legislate offi  cial 
cultures and instead, in 1971, introduced a policy of multiculturalism. At 
that time a strong message was conveyed to the eff ect that there was no con-
tradiction between maintaining one’s ethnic identity and being Canadian. 
Th en Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau observed during debate in the House 
of Commons (on October 8, 1971) that the “question of cultural and eth-
nic pluralism in this country, and the status of our various cultures and 
languages, [is] an area of study given all too little attention in the past by 
scholars.” He contended that: “adherence to one’s ethnic group is infl u-
enced not so much by one’s origin or mother tongue as by one’s sense of 
belonging to the group, and by the group’s collective will to exist.”
During the early 1970s the foreign-born population of Canada was 
predominantly white and European in origin. Since that period, however, 
the composition of the population has been considerably modifi ed, and 
some three quarters of new Canadians are of non-European origin. As a 
consequence, the pattern of non-offi  cial languages has shifted signifi cantly 
with the increase in the numbers of persons whose fi rst language is neither 
English nor French (see Table 15.1). In 2008 the number of immigrants 
whose mother tongue was English hit a ten-year high, at just over 26,600, 
and eclipsed Mandarin as the leading mother tongue of immigrants to 
Canada. Arabic, Tagalog and Spanish held the next three spots. Immigrants 
whose mother tongue was Cantonese formed the eighteenth largest lan-
guage group as their numbers fell from 5,322 in 2000 to 3,434 in 2008. In 
eleventh spot was a group referred to as “Other Chinese,” at 5,693 in 2008, 
a decline from 8,761 in 2000. Th ese changes in numbers refl ected the shift 
in the regional origins of Chinese immigrants to Canada.
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English Mandarin Arabic Spanish Tagalog 
2000 227,458 19,560 31,389 15,492  8,719  9,612
2001 250,638 22,135 36 ,78 20,216 10,143 12,557
2002 229,049 18,868 28,127 18,049 10,462 10,610
2003 221,349 18,694 31,715 17,218 12,489 11,442
2004 235,823 22,031 31,456 18,985 14,319 12,443
2005 262,240 22,906 37,321 19,515 17,016 16,332
2006 251,643 24,884 28,049 20,009 17,059 16,099
2007 236,758 26,616 23,208 18,998 16,913 16,537
2008 247,243 28,751 26,086 21,925 16,292 20,835
Source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2008.
Among the non-offi  cial languages of Canada, Cantonese is the fi fth 
most widely used mother tongue and Mandarin the ninth most widely used 
(see Figures 15.1 and 15.2). Th e combination of all Chinese languages into 
one category in the Census of 1996 made “Chinese” appear to be the most 
widely spoken non-offi  cial language in the country, but the Census of 2001 
split the category up, so that Mandarin and Cantonese appeared in fourth 
and ninth place, respectively, that year. In 2006 Cantonese dropped to fi fth 
place, while Mandarin moved up to seventh place. Th e most widely spoken 
non-offi  cial language in Canada remains Spanish, though it is spoken more 
often as a second language rather than as a mother tongue.
Mandarin versus Cantonese
Th e Census of 2006 showed that Cantonese continued to be the fi rst lan-
guage of the majority of the Chinese Canadian population, as 361,450 
Canadians reported Cantonese as their mother tongue that year, and around 
73,000 others reported that they spoke Cantonese as a second language. 
However, between 1996 and 2006 the number of immigrants arriving in 
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Figure 15.2 Selected Non-Offi  cial Languages Spoken in Canada, by 
Th ousands of Speakers, 1996, 2001 and 2006
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Censuses of 1996, 2001 and 2006.
Figure 15.1 Selected Non-Offi  cial Mother Tongues of Canadians, by 














































































































Canada from China whose mother tongue was Mandarin, the dominant 
language of mainland China, exceeded the number whose mother tongue 
was Cantonese (see Table 15.2).
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Table 15.2 Canadians with Mandarin, Cantonese and Other Chinese 
Languages as Mother Tongues, 2006
Canada 2006 Cantonese Mandarin Chinese, 
n.o.s. 
Total 
Total 361 450 170 950 456 705 989 105
  Non-immigrants 74 600 17 695 75 650 151 300
  Immigrants 282 410 143 820 362 030 788 260
      Before 1991 138 780 16 095 145 975 300 850
      1991 to 2000 123 440 67 795 128 695 319 930
      1991 to 1995 79 855 19 670 58 200 157 725
      1996 to 2000 43 585 48 120 70 500 162 205
      2001 to 2006 20 180 59 925 87 360 167 465
  Non-permanent 
  residents
4 435 9 435 19 025 32 895
Source: Statistics Canada, Census of 2006. 
Th e majority of Cantonese speakers had come to Canada from Hong 
Kong between the late 60’s to mid 70’s and in signifi cant numbers in the 
80’s to late 90’s. Immigrants from Guangdong, Vietnam and Southeast 
Asia also form an integral part of the Canada’s Cantonese speaker popula-
tion. But since the 1990’s, the vast majority of new Chinese immigrants 
have come from mainland China, especially Fujian Province, and tend to 
speak Mandarin along with their regional languages.
As China’s global infl uence increases, it is likely that immigrants of Chi-
nese origin will urge the younger generation to learn Mandarin. Th e decline 
of Cantonese purportedly represents a challenge for the older generation 
who speak only that language. Nonetheless, the Cantonese language still 
dominates Chinese Canadian television, and most events organized by the 
media are still conducted in Cantonese. If you want to get a job in the Chi-
nese service sector in Canada, you still need to know Cantonese.
In 2006, immigrants represented nearly one in fi ve Canadians. Of 
those with neither English nor French as their mother tongue, some 
seventy percent were immigrants. Nearly eighty-fi ve percent with 
Mandarin as their mother tongue were immigrants and this was also 
the case for seventy-eight percent of those whose mother tongue was 
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Cantonese. Th ere are nearly twice as many fi rst-generation speakers 
of mother-tongue Cantonese as there are fi rst-generation speakers of 
mother-tongue Mandarin, and more than ten times as many in the sec-
ond generation, while in the third generation there are about sixty per-
cent more speakers of mother-tongue Cantonese than there are speakers 
of mother-tongue Mandarin (see Table 15.3). For every non-immigrant 
under the age of fi fteen whose mother tongue is Mandarin, there are 
nearly 2.5 whose mother tongue is Cantonese, but among immigrants 
under the age of fi fteen more than twice as many have Mandarin as 
their mother tongue as have Cantonese as their mother tongue.
Table 15.3 Generational Status of Mandarin and Cantonese as Mother 
Tongues among Canadians, 2006
Canada mother tongue 2006 Mandarin Cantonese
Total 173 730 369 645
  1st Generation - subtotal above the 
  age of 15 years
130 090 278 745
     1st Generation 116 220 232 140
     1.5 Generation* 13 875 46 605
  2nd Generation - subtotal above the 
  age of 15 years
3115 39 560
     2nd Generation** 2865 38 110
     2.5 Generation 250 1 445
  3rd + Generation 1240 1 985
  Immigrants under 15 years of age 14 940 7 345
  Non-immigrants under 15 years of age 14 820 37 540
Notes: Th e term “1.5 generation” refers to persons who were born outside Canada to parents 
who were also born outside Canada, and who arrived in Canada, either as citizens or as 
immigrants, before the age of 12; or to persons who were born outside Canada with one 
Canadian parent and arrived in Canada as immigrants after the age of 12. Th e term “2.5 
generation” refers to persons who were born in Canada with one parent who was also born 
in Canada.
Source: Statistics Canada, Census of 2006.
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Knowledge of Offi  cial Languages among the 
Chinese Population
Almost all immigrants whose mother tongue is neither English nor French 
retain their languages of origin. Exceptions arise among immigrants who 
have arrived in Canada at a very young age, for whom knowledge of the 
non-offi  cial language tends to be eroded over time. However, those moni-
toring the process of immigrant integration have been particularly inter-
ested in the pace at which one or other of the offi  cial languages is acquired 
by persons with neither English nor French as their mother tongue.
In 2006 some 6.4 percent of all immigrants reported speaking neither 
English nor French (see Figures 15.3 and 15.4). Among those who had 
arrived before 1991, some 4.8 percent spoke neither offi  cial language, among 
those who had arrived between 1991 and 2001 the proportion was 7.8 per-
cent, and among those who had arrived between 2001 and 2006 the propor-
tion was 9.2 percent. Of the approximately 520,000 Canadians who in 2006 
reported speaking neither English nor French, the majority were over the age 
of fi fty-fi ve. Some one fi fth of those persons whose mother tongue was Can-
tonese reported knowledge of neither English nor French, while one sixth of 
those whose mother tongue was Mandarin did so. As among immigrants in 
general, most of those whose mother tongue was either Cantonese or Manda-
rin and who knew neither English nor French were over the age of fi fty-fi ve. 
Some thirty-eight percent of those immigrants who had Cantonese as their 
mother tongue and had arrived in Canada between 2001 and 2006 reported 
knowing neither English nor French, as compared to nearly nineteen per-
cent of those whose mother tongue was Mandarin and twenty-one percent of 
those with other Chinese mother tongues.
Th e largest communities of Chinese-language-speakers are in Toronto 
and Vancouver, where their critical mass allows them to work in Chinese 
languages rather than, or as well as, in English. In 2006 some forty-six 
percent of Canada’s mother-tongue Cantonese population resided in the 
Toronto region (170,495 people) and another thirty-fi ve percent resided in 
Vancouver (128,550 people). Among the mother-tongue Mandarin popu-
lation, some forty-one percent resided in Vancouver (70,410 people) com-
pared to thirty-seven percent in Toronto (63,820 people).
In 2006, around 7.5 percent of Canadians whose mother tongue was 
neither English nor French used a non-offi  cial language at work. Among 
the mother-tongue Mandarin population, some 18.8 percent used Man-
darin most often in the workplace, a proportion that was at twenty-seven 
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Figure 15.3 Knowledge of English and French among Canadians with 
Chinese Mother Tongues, 2006 (%)































Figure 15.4 Canadians with Chinese Mother Tongues Having Knowledge of 
Neither English nor French, 2006 (%)
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percent in Vancouver and seventeen percent in Toronto. Among the 
mother-tongue Cantonese population, some 37.4 percent used Canton-
ese most often in the workplace, the same percentage did so in Toronto, 
and nearly twenty-fi ve percent did so in Vancouver.
Language Retention, Ethnic Identifi cation, and Belonging 
to Canada
Observers of language integration are generally concerned with the extent to 
which the children of immigrants retain their language of origin, particularly 
if they believe that retention of the non-offi  cial language impedes acquisition 
of one of the offi  cial languages. Canadian Census data support the idea that 
non-offi  cial languages become eroded in the second generation.
Among the second generation in groups of Canadians with non-offi  cial 
mother tongues, there is a broadly similar rate of language transfer, that is, 
of changing from the language fi rst learned to the use of another language 
in the home (see Figure 15.5). In 2006, those reporting Punjabi as their 
mother tongue had the highest rate of home language retention, with some 
37.4 percent continuing to speak it most often in their homes, while among 
those whose mother tongue was Greek only twenty percent continued to 
speak it in their homes, but overall about one in three persons in the second 
generation reported speaking their mother tongue most often at home.
Th e Ethnic Diversity Survey, conducted by Statistics Canada in part-
nership with the Department of Canadian Heritage in 2002, off ers 
some insight into the use of non-offi  cial languages in various contexts, 
and permits an examination of how language may infl uence other 
expressions of identity. Th e survey reported that, among persons whose 
mother tongue was neither English nor French, some 68% used a non-
offi  cial language, with siblings the fi gure drops to 51% and with friends 
some 30% use a non-offi  cial language while 54% use English only. Th e 
survey also provides data about the use of non-offi  cial and offi  cial lan-
guages, and about feelings of belonging, among the Chinese popula-
tion in Canada (see Table 15.4). Th ere was not much impact on the 
strength of feeling of belonging to Canada among those Chinese who 
used mainly English or a non-offi  cial language most often with siblings, 
parents or friends. However, those who used a non-offi  cial language 
most often reported somewhat higher rates of belonging to their ethnic 
or cultural group.
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Figure 15.5 Use of Mother Tongues in the Home by Members of Second 
Generations in Selected Language Groups for Age Cohorts 15 to 
24 and 25 to 34, 2006 (%)
 






























Table 15.4 Visible Minority Chinese Reporting Belonging to Canada and 
Belonging to an Ethnic or Cultural Group, 2002 (%)
Percentage 4 and 5 
on a fi ve point scale 
where 5 is very strong





offi  cial 
language
English Non-
offi  cial 
language
Language of Interview 74.4% 70.1% 51.6% 58.4%
Language Used Most 
Often with Siblings 
76.2% 71.3% 47.1% 57.2%
Language Used Most 
Often with Parents 
75.4% 72.1% 41.8% 58.0%
Language Used Most 
Often with Friends 
76.0% 67.1% 48.6% 58.3%
Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, Statistics Canada and the Department of Canadian Heritage, 
2002.
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Before the Census of 1991, a campaign was conducted to encourage 
the population to write in “Canadian” as their response to the question 
on ethnic origins. Until then, “Canadian” had not been among the sug-
gested responses on the list provided on the Census form. In the view of 
the architects of the campaign, ethnicity was divisive and the very reporting 
of it encouraged interethnic confl ict, so writing in “Canadian” was seen as 
a means of asserting a strengthened Canadian identity. Some 700,000 per-
sons responded to the appeal and made “Canadian” the sixth most popular 
response to the Census question on ethnic origins. In 1996 the Census 
form itself listed “Canadian” sixth among the suggested responses to the 
question, and that year it emerged as the most popular response, with 5.3 
million persons declaring “Canadian” their single ethnic origin and another 
1.7 million including it as part of a multiple response.
Th e Census of 2001 saw a further increase in the number of “Canadian” 
responses, but analysis of these responses suggested that the vast majority of 
those giving them had previously reported French and British origins, and 
the vast majority of the members of minority ethnic groups had not shifted 
to the “Canadian” response, although many had included it in a multiple 
response. Among those respectively reporting Cantonese or Mandarin as 
their mother tongue, nearly every person identifying as fi rst- or second-
generation identifi ed solely with a minority ethnic origin. Among those 
in the third or later generations, forty-nine percent of the mother-tongue 
Cantonese population identifi ed solely with a minority ethnic origin, while 
thirty-seven percent of the Mandarin mother-tongue population did so. 
One in fi ve of the persons in the third generation with Cantonese as their 
mother tongue made “Canadian” part of their response to the question on 
ethnic origin. Nearly one in three in the third generation with Mandarin as 
their mother tongue made “Canadian” part of their response.
On the basis of the Census data on the degree of self-identifi cation as 
“Canadian,” some might contend that Canadian identity gets stronger from 
one generation to the next. It should not be assumed, however, that nominal 
ethnic Canadianness implies a greater sense of belonging to Canada. Includ-
ing “Canadian” as part of the response to the Census question on ethnic ori-
gin is most prevalent in the third generation. Some analysts are persuaded that 
self-identifying as ethnically “Canadian” implies a greater sense of belonging 
to Canada (see Hassman-Howard 1999), while Jeff rey G. Reitz and Rupa 
Banerjee (2007), working on the basis of the responses to the ethnic self-iden-
tifi cation question in the Ethnic Diversity Survey, point to a presumed gap 
in self-identifying as Canadian between second-generation white Canadians 
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and second-generation visible-minority Canadians. Yet the survey data reveal 
that, despite much less frequently self-identifying as “Canadian,” immigrants 
had a stronger sense of belonging to Canada than their descendants did. Th e 
majority of the Chinese, South Asian and Black respondents to the survey 
reported a strong sense of belonging to their ethnic or cultural group, yet 
members of all these groups reported an even stronger sense of belonging to 
Canada (see Figure 15.6).
As for diff erences in the sense of belonging to Canada between fi rst-
generation and second-generation members of visible minorities, they were 
not very substantial (see Figure 15.7), although it is possible to make the 
gap appear wider by focusing only on those who reported “very strong” 
feelings of belonging (see Reitz and Banerjee 2007).
It is often assumed that where the sense of belonging to Canada is weak, 
it is due to the persistence of identifi cation with an ancestral culture or eth-
nic origin. Following such logic, it might be assumed that Chinese Canadi-
ans possess a weaker sense of belonging to Canada than members of other 
groups do because of the persistence of their ties to Chinese culture. Such 
explanations are at the root of social integration theory, which assumes that 
Figure 15.6 Proportions of Members of Selected Visible Minority Groups 
Reporting Belonging to Canada and Belonging to Ethnic or 
Cultural Groups, 2002 (%)
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Figure 15.7 Proportions of Members of Selected Visible Minority Groups 
Aged 30 to 44 Years, and in First and Second Generations, 
Reporting Belonging to Canada, 2002 (%)
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ties to countries of origin are an important obstacle to cultural adjustment. 
Yet the data from the Ethnic Diversity Survey do not support this notion 
(see Table 15.5). Around eighty-fi ve percent of those Chinese respondents 
who reported strong rates of ethnic belonging also reported a strong sense 
of belonging to Canada. By contrast, some sixty-three percent of those who 
reported a very weak sense of belonging to their ethnic group reported a 
strong sense of belonging to Canada.
Among those who identifi ed as Chinese in the Ethnic Diversity Survey, 
11 percent reported that all their friends were of the same fi rst ancestry as 
themselves and 38 percent reported that most of them were. Th e combined 
total, 49 percent, compared with 37 percent of the South Asian population 
and twenty-two percent of the white population reporting that all or most 
of their friends had the same fi rst ancestry. Social capital theorists contend 
that there is a distinction between “good” and “bad” social capital, the for-
mer referring to bonding between members of the same ethnic group and 
the latter to bridging across ethnic groups. Yet the data from the survey 
indicated that one’s share of friends of the same ancestry had virtually no 
bearing on the strength of one’s sense of belonging to an ethnic group or to 
Canada (see Figure 15.8).
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Table 15.5 Sense of Belonging to an Ethnic or Cultural Group Correlated 
with Sense of Belonging to Canada among the Visible Minority 










2 3 4 5 
(very 
strong)
Total 4 and 5 
combined
63.5% 70.5% 65.8% 79.9% 85.5%
4 29.9% 31.2% 31.9% 44.6% 20.6%
5 - very strong 33.6% 39.3% 33.9% 35.3% 64.9%
Source: Statistics Canada, Ethnic Diversity Survey, 2002.
Figure 15.8 Correlation between Having Friends of the Same First Ancestry 
and Having a Strong Sense of Belonging to Canada for the 
Visible Minority Chinese Population, 2002 (%)
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Finally, the number of trips taken back to the country of origin by Chi-
nese Canadians did not have much infl uence on their sense of belonging to 
Canada (see Figure 15.9).
Citizenship is one area where there appeared to be signifi cant diff erences 
among Canadians of Chinese origin in the strength of their sense of belonging 
to Canada. Chinese respondents reporting Canadian citizenship indicated a 
stronger sense of belonging to Canada than those holding dual citizenship, 
that is, citizenship of Canada as well as citizenship in their country of birth. 
Some seventy-fi ve percent of the former had a strong sense of belonging to 
Canada, compared with nearly sixty-six percent of the latter.
Models of Diversity and Cultural Bridging between 
Canada and China
Overseas migrants play an important role in the relationship between Canada 
and China. Although most migrants would not describe themselves as cul-
tural brokers, very often persons of Chinese origin in Canada establish 
bridges between the cultures, and, while their numbers are relatively few, 
Figure 15.9 Correlation between Number of Trips to Country of Birth and 
Sense of Belonging to Canada for the Visible Minority Chinese 
Population, 2002 (%)
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persons of Canadian origin living and working in China also play a role in 
the bridging process. However, cultural brokerage requires that those mak-
ing up the bridge possess dual or multiple attachments. Th e persistence of 
such attachments remains at the very centre of the debate in Canada over the 
nation’s approach to managing diversity. While some feel that adjustment 
to life in Canada does not require that minority ethnic cultures and tradi-
tions be abandoned, others insist that if Canada is to build a cohesive society, 
immigrants and, more importantly, their descendants need to give up their 
ethnic and cultural ties to countries of origin. Th ere is a need to understand 
better how the persistence of migrant ties infl uences cultural and commercial 
ties between countries, and specifi cally, in the case of Chinese migration, the 
ties between Canada and China.
Critics of the Canadian multicultural model believe that the persistence 
of ethnic cultures undercuts national identifi cation, but very often their 
criticism has fallen short of providing evidence for the ways in which this 
undercutting happens. Too often, it is assumed that if the sense of belong-
ing to Canada is insuffi  cient, it must be because the sense of belonging to 
a minority ethnic culture is too strong. As demonstrated above, however, 
in the case of Canada’s Chinese population their sense of ethnic belonging 
does not in fact diminish their sense of belonging to Canada, nor does the 
degree of contact with members of the same group (the “bad” social capital) 
have that eff ect. Only the holding of dual citizenship appears to make a 
noticeable impact on the strength of the sense of belonging to Canada, and 
even in these cases the diff erence is not so very great.
In the Canadian multicultural paradigm, knowledge of non-offi  cial lan-
guages has not been deemed essential to ethnic belonging: in eff ect, a strong 
sense of belonging to one’s ethnic origins is not seen to require knowledge 
of the associated language. While members of ethnic communities may 
disagree with this view, it has not been the subject of much public debate. 
Th at is not to say that Canadian government policy does not recognize the 
importance of language as an expression of culture. It does so, after all, with 
respect to the country’s French and Aboriginal communities. Yet there is no 
historic commitment to the preservation and enhancement of non-offi  cial 
languages, and there seems to be no strong reason for the government to 
extend support to such an objective.
As for the role of Chinese languages, whether as mother tongues or sec-
ond languages, they do not appear to have a considerable eff ect on the 
strength of the Canadian Chinese population’s sense of belonging to Can-
ada. On the other hand, they do infl uence the strength of the sense of 
Th e Bridge Too Far? 221 
belonging to the ethnic or cultural group. In other words, for the Chinese 
population language retention is an important element of ethnic belong-
ing. Again, however, that does not mean that Chinese Canadians cannot 
feel a strong sense of ethnic belonging without knowledge of any of the 
Chinese languages.
Th e Chinese population of Canada is often wrongly presumed to be lin-
guistically monolithic. In fact, its linguistic diversity to some extent refl ects 
the historic migration patterns of the Chinese in Canada. It is also in part 
a microcosm of the ethnic diversity in China, which is not well-known 
to many Canadians. Understanding the internal diversity of the Chinese 
Canadian population and the diversity of the population of China will 
be extremely useful to those engaged in building bridges between the two 
countries. 
References
Citizenship and Immigration Canada. (2009). “Facts and Figures 2008—
Immigration Overview: Permanent and Temporary Residents.” Ottawa: 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Online at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/
resources/statistics/facts2008/index.asp [consulted January 14, 2011].
Howard-Hassman, Rhoda E. (1999). “Canadian as an Ethnic Category: 
Implications for Multiculturalism and National Unity.” Canadian Public Policy 
25:4, 523–37.
Reitz, Jeff rey G., and Rupa Banerjee. (2007). “Racial Inequality, Social Cohesion, 
and Policy Issues in Canada,” in Belonging?: Diversity, Recognition and Shared 
Citizenship in Canada, ed. Keith Banting, Th omas J. Courchene, and F. Leslie 
Seidle. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 489–545.
Statistics Canada. (1996, 2001, 2006). Census of Canada. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
Statistics Canada. (2002). “Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS).” Ottawa: Statistics 
Canada. Online at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/imdb-bmdi/4508-eng.htm [con-
sulted January 14, 2011].
222
Canada is a country whose demographic evolution has depended upon 
immigration. In 2006 19.6 percent of its total population, or 6.2 million 
people, had been born outside Canada, and 3.8 million had settled in Canada 
after 1980. Th ese new migration fl ows were part of a broader immigration 
boom in Canada, refl ecting important changes in the country’s immigration 
policies. First, in 1967 the policy of giving Europeans preferential access to 
Canada was abandoned. Second, the offi  cial objectives of immigration policy 
were broadened beyond responding to Canada’s need for workers to include 
reuniting families and respecting the humanitarian tradition of admitting 
refugees. In addition, since the end of the 1970s the provincial governments 
have been responsible for policy-making and management with respect to the 
selection and integration of immigrants. Against this changing backdrop, the 
average number of immigrants increased annually throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. While 102,000 people migrated to Canada between 1981 and 1985, 
823,925 settled in the country between 1991 and 1995, and then 1,109,980 
came between 2001 and 2006.
Th is movement of recent immigrants is also characterized by a pro-
found change in the source countries of immigration: Europe is no longer 
the main source of immigrants, having been replaced by the Asia–Pacifi c 
region. In 2008, forty-six percent of immigrants in Canada came from 
this region, including those from mainland China, India, the Philippines, 
Pakistan, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Th e highest 
proportion of Asian immigrants was from the world’s two most populated 
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countries, China and India. For instance, between 1999 and 2008 393,941 
Chinese settled in Canada, 87.3 per cent of them being from mainland 
China and the rest from Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan (see Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada 2009).
From a quantitative perspective the evolution of Chinese nationals’ 
migration to Canada is particularly interesting. Mainland China (refers to 
the Chinese population living in People’s Republic of China, excluding 
Hong Kong and Macao) has become the country with the largest propor-
tion of citizens migrating to Canada since the mid-1990s (see Shi 2004). 
Th e specifi c motivations of Chinese migrants to Canada have also evolved 
considerably over time. While those who arrived around the beginning of 
the 20th century left their country of origin in the hope of escaping poverty 
and political instability, recent migration fl ows have been more selective, 
mostly consisting of students, entrepreneurs and investors (see Lai 2003).
Chinese Immigration to Canada: A Historical Overview
Chinese immigration to Canada started in the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury (see Lai 1988, Li 1998 and Wickberg 1984). Th ese fl ows were essentially 
composed of single men, and were part of a broader wave of immigration 
to Canada that had started through the colonial empires in Southeast Asia. 
Migrants from mainland China sought to escape misery in a country where the 
population had nearly doubled from 200 to 250 million in 1750 to 410 mil-
lion in 1850, while access to agricultural land remained limited (see Li 1998). 
Military defeat, political instability, famines and natural disasters, including 
fl oods, were also crucial motivations for migrating to North America.
Migratory procedures were of two kinds. Th e fi rst was by means of a work 
contract, which was the procedure through which the labourers known as 
“coolies” migrated to Canada. Coolies, who were at the bottom of the socio-
economic ladder, were hired on contract to work in the country of destina-
tion for a certain period of time, and had to reimburse the person involved 
in paying for and facilitating their migration to the relevant country. Once 
the contract was over, coolies could fi nd themselves jobs on their own (see 
Wickberg 1984). Th e second procedure was migration in stages, meaning 
that migrants would, fi rst, work in the country of destination until they had 
enough money to return to their country of origin; then they would usu-
ally get married there; and later they would return to their host countries, 
taking sons, nephews or other male relatives along with them. A migratory 
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network slowly emerged out of such fl ows. Depending on their fi nancial cir-
cumstances and the opportunities available in the host country, migrants also 
brought their spouse along and rebuilt their households in the host country.
Th e fi rst Chinese immigrants were mostly coolies hired in groups to 
work on construction projects or in mining, but after 1900 migration in 
stages became the more common procedure (see Wickberg 1984). Th e fi rst 
wave of Chinese immigrants came from British colonies, including those 
in what is now Eastern Canada, as well as from California, and settled 
in British Columbia, especially on Vancouver Island, in response to the 
Fraser River Gold Rush of 1858–1860 (see Lai 1988). Th e second wave of 
Chinese migration into the province started during the construction of the 
transcontinental railway at the end of the 1870s. Around 1,500 Chinese 
arrived in Canada from the United States to work on the construction 
of the line between 1880 and 1881, and they were joined by more than 
16,000 other Chinese immigrants, including 10,000 who came directly 
from China (see Lai 1988 and Wickberg 1984).
By the beginning of the 20th century an average of 2,000 Chinese immi-
grants were settling in Canada each year. Th e vast majority of them were 
in British Columbia, although starting in 1880 a minority went all the 
way to Eastern Canada. As their professions diversifi ed, Chinese enterprises 
moved beyond making, importing and/or selling goods exclusive to the 
needs of the Chinese immigrant community, as in the case of laundry busi-
nesses that dispatched Chinese pioneers across Canada. Some Chinese also 
opened western-style restaurants, especially in Manitoba and those parts of 
the Prairies that are now Alberta and Saskatchewan. Starting in the 1890s, 
however, the Chinese faced an increasingly limited job market, due to 
pressures from trade unions and politicians, British Columbia’s Legislative 
Assembly even passed a law prohibiting the use of Asian labour, which its 
supporters justifi ed as a response to an explosion at a coalmine in Nanaimo 
for which Chinese workers were apparently responsible, and which killed 
200 people (see Wickberg 1984). Next, succumbing to pressures from 
groups in British Columbia and elsewhere, the federal Parliament also leg-
islated to restrict Chinese immigration, in eff ect from January 1, 1902. 
(It is worth noting that during this period Asian immigrants were facing 
similar forms of exclusion elsewhere in North America: the U.S. Chinese 
Exclusion Act was passed in 1882 and became permanent in 1902.) Laws 
deterring Chinese immigration had already been in eff ect since the comple-
tion of the Canadian Pacifi c Railway in 1885, including a CA$ 50 head 
tax. Th e Canadian legislation of 1902 stated that a ship could transport 
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only one Chinese migrant for every fi fty tons of merchandise and increased 
the head tax, eff ectively an entry fee for Chinese migrants, to CA$ 100. In 
1903, Parliament increased it to 500 dollars, but exempted those in six spe-
cial categories from having to pay it: established tradesmen (a rather vague 
term that led to many abuses), diplomats, religious ministers, tourists, stu-
dents and scholars (see Wickberg 1984). Th e head tax was the subject of a 
public apology by Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 2006 (see Offi  ce of 
the Prime Minister 2006).
Th e restrictions on Chinese immigration did not have signifi cant eff ects, 
and the Chinese population of Canada, which had been 4,383 in 1881 and 
9,129 in 1891, rose to 17,312 in 1901 and to 27,831 in 1911 (see Li 1998). 
Th e number of Chinese immigrants into British Columbia in particular also 
continued to increase, although many of them left the province by train to 
settle in the East. Th is diff usion, however, fuelled the rise of powerful anti-
Chinese movements throughout the country and led the federal Parliament 
to legislate a total ban on Chinese immigration into Canada in 1923. During 
the period of exclusion, which lasted from 1924 to 1947, only a few Chinese 
were able to enter Canada (see Lai 1988), and the Chinese population of 
Canada declined by around twenty-fi ve percent between 1931 and 1941.
From 1945 onward the Chinese communities in Canada pressured the 
Canadian government on two issues: the repeal of the ban on further immi-
gration and the right of Chinese citizens in British Columbia to vote, which 
only the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation had supported until then 
(see Wickberg 1984). Th e repeal of the immigration ban in May 1947 con-
stituted a signifi cant moral victory for the Chinese Canadian population, 
and the introduction of Canadian citizenship the same year gave the right 
to vote to all citizens. Nevertheless, institutional restrictions on Chinese 
immigration continued until 1962, illustrating the racial prejudices that 
still underlaid Canadian immigration policy in relation to non-white popu-
lations. In particular, the only category of immigration available to Chinese 
was that of relatives sponsored by Chinese Canadians. During the 1950s, 
many Chinese immigrants were women and children who had been sepa-
rated from their husbands or fathers during the long period of exclusion.
In 1962, the government of Canada changed immigration policy by 
creating four categories of admission (see Li 1998). Th e fi rst two allowed 
independent migration by educated individuals entering the liberal pro-
fessions, while the third was for immigrants who had privileged relation-
ships with Canadian citizens or permanent residents, and in all three of 
these categories, immigrants’ racial background or country of origin no 
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longer constituted a criterion for admission into Canada. Th e fourth 
category, however, enabled Canadian citizens or permanent residents to 
sponsor only Europeans or US citizens seeking admission. Th e new policy 
of 1962 enabled the Chinese without family ties in Canada to enter the 
country as independent immigrants for the fi rst time since 1923.
Changes in the composition and characteristics of the Chinese Cana-
dian population were becoming obvious by the mid-1960s, but the last 
remnants of racial discrimination against the Chinese were not abandoned 
until 1967, the same year in which the Cultural Revolution directly aff ected 
Guangdong and made some impact on Hong Kong too (see Wickberg 
1984). Direct migration from mainland China remained restricted because 
of the “closed door” imposed by Mao Zedong’s regime since 1949, so most 
Chinese migrating to Canada came from Hong Kong, Taiwan and diaspora 
communities in Southeast Asia, Southern Africa, Latin America (especially 
Peru) and the West Indies. It was only starting in 1974, under the family 
reunifi cation programme initiated during Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s 
visit to China in 1973, that immigration from mainland China became 
a signifi cant factor (see Liu 1997). Between 1974 and 1988 most of the 
mainland Chinese who migrated to Canada did so with the help of their 
already established families or through social networks. Additionally, as a 
result of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms and “open door” policy, intro-
duced from December 1978, around 50,000 mainland Chinese students 
studied in Western democratic countries between 1978 and 1987, 40,000 
of whom were funded by the Chinese government, the other 10,000 being 
self-supporting (see Gittings 1989). Starting in the 1990s, the level of edu-
cation of immigrants from mainland China to Canada was higher than 
that of other immigrants settling in the country (see Liu 1997). It is worth 
noting that, as a result of a change in Ottawa’s immigration policy follow-
ing the Tiananmen incident in 1989, many mainland Chinese immigrants 
during this period were admitted as independent immigrants.
Th e specifi c motivations of Chinese migrating to Canada have changed 
considerably over the past 150 years. While the need to escape poverty and 
misery constituted the primary motivation for the fi rst wave of Chinese 
immigrants, by the 1960s, and especially in the 1980s and 1990s, migra-
tion became much more targeted, involving students, qualifi ed profession-
als, and entrepreneurs and business owners looking for an economic envi-
ronment favourable to investment and private sector employment (see Lai 
2003). Nevertheless, the general theme of pursuing economic opportunity 
has remained dominant through the decades.
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Chinese Immigrants on Canadian Territory
Chinese immigration to Canada took on a diff erent dimension starting in 
the 1980s, following the historical developments outlined above, and the 
spatial diff usion that had occurred around the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury became more obvious as the century ended. In particular, Vancouver 
used to be the main gateway through which Chinese immigrants entered 
Canada, but in recent years other migratory trends have developed. First, 
immigration from mainland China increased rapidly from the 1970s 
onward. Second, Chinese immigrants are now most likely to live in the 
largest and most dynamic urban areas of Canada, and around ninety-fi ve 
per cent of them are located in just fourteen of Canada’s thirty-three Census 
metropolitan areas, or CMAs (see Table 16.1).
Until the mid-1990s Chinese immigrants gave priority to just two 
urban centres in Canada: Toronto and Vancouver (see Table 16.2). Th eir 
geographical concentration became more and more obvious from one Cen-
sus to another: less than sixty-one percent of Chinese Canadians lived in 
one or the other of these two cities in 1961, but by 2006 more than seventy 
percent of them did. From the beginning of 1970s, Vancouver gradually 
lost its status as fi rst-choice Canadian host city for Chinese immigrants. 
Table 16.1 Numbers and Main Destinations of Immigrants from Mainland 
China to Canada, in Successive Periods from before 1961 to 
2001–2006
Canada 14 CMAs Proportion in the 
14 CMAs (%)
Before 1961 13,865 12,325 88.9
1961–1970 17,745 16,435 92.6
1971–1980 39,355 37,405 95.0
1981–1990 62,940 60,395 96.0
1991–2000 177,925 169,645 95.3
1991–1995 69,640 66,800 95.9
1996–2000 108,290 102,845 95.0
2001–2006 155,105 146,690 94.6
Source: Statistics Canada, Census of 2006.
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In 1961, it was home to thirty-fi ve percent of the Chinese immigrant pop-
ulation of Canada, but by 2006 it was home to only twenty-nine percent. 
However, this proportionate decline does not imply a numerical decrease in 
the Chinese population of the city: while there were 23,255 newly arrived 
Chinese immigrants in Vancouver in the period 1991–1995, there were 
39,790 of them in the period 2001–2006. Since the 1980s, the Greater 
Toronto Area has been the most popular destination, accommodating 
forty-one percent of newly arrived Chinese immigrants, or 63,855 people, 
during the period 2001–2006.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the other twelve CMAs, particularly 
Montreal, Calgary, Edmonton and Ottawa–Gatineau, have had signifi -
cantly increasing numbers of Chinese immigrants (see Figure 16.1). Th e 
Census of 2006 showed that, for the fi rst time, the total number of newly 
arrived Chinese immigrants in these twelve CMAs exceeded the number 
in Vancouver, and that the rate of increase in that total number between 
2001 and 2006 was almost the same as in Toronto between 1996 and 2000. 
Figure 16.1 Increase in Numbers of Chinese Immigrants in Toronto, 
Vancouver and Twelve Other CMAs, in Successive Periods from 
before 1961 to 2001–2006 
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It is clear, therefore, that recent Chinese immigrants have tended to spread 
further throughout Canada, particularly its urban centres.
Given the urban concentration of Chinese immigrants, the fi ndings on 
their presence in these fourteen CMAs correlate with observable changes in 
their distribution across the provinces of Canada (see Figure 16.2 and Map 
16.1). British Columbia was historically the main host area for the newly 
arrived Chinese population, but is now behind Ontario, where the num-
bers of new Chinese immigrants doubled between the period 1996–2001 
and the period 2001–2006, accounting for more than fi fty percent of all 
new Chinese immigrants in Canada in 2006. Th e fl ows of Chinese immi-
grants thus suggest an increasing tendency to favour Ontario, especially 
the Greater Toronto Area and neighbouring cities. For instance, Ottawa–
Gatineau, Hamilton, Kitchener, Windsor and St. Catharines–Niagara all 
witnessed considerable rises in their Chinese populations from the 1990s 
onward. In Hamilton, the number of newly arrived Chinese immigrants 
went from 645 between 1981 and 1990 to 3,210 between 1996 and 2006, 
while the cities of Kitchener, Windsor and London received 3,095, 2,605 
and 1,880 newly arrived Chinese immigrants, respectively, between 1996 
and 2006, compared to fewer than 300 during the 1980s. Th e most signifi -
cant increase was in the Ottawa–Gatineau area, with 8,885 new Chinese 
immigrants between 1996 and 2006, eight times as many as between 1981 
and 1990. Th e Chinese population in Ontario has undeniably benefi ted 
these cities, particularly those located along the urban corridor stretching 
toward Montreal (see Map 16.1). Th e economic dynamism of the region, 
especially in the area of new technologies, was presumably a decisive factor 
in this choice of geographical location.
In contrast, Chinese immigration into the province of Quebec and the 
three Prairie provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba illustrates a 
more nuanced pattern, with stable fl ows until the 1990s, and then a signifi -
cant increase in both the numbers and proportions of Chinese immigrants 
since the year 2000. Th is new increase largely comprises concentrations of 
Chinese immigrants in Montreal for Quebec, and in Calgary, Edmonton, 
Winnipeg and Saskatoon for the Prairies. Th e number of newly arrived 
Chinese immigrants in Montreal went from 3,465 in the 1980s to 23,150 
in the period 1996–2006, a near-sevenfold increase. Similar tendencies 
were observed in Calgary and Edmonton: these two cities were host to 
13,340 and 6,160 new Chinese immigrants, respectively, in the period 
1996–2006, compared to only 3,420 and 2,960, respectively, during the 
1980s. Montreal attracted a lot of Chinese immigrants mainly because the 
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Figure 16.2 Increase in Numbers of Chinese Immigrants in the Canadian 
Provinces, in Successive Periods from before 1961 to 2001–2006 
 


















city is part of the dynamic urban corridor stretching from London to Mon-
treal, and is also bilingual. As for Calgary and Edmonton, the economic 
boom and rapid growth experienced in Alberta was no doubt the main 
factor attracting new Chinese immigrants.
Between Chinatown and the Suburbs: Plural Immigrant 
Communities
As part of the institutional expression of signifi cant racial discrimination, 
the concept of “Chinatown” was initially associated with the building of an 
enclave that culturally and geographically isolated Chinese immigrants from 
the rest of the Canadian population. It was also at the heart of the larger 
process of assimilation of Canadian-born Chinese and their adaptation to the 
host society. Th en, as discussed above, new dimensions in Chinese immigra-
tion started to develop in the 1960s, and became more evident during the 
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Map 16.1 Evolution of Spatial Distribution of Immigrants from Mainland 
China in Selected Canadian CMAs, 1990 and 2006
 
Source: Statistics Canada, Census of 2006.
1980s and 1990s. Accompanied by investment, they facilitated the revitaliza-
tion of old Chinatowns, and contributed to the development of new ones 
(see Lai 2003), enabling the opening of Chinese or Asian shopping centres in 
suburbs, especially in the Greater Toronto Area and in Vancouver. Th ese new 
development projects were made possible by transnational capital originating 
from China. Chinatown became a symbolic cultural and commercial centre 
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for the Chinese communities in Canada, although it was not necessarily a 
residential area for new immigrants (see Li 2000).
Suburbanization began in major urban centres in North America in the 
1960s and had a considerable impact on new Chinese immigrants’ choice 
of residential area. In New York, Los Angeles and San Francisco the spatial 
mobility of Chinese immigrants stretches all the way to suburbs, which for 
a long time were considered ethnically and racially homogenous residen-
tial areas for the most socioeconomically privileged (see Fang and Brown 
1999). Chinese Americans have increasingly left areas with high concen-
trations of ethnic groups, and chosen to settle in neighbourhoods where 
work opportunities are better. Chinese living in suburbs also seem to have 
a higher socioeconomic status than those who live in downtown Chinese 
neighbourhoods. Residents of Chinatowns are often older, have lower levels 
of education, and have lower incomes, and are distinct from the younger 
generation of Chinese who have benefi ted from greater geographical mobil-
ity, better education and better knowledge of English.
In Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal the number of “visible minority 
neighbourhoods”—defi ned as Census sectors where more than thirty per-
cent of the population comprises members of visible minorities (Statistics 
Canada, 2004)—rose from six in 1981 to 254 in 2001, and slightly more 
than sixty percent of these neighbourhoods were Chinese (see Keung 2004). 
In Toronto, however, most Chinese have chosen to live in the suburbs and 
less than ten percent live downtown. Some Chinese have settled in cer-
tain suburbs of Toronto as a result of the development of high-technology 
industries and better job opportunities.
Comparisons between Chinese living in ethnic enclaves and those living 
outside them indicate that there are signifi cant socioeconomic diff erences, 
which are particularly marked in Toronto (see Lo and Wang 1997). Sub-
urban Chinese have benefi ted from higher levels of human capital, espe-
cially since the mid-1980s. At that time the majority of them came from 
Hong Kong and Taiwan, but since the 1990s more and more Chinese have 
migrated from mainland China as independent migrants, investors and/or 
business owners. In contrast, Chinese who live in downtown Toronto are 
predominantly from the southern parts of mainland China, Hong Kong 
or Vietnam and arrived before the 1960s. Th ey are on average older, were 
either refugees or settled in Canada under the family reunifi cation pro-
gramme, and suff er from a higher unemployment rate.
A detailed look at the Chinese in one Canadian city will illustrate these 
broader developments. In Ottawa, one person out of fi ve is now an immigrant 
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and one person out of seven is a member of a visible minority, and it has been 
projected that these proportions will double over the next twenty years. Th e 
Chinese community in the city comprises more than 30,000 people and consti-
tutes the largest visible minority (see O’Neill 2003). In the period 1991–2006 
more than 11,105 new immigrants from mainland China settled in Ottawa, 
representing around thirty percent of the total Chinese population of the city. 
Th e fi rst Chinese arrived in Ottawa near the end of the 19th century, following 
their involvement in railway construction (see Li 2000), but as recently as the 
early 1960s there were still only around 1,000 Chinese residents, of whom 315 
were from mainland China. By 1981 an estimated 3,800 Chinese people lived 
in the city and by 1991 there were 7,600, settled in most of the neighbour-
hoods all over Ottawa, although there was already a clear tendency to concen-
trate in suburban neighbourhoods (see Map 16.2). Some Chinese still prefer 
to live around Chinatown, but suburbanization has become more and more 
prominent since the late 1990s.
Eff ectively, the Chinese immigration boom started in the mid-1990s 
in Ottawa. Opportunities in high-technology industries were among the 
main motives for immigration. Many Chinese engineers from mainland 
China settled in Kanata, where information technology corporations such 
as Nortel had their headquarters. Nortel alone hired more than 10,000 
Chinese immigrants between the mid-1990s and the beginning of 2000. 
Th ere was a very important presence of Chinese immigrants in Kanata, and 
the community also opened Chinese food stores and small enterprises spe-
cializing in subcontracting. Kanata became one of the residential areas most 
preferred by the Chinese population in Ottawa. However, this changed 
suddenly with the downfall of Nortel and other high-tech companies 
around the beginning of the 21st century. Many of the Chinese workers 
who had migrated to Canada from the mid-1990s were left unemployed, 
many of them left, and some of them returned to China, indicating that 
they lacked roots in the city (see Rao 2001). However, in 2010 the Chinese 
multinational corporation Huawei Technologies announced a partnership 
and investment of CA$ 50 million in the Ottawa Centre for Research and 
Innovation, bringing in 180 jobs in research and development alone (see 
CTV News 2010). Th e arrival of this Chinese fi rm may help to breathe 
new life into a struggling industry and give new opportunities to the pre-
existing pool of skilled labour.
Compared to other Chinatowns in Canada, Ottawa’s Chinatown has 
had a short history, which started when 4,000 immigrants from Indochina 
settled in the city during the 20th century, opening restaurants, grocery 
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Map 16.2 Spatial Distribution of Chinese toward Suburban Areas of 
Ottawa, 1960, 1990, and 2006
 
Source: Based on data from Statistics Canada, Census of 2006.
stores and laundromats downtown (see Li 2000). Th e fi rst waves of Chinese 
immigrants in Ottawa came from areas of China other than the mainland, 
such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, which had been more infl uenced by the 
West. Th ey were much more market-oriented, spoke Cantonese and Eng-
lish, and in many cases were Christians. Unlike these earlier cohorts, the 
recent waves of Chinese tend to be non-religious, are often highly quali-
fi ed as doctors, engineers or professors, and come from mainland China. 
As most of them speak Mandarin, this has become the main language for 
communication among the Chinese in Ottawa.
As the example of Ottawa suggests, the immigrant communities in Can-
ada that are aggregated under the term “Chinese” are in fact very diverse 
culturally and historically, in terms of their geographical origins, socioeco-
nomic status, lifestyles and residential locations. In the context of such a 
diverse population, individual motivations have become more central to 
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Chinese decisions to migrate to Canada. Consequently, in urban centres 
such as Ottawa–Gatineau where the Chinese population is highly diverse, 
they are more geographically dispersed than in other parts of Canada. Most 
of them are no longer geographically segregated and live outside China-
town, although there are some new concentrations of Chinese in suburbs 
near to their workplaces. Suburbanization, which accelerated in the early 
1990s, has thus facilitated integration into Canadian society and impeded 
the expansion of Chinatown.
Concluding Discussion and Policy Implications
Th e history of immigration to Canada was marked at the end of the 
20th century by an increase in the scale of migration originating from 
Asian countries, and particularly mainland China. Since 1996, Chinese 
languages as a group have replaced Italian as the most commonly spo-
ken non-offi  cial mother tongue in Canada, being the mother tongues of 
3.3 percent of Canada’s population. In the Census of 2006, 1,034,085 
people reported speaking these languages, including Cantonese and 
Mandarin. Th ere has also been an increasing polarization of the Chinese 
population in Canada in favour of the most dynamic urban areas, 
primarily Toronto and Vancouver, but also increasingly other cities. 
However, Chinese immigrants’ choices of geographical location suggest 
that the causes of immigration to Canada have not changed over the 
decades: most Chinese immigrants are still primarily motivated by the 
quest for better living conditions and higher incomes, regardless of their 
qualifi cations and level of education, although it is noteworthy that 
around thirty-four percent of recent Chinese immigrants aged between 
twenty-fi ve and forty-four had completed their academic studies, com-
pared to nineteen percent of Canadian citizens in the same age category.
Th e Chinese community in Canada today is highly diverse, socially, cul-
turally and economically. Th e new generation has more post-secondary edu-
cation and is better prepared for successful migration and economic integra-
tion in Canada. Th e Chinese community today is composed of individuals 
with very diverse geographical origins, and is also politically divided as a 
result of recent events in mainland China. Th ere is a signifi cant gap between 
the older generation of migrants, who tended to live in British Columbia and 
were originally from Hong Kong, and the newer generations of Chinese, who 
were educated in mainland China following the economic reforms launched 
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in the late 1970s. In the context of such a diverse Chinese population, “Chi-
natown” has acquired various meanings. Recent migrants have chosen not to 
live in these neighbourhoods, giving priority instead to a suburban lifestyle 
and Chinese grocery stores on the urban periphery. Chinatown nonetheless 
remains symbolic for those Chinese, and Asian immigrants more generally, 
who are less socioeconomically privileged, as well as for Chinese youth born 
in Canada, who use it as a site for cultural events and gatherings. Th e socio-
economic, cultural and historical heterogeneity of the Chinese Canadian 
population is particularly notable in Ottawa, where the Chinese community 
has slowly disaggregated into various sub-communities as the choice of resi-
dential location has become the product of individual preferences.
As discussed above, increasing numbers of Chinese immigrants have 
decided not to settle in Toronto or Vancouver, and have dispersed to other 
cities across Canada. As more Chinese immigrants take on these new ter-
ritorial strategies, residing in cities with less established Chinese communi-
ties while in search of employment, there will be an increasing demand for 
policy targeted at retaining their talents for a longer term. Economic factors 
are the primary motivators for the mobility of Chinese immigrants. Th e 
wealth maximization thesis in migration studies states that “migrants move 
to countries where economic returns to their human capital are higher than 
in their home country” (see Wang and Lo 2005). While this theory refers 
to international migration, it also holds true for intranational migration 
and illuminates, for example, Ottawa’s experiences following the decline 
of high-tech industries in the west end of the city. Th is raises the question 
of how cities with smaller and more recently expanded Chinese popula-
tions can retain the newer members of the community, given fl uctuations 
in employment. Municipalities without large Chinese communities may 
fi nd it benefi cial to increase their eff orts to include Chinese immigrants 
in community activities where possible, since creating connections with 
non-Chinese members of Canadian society is very important to a feeling of 
inclusion (see Wang and Lo 2005).
One obstacle to inclusion in the larger community is the language bar-
rier, particularly for Chinese immigrants who have, on average, less ability 
in either of the two offi  cial languages of Canada than other immigrant 
groups (see Sakamoto, Ku and Wei 2009). Communication ability is 
directly correlated with increased income, and is therefore an issue for those 
Chinese immigrants in transition who have less language ability (see Wang 
and Lo 2005). Th is is particularly a problem in Ottawa: communication 
in the workplace may not be of primary importance for those working at 
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home using information technology, but it becomes an issue when seeking 
new employment or pursuing further involvement in the community.
At the more general level, smaller Canadian cities that are receiving 
more Chinese immigrants need to focus on creating an environment that 
will enhance inclusiveness and increase communication between Chinese 
and non-Chinese, by fi nding entry points to non-Chinese communities 
and networks, and targeting improvements in the language abilities of 
recent Chinese immigrants. Both sides of this line of policy are mutually 
reinforcing, and can have benefi ts in adding a non-economic dimension 
to the reasons for living in a particular city. A particularly viable contribu-
tion to helping with this issue is to create partnerships between Mandarin-
speaking immigrants and local institutions that off er Mandarin-language 
programmes. Initiating sustained language and cultural exchanges, as well 
as opportunities for skills improvement, can go a long way toward helping 
mutual understanding and learning, and developing local friendships and 
networks.
While such social and cultural policies may assist in the development 
of connections, they do not directly address the problem of employment. 
In the case of Ottawa, for example, in the early 2000s the lack of suitable 
employment for skilled workers specialized in high technologies led many 
Chinese immigrants to move away to Canadian cities with better prospects, 
or back to mainland China, with its increasingly prosperous information 
technology sector. Policy measures are required to attract new employers 
at the local level, using the available body of labour that exists in each city. 
Th ese, of course, would have benefi ts not only for recent Chinese immi-
grants, but for the community as a whole, although recent immigrants may 
be more prone to relocate as a result of unemployment.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, Chinese fi rms have increas-
ingly become global competitors and sources of local investment, which 
may be particularly attracted to areas with large pools of sector-specifi c 
labour. Chinese members of these labour pools may have linguistic, cul-
tural and network advantages in attracting this sort of investment, and 
these skills should not go unnoticed. Th ere may also be opportunities for 
Chinese immigrants in Canada, particularly more recent immigrants, to 
use networks in China to promote Canadian business in China. Further, 
when investment does occur, Chinese immigrants may have the same 
“bridge” advantages in helping Chinese companies to operate in the 
Canadian context, and vice versa. Nurturing the development of inte-
grated communities in Canada with links to China will not only help 
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to retain skilled Chinese immigrants, but may also help to draw in the 
investment needed to create the jobs sought by Chinese immigrants. It is 
now up to policy-makers, locally, provincially and nationally, to acknowl-
edge the new territorial strategies of Chinese immigrants in Canada, rec-
ognize their new demands for inclusion, and focus on opportunities for 
transnational partnerships.
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More than thirty years have passed since Richard Freeman’s infl uential 
book Th e Overeducated American (1976) described the growing tendency 
for workers to have more formal education than their jobs require, a ten-
dency that Freeman suggested generated a pattern of declining returns to 
higher education within the United States. While a similar pattern was 
initially confi rmed for Canada (see Dooley 1986), this trend seems to have 
been reversed more recently in both countries, and certainly so for younger 
workers (see Katz and Murphy 1992, Bar-Or et al. 1995 and Card and 
Lemieux 2001). Nevertheless, the extent of overeducation and its conse-
quences remain of vital policy interest. It has been estimated at diff erent 
periods that forty-one percent of workers in the United States are overedu-
cated (see Sicherman 1991), that thirty-one percent of British workers are 
overeducated (see Sloane, Battu and Seaman 1999), and that twenty-seven 
percent of Canadian workers are overeducated (see Ying 2003), while com-
parative data on seventeen countries in Europe and North America put 
the Canadian rate of overeducation at second only to that of the United 
States (see Brisbois 2003). Th e overeducated are known to have lower earn-
ings, lower job satisfaction and higher job turnover (see Allen and van der 
Velden 2001). Overeducation represents labour market mismatch, signals 
wasted public resources and gives rise to ineffi  cient churning and job search 
(see Bender and Heywood 2006 and Wald 2005). Indeed, the variation in 
overeducation by degree programme has been used to suggest reallocations 
within Canadian higher education (see Frenette 2004).
Chapter 17
Causes and Consequences: 
Overeducated Chinese Immigrants 
in the Canadian Labour Market
Tony Fang
242  Th e China Challenge
While recent data confi rm the impressions articulated above, the situa-
tion is even worse for disadvantaged workers in the labour market, such as 
immigrants, and especially recent immigrants to Canada. For example, in 
2001 twenty-fi ve percent of university-educated male immigrants and thirty-
eight percent of university-educated female immigrants were working in jobs 
that required, at most, a high school education (see Galarneau and Moris-
sette 2004). Th is compared with twelve percent of Canadian-born men and 
thirteen percent of Canadian-born women. Data from the Survey of Labour 
and Income Dynamics reveal that fi fty-two percent of recent immigrants 
with university degrees worked in jobs requiring only high school educa-
tion at some point during the period 1993–2001, nearly double the propor-
tion among the Canadian-born (see Li, Gervais and Duval 2006). Data from 
the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada also indicate substantial 
job mismatch for immigrants to Canada. For example, among working-age 
immigrants who arrived in Canada between April 2001 and May 2002, only 
forty-two percent found work in their intended occupations during their fi rst 
two years in Canada (see Statistics Canada 2003).
While the study of racial and ethnic minorities deserves scrutiny, the 
imperative for Canada is to focus on the distribution of overeducation 
among immigrants. Th e education of immigrants has become a central 
labour market issue in Canada for a number of reasons. First, Canada 
selects economic immigrants on the basis of a system that heavily rewards 
educational attainment. In the most recent version of the “Point System,” 
which came into eff ect in 2002, applicants in the “Skilled Worker” category 
can earn twenty-fi ve of the sixty-seven points necessary for admission into 
Canada through their educational attainment. Given the policy emphasis 
on skill-based immigration, it becomes critical to measure the extent to 
which the education of immigrants is both used and rewarded.
Second, demographic projections show that the growth of the Canadian 
population will increasingly rely on immigration. According to one forecast, 
immigration is expected to account for all net labour force growth by 2011 
(see Human Resources Development Canada 2002). Th ird, and more impor-
tantly, immigrants, particularly the recent cohort, suff er increasing diffi  culties 
in the Canadian labour market in the following three dimensions. Th e relative 
educational standing of immigrants has been falling compared to native-born 
Canadians; the return that immigrants earn on their education appears to be 
signifi cantly lower (see Reitz 2001 and Aydemir and Skuterud 2005); and 
immigrants are less likely to be employed in the most highly skilled professions 
(see Reitz 2006). Th e second and third outcomes might well be expected if 
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overeducation is more common among immigrants. Lack of information and 
failures in signalling make it likely that foreign credentials will be undervalued 
in the Canadian labour market. At the same time, lack of language fl uency 
may make it genuinely diffi  cult for immigrants to gain a return even on valu-
able education and credentials. While these points argue that immigrants are 
more likely to be overeducated (mismatched), they may also indicate that the 
economic consequences of overeducation may be smaller than anticipated if 
one controls for language ability. Further, since a very large share of Canada’s 
visible minorities is comprised of immigrants, one might anticipate that dis-
crimination by employers makes immigrants more willing to compromise in 
the job search process, resulting in mismatch. Similar concerns in Australia 
have resulted in at least one major study of the extent of overeducation among 
immigrants (see Green, Kler and Leeves 2004).
Although a variety of aspects of overeducation have been studied by 
labour market economists (see Belfi eld 2000 for a review of the litera-
ture), the distribution of overeducation and the diff erential consequences 
of overeducation have received much less study. Early work from the 
United States suggested that African Americans were more likely to be 
overeducated (see Duncan and Hoff man 1981). More recent work from 
the United Kingdom also indicates that members of ethnic minorities are 
more likely to be overeducated (see Alpin, Shackleton and Walsh 1998), 
although there is heterogeneity among those minorities (see Battu and 
Sloane 2002). Th ere have been a number of studies examining returns to 
immigrants’ education in the Canadian context (see Reitz 2001, Ferrer 
and Riddell 2008 and Sweetman 2004), but to my knowledge only two 
studies have directly considered the impact of overeducation (see Galar-
neau and Morissette 2004 and Wald and Fang 2008). Th is lack of atten-
tion is somewhat surprising, given the prevalence of immigrant overedu-
cation as described above, as well as the well-developed body of literature 
that examines the earnings consequences of overeducation (see McGuin-
ness 2006 for an up-to-date and thorough review). On the other hand, 
there were no published studies examining the relationship between edu-
cational mismatch and wages in Canada until quite recently (see Vahey 
2000). Most Canadian studies of overeducation neglect the immigrant 
population, either because the focus of the particular research is on other 
issues, such as literacy or the Canadian post-secondary education system, 
or because there are unacceptably small numbers of immigrant observa-
tions, or even none at all, within the data sets employed (see Boothby 
1999, Frenette 2001 and Green and Riddell 2001).
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In this chapter I examine the impacts of overeducation on the earnings of 
immigrants, particularly Chinese immigrants, in the Canadian labour mar-
ket from a slightly diff erent perspective. Specifi cally, I use the framework 
most commonly appearing in the overeducation literature that enables one 
to examine returns to school contingent upon job requirements. In more 
precise terms, a decomposition of respondents’ years of education permits 
the estimation of returns to schooling according to whether those years of 
education: are required for the job, exceed job requirements or are in defi cit 
of job requirements. I also use a categorical version of mismatch measure-
ment that contrasts overeducated and undereducated workers to those who 
are properly matched. Further, whereas Diane Galarneau and René Moris-
sette (2004) examined one particular type of overeducation, albeit probably 
the most important type, the data set used here captures many diff erent 
magnitudes of educational mismatch.
Explaining Overeducation
Why might recent immigrants face a heightened incidence of overedu-
cation? A number of hypotheses have been developed. Th e fi rst possible 
explanation, which renders the existence of overeducation consistent with 
the assumptions of human capital theory, is that, while immigrants may 
be categorized as overeducated, their “surplus” education compensates for 
education of inferior quality or other human capital “defi ciencies.” For 
example, a study for Statistics Canada examining the employment of immi-
grants four years after arrival concludes that there is a signifi cantly posi-
tive relationship between the ability to speak English and the likelihood 
of having an “appropriate” job (see Statistics Canada 2007). Employed 
immigrants with the highest levels of spoken English (on a fi ve-point self-
reported scale) were more likely to have high-skill jobs, jobs in the intended 
fi eld, jobs similar to the ones they had before migrating, jobs related to 
their training or education, and higher hourly wages.
Th e high incidences of overeducation among Asian immigrants can also 
be explained by the fact that Asians, especially Chinese, have historically 
placed a great emphasis on higher education as a stepping stone to social, 
political and economic advancement (see Stevenson and Stigler 1992). For 
example, according to one study comparing elementary school children and 
their families in mainland China, Taiwan and Japan with counterparts in 
Chicago, Illinois (see Stevenson 1992), the Chinese, Taiwanese and Japanese 
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families were more likely to attribute success in school to the quality of teach-
ing and the hard work of students, whereas the families in Chicago con-
tended that innate talents and abilities beyond students’ control had a greater 
infl uence. Th e families in Chicago tended to regard childhood as a time for a 
variety of activities, but in East Asia school work was seen as a child’s primary 
task. When asked to fantasize about what they would like if they could have 
any wish, more than two thirds of the children in this study from mainland 
China, Taiwan and Japan wished for something related to education and 
educational success, while only one in ten of the students in Chicago did so, 
and the majority instead chose wealth, material objects or fun fantasies such 
as a trip to the Moon. Th e lives of the children in East Asia were clearly much 
more centred on school than those of the children in Chicago were, and the 
parents were much more involved in, and critical of, their local schools than 
the parents in Chicago were. Th ese contrasts go a long way toward explaining 
why students in East Asia have more success in school than American chil-
dren do. However, attitudes do not exist in a vacuum. Th ere are structures in 
the societies and educational systems of East Asia that support and encourage 
them. For example, historically, individuals who excelled in the educational 
system in China were much more likely to be recruited and promoted into 
the higher ranks of government or industry even if they did not possess supe-
rior management or practical skills. (Nevertheless, the system of recruitment 
and promotion mainly based on educational attainment has been in transi-
tion since China adopted open-door and market reform policies, starting 
in 1978.) In theory, then, it is because immigrants from East Asia are more 
educated than Americans or Canadians that they are likely to experience a 
higher incidence of overeducation.
Th ird, if visible-minority immigrants are discriminated against by Cana-
dian employers, they will fi nd it harder to gain employment and will there-
fore become willing to make greater compromises in terms of job match (an 
argument advanced in relation to immigrants in Britain by Battu and Sloane 
2002). Indeed, a case before the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in 2006 
focused squarely on this issue: the complainant, an immigrant from India 
with a PhD, argued that refusal to hire overqualifi ed immigrants amounted 
to discrimination, since members of visible minorities face barriers at their 
appropriate levels of employment that force them to seek lower-skilled jobs 
instead (see Canadian Human Rights Tribunal 2006). Th ird, given their 
status as new labour market entrants, mismatches might be more preva-
lent as newcomers learn about the labour market, although overeducation 
among immigrants cannot be dismissed as a temporary phenomenon, but 
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may persist even ten years after immigrants arrive in Canada (see Galarneau 
and Morissette 2004). Fourth, it might simply be that the quality of the 
job match is secondary to more pressing concerns. While it is not surpris-
ing that immigrants escaping political persecution would put a somewhat 
low priority on the quality of job match, survey responses reveal that even 
principal applicants in the “Economic Class” of immigrants cited reasons 
other than job prospects as the most important determinant behind their 
settlement location decision (Statistics Canada 2003, p. 15). Among prin-
cipal applicant economic immigrants who settled in Vancouver, a number 
of reasons outranked “job prospects” as the most important, including fam-
ily or friends, climate, lifestyle; and education prospects. In Toronto “fam-
ily or friends” was cited by 49.7 percent of respondents, compared to 23.4 
percent citing “job prospects.” Finally, immigrant skills may not be fully 
used when Canadian licensing bodies or employers fail to recognize foreign 
credentials or work experience (see Reitz 2001).
Returns to Immigrant Education
As mentioned above, there have been a number of studies examining the 
returns to immigrants’ education in the Canadian labour market. A fi nd-
ing common to most research is that immigrants receive a smaller earn-
ings premium for formal education compared to the Canadian-born (see 
Reitz 2001 and Ferrer, Green and Riddell 2006). According to Jeff rey Reitz 
(2001), a generalization that can be drawn from this research is that the 
estimated return to an additional year of schooling for immigrants is about 
half what it is for the native-born. Why should immigrants’ education be 
rewarded less than that of other Canadians? Again, one strand in the litera-
ture hypothesizes that the skills embodied in the education of immigrants 
are, in some respects, inferior to those of the native-born population and 
that the observed inferior returns are refl ective of this. Research testing this 
hypothesis has examined heterogeneity in school quality and literacy skills 
(see Sweetman 2004 and Alboim, Finnie and Meng 2005).
Arthur Sweetman (2004), using data from multiple Censuses and 
school quality measures for eighty-seven countries, has explored the 
role of educational quality in immigrants’ source countries in returns 
to schooling. He concludes that there is substantial correlation between 
average source country school quality and Canadian labour market earn-
ings. For instance, parameter estimates implied that moving up from the 
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twenty-fi fth to the seventy-fi fth percentile of the school quality index is 
associated with a ten percent increase in annual earnings.
Ana Ferrer, David Green, and Craig Riddell (2006), using the Ontario 
Immigrant Literacy Survey to examine the impact of literacy skills on 
immigrant earnings, fi nd that diff erences in literacy account for a large 
amount of the higher earnings of Canadian-born workers. For example, 
among the university-educated literacy diff erences account for about two 
thirds of the earnings gap between immigrants and the Canadian-born. 
Naomi Alboim, Ross Finnie and Ronald Meng (2005) use the Survey of 
Literacy Skills Used in Daily Activities, conducted in 1989, and similarly 
fi nd that an important factor related to the discounting of immigrants’ 
foreign education is language ability.
Data and Methodological Approach
Data for this study are drawn from the Canadian Workplace and 
Employee Survey (WES), conducted by Statistics Canada in 2003. Th e 
WES is a linked fi le consisting of both employer and employee compo-
nents, and covers a broad range of topics from both the demand and 
the supply sides of the labour market. Employers are sampled by physi-
cal location and employees are then sampled within each location from 
employer-provided lists. Th e survey excluded business locations in the 
Yukon, Nunavut and the Northwest Territories, along with agriculture, 
fi shing, road, bridge and highway maintenance, government services and 
religious organizations. Responses were received from 6,565 business 
locations and 20,834 employees.
For the present study, the key WES data include information on earn-
ings, workers’ educational attainments, perceptions of job requirements, 
ethnic backgrounds and dates of immigration. Information pertaining to 
immigrants’ countries of origin and measures of literacy—which, as dis-
cussed above are generally found to be important determinants of immi-
grant labour market earnings—is unfortunately absent from the WES data, 
but there is information on ethnicity and foreign language usage at home, 
which will serve as proxy measures.
Th e WES contains certain data that render it particularly well-suited for 
studying the impacts of overeducation on earnings. For instance, it contains 
a direct measure of individuals’ total work experience in addition to a mea-
sure of job tenure with current fi rms. Th is is unavailable in most data sets, 
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for which years of experience must be estimated (using the formula: experi-
ence = years of age – years of schooling – 5). Th e WES also contains detailed 
information on the incidence and amount of workplace training. Th ese high-
quality measures of work experience and training are particularly important 
in light of the hypothesis that overeducated workers possess lower levels of 
other forms of human capital, namely work experience and training.
Th e sample of interest consists of paid workers who were between the ages 
of eighteen and sixty-four in 2003. Th is results in a sample of 20,558 work-
ers from 5,267 workplaces, among whom 17,270 were born in Canada and 
3,288 were immigrants (including twelve percent Chinese). For this analysis 
I focus on the economic performance of those who immigrated after 1989. 
Of the 3,288 immigrants, 963 are what may be termed “recent” immigrants, 
having immigrated between 1990 and 2003. Chinese immigrants consist of 
18.5 percent of these recent immigrant workers (see Table 17.1).
Key Variables and Measures
Four approaches are typically used in the overeducation literature to ascer-
tain the match between a job’s entry and/or performance requirements and 
an individual’s educational attainment (see Wald 2005): (1) comparison of 
a worker’s educational attainment with the education level that the worker 
believes is necessary for either job entry or performance; (2) the respondent’s 
perception of being overeducated or overqualifi ed; (3) comparison of a work-
er’s educational attainment to the educational requirements for the position 
as specifi ed by job analysts; and (4) deviation from the average level of edu-
cational attainment within a narrowly defi ned occupation. Th e third and 
fourth of these approaches cannot be used here, since WES data available to 
researchers via remote access are not coded with suffi  ciently detailed occupa-
tional information, but the fi rst of these approaches can be used.
Specifi cally, an individual’s educational attainment can be compared 
with responses to the following question: “What is the minimum level of 
education required for this job?” Th is question can be reasonably inter-
preted as asking either about the requirements for being hired or about 
those for job performance. However, Séamus McGuinness (2006) has 
pointed out that both interpretations have elicited similar responses. 
McGuinness cites results from a study using a data set of alumni of the 
University of Newcastle in the United Kingdom (Green, McIntosh and 
Vignoles 1999), which found that in the “vast majority of cases, the 
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assessment of education levels needed to do the job tended to match 
those needed to get the job.”
Based on the comparison between survey respondents’ educational 
attainments and the perceived minimum levels of education required for 
their jobs, I derive a set of three dichotomous variables, characterizing the 
fi t as either overeducated, matched or undereducated. Th e analysis focuses 
on the overeducated population, due to its policy relevance. I also derive a 
continuous version whereby years of schooling (Sa) are separated into three 
components: years of schooling required for the job (Sr); years of surplus 
education or overschooling (So); and years of defi cit or underschooling 
(Su), so that Sa = Sr + So - Su.
For example, a PhD graduate assumed to have twenty years of schooling 
and driving a taxi would have twelve years of required schooling and eight 
years of surplus schooling if he/she responded that in order to drive a taxi; 
a high school education was required. On the other hand, a high school 
graduate working in a job perceived to require a college diploma would 
have fourteen years of required schooling and two years of defi cit schooling.
While the self-assessed overeducation measure adopted here can reason-
ably be criticized for its subjectivity, I feel that it confers two major advan-
tages over external measures. First, it is a job-specifi c measure rather than 
an occupation-specifi c measure, and thus avoids the risk of misclassifi ca-
tion solely due to heterogeneity within an occupation. Second, external 
assessments often rely on occupational taxonomies that are infrequently 
updated by government analysts. According to analysis of Canadian poli-
cies aimed at developing skilled workers (see Baygan 2004), “occupational 
classifi cations are slow to incorporate newly emerging fi elds, particularly 
in science and technology, or changing skill requirements within occupa-
tions.” Given the high number of recent immigrants in Canada employed 
in computer-related occupations, and the likely rapidity of change within 
these occupations, relying on respondents’ assessments of the skill require-
ments of their jobs seems to be the preferable measurement approach.
Sample Characteristics
If one tabulates weighted sample means according to immigration status 
(see Table 17.1), one fi nds, consistent with other data sets, that the earnings 
of recent immigrants, at $17.81, were well below those of Canadian-born 
workers, at $20.73. However, recent Chinese immigrants made even less, at 
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$16.49, despite being the most educated in terms of years of education, at 
15.0 years versus 13.4 years for the entire population. Th ese inferior wages 
cannot be attributed to lower amounts of educational attainment, as recent 
immigrants were a very well-educated group. For example, 31.2 percent of 
recent immigrants were university graduates, compared to 13.7 percent of 
Canadian-born workers, and recent immigrants brought one more year of 
education to the labour market than the Canadian-born did (14.4 years ver-
sus 13.2 years). Strikingly, 50.9 percent of recent immigrants were labelled 
as overeducated according to the dichotomous measure of overeducation, 
compared to about one third of the Canadian-born. Th e proportion of the 
overeducated was even higher for the Chinese immigrant sample, at 55.9 
percent. Recent immigrants had one additional year of overeducation com-
pared to Canadian-born workers (2.4 years versus 1.4 years). In fact, despite 
their signifi cantly higher levels of educational attainment, the jobs of recent 
immigrants were perceived to require levels of education almost identical to 
those of the Canadian-born (12.3 years compared to 12.2 years).
If one tabulates the sample according to education–job matches (see 
Table 17.2), the data once again indicate that recent immigrants were more 
likely to be overeducated than non-recent immigrants or the Canadian-
born. Recent immigrants comprised 8.9 percent of the overeducated sam-
ple, in contrast to only 4.3 percent of workers who were matched. (Note 
that recent immigrants in this table include forty-four immigrants who 
entered Canada in 1998 and 1999, whereas these are excluded from the 
data sample for the purpose of regression analysis.) Individuals of Chinese 
descent (4.4 percent, compared to 2.8 percent of the overall sample) and 
individuals of other non-European descent (22.5 percent versus 20.0 per-
cent) are overrepresented in the sample of overeducated workers.
Overeducated workers earned somewhat less than matched workers or 
undereducated workers. Compared to workers who were educationally 
matched, overeducated workers earned $2.27 less per hour on average, in 
spite of their higher levels of educational attainment, at 14.2 years com-
pared to 12.9 years for matched workers. Th e positive relationship between 
the hourly wage rate and years of required education hints at the effi  cacy of 
decomposing years of education in this manner.
Th e argument that higher levels of education compensate for lower levels 
of experience and training seems plausible when examining these mean dif-
ferences. For example, overeducated workers were younger than matched 
workers (38.6 years compared to 40.5 years), had fewer years of full-time 
work experience before the current job (9.0 years compared to 9.1 years), 
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Table 17.2 Weighted Means by Educational Match
Variable Undereducated Matched Overeducated
Hourly wage ($) 24.57 20.97 18.70
Education–job match (continuous variables)
   Years of education 12.7 12.9 14.2
   Years of  required 
      education 
15.1 12.9 10.0
   Years of overeducation   0.0   0.0   4.2
   Years of undereducation   2.4   0.0   0.0
Highest level of educational attainment
   Less than high school 
      education
0.234 0.127 0.000
   High school graduation 0.128 0.244 0.174
   Some college 0.150 0.104 0.065
   Some university 0.263 0.344 0.423
   College diploma 0.031 0.056 0.052
   Undergraduate degree 0.194 0.098 0.212
   Professional degree 0.000 0.009 0.005
   Graduate degree 0.000 0.018 0.068
Immigration period
   Born in Canada 0.810 0.840 0.776
   Immigrated before 1970 0.047 0.040 0.033
   Immigrated between 1970 
      and 1979
0.049 0.039 0.044
   Immigrated between 1980 
      and 1989
0.042 0.038 0.058
   Immigrated between 1990 
      and 2003 
0.052 0.043 0.089
   [European Canadians] 0.794 0.795 0.731
   Chinese 0.017 0.020 0.044
   Other Non-Europeans 0.189 0.185 0.225
Occupation
   Managers 0.183 0.112 0.128
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   Professionals 0.260 0.167 0.114
   Technical/Trades 0.365 0.450 0.389
   Marketing/Sales 0.026 0.067 0.124
   Clerical/Administrative 0.120 0.147 0.162
   Production workers 0.046 0.057 0.083
   Observations 3,532 10,271 6,755
Source: Statistics Canada, Workplace and Employee Survey, 2003.
and had lower levels of fi rm-specifi c job tenure (6.9 years compared to 9.0 
years). Additionally, overeducated workers were employed in fi rms with 
lower training expenditures per capita ($281 compared to $318).
Overeducated workers do not appear to diff er in a substantial manner from 
matched workers either along gender lines or according to the presence of chil-
dren. Personal employment history does seem to aff ect the likelihood of over-
education, as those with higher levels of unemployment and those who invol-
untarily left their previous jobs had heightened incidence of overeducation.
A number of other variables appear to have increased the likelihood 
of overeducation. For example, a higher proportion of workers in part-
time positions were overeducated compared to those who were education-
ally matched (29.2 percent compared to 25.2 percent), as were workers 
in fi rms with a higher incidence of part-time work. Workers with post-
secondary educational credentials comprised a relatively large share of the 
overeducated. For example, while 9.8 percent of the total sample of workers 
had undergraduate degrees (see Table 17.1), 21.2 percent of overeducated 
workers had them.
Findings
I use a multinomial logit model to investigate the probability of overedu-
cation and undereducation. Th e multinomial logit estimation technique 
is appropriate where the discrete dependent variable covers two or more 
outcomes that do not have a natural ordering. I am particularly interested 
in whether the negative relationship between overeducation and time spent 
in Canada is statistically signifi cant when the other potential determinants 
discussed above are considered.
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I use survey estimation commands with the employee survey weights 
provided in the WES in all the estimations to account for the fact that, 
once an establishment has been selected in the survey, the assumption 
that a given worker is randomly sampled from the overall population of 
workers is no longer appropriate. In Stata Version 9, I use the “svyreg” and 
“svymlogit” commands, the counterparts to “reg” and “mlogit,” which are 
inappropriate in the presence of complex survey data. Th at is, the errors 
generated are corrected for the common components associated with a 
cluster of workers from a given workplace. Th ese estimation commands 
also return representative results and provide heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors.
If one tabulates coeffi  cients and marginal eff ects (evaluated at the 
means) from the multinomial logit model (see Table 17.3), one fi nds, 
consistent with the bivariate relationships, that the likelihood of over-
education was higher for recent immigrants, the marginal eff ect being 
0.126. Being of Chinese descent increased the likelihood of overedu-
cation by a slightly larger magnitude (0.147). Th erefore it would be 
safe to conclude that recent immigrants from Chinese background were 
highly prone to overeducation.
Results from the multinomial logit are consistent with the hypothesis 
that overeducated workers may have been substituting formal education for 
work experience and workplace training. Higher level of job tenure signifi -
cantly decreased the likelihood of overeducation. None of the demographic 
variables related to potential household constraints—such as marriage, the 
presence of children or gender interactions—were statistically signifi cant. 
Despite the bivariate relationships between overeducation and a worker’s 
previous job separation and unemployment history, the estimates from the 
multinomial logit failed to fi nd a signifi cant relationship. Working in estab-
lishments with higher part-time rates heightened the incidence of overedu-
cation (marginal eff ect of 0.099).
To analyze the eff ect of educational mismatch on earnings, I rely on a 
standard Mincerian semi-logarithmic wage equation, with the modifi ca-
tion that years of educational attainment are decomposed:





3Suij + Xijγ + Yij δ + ij (1)
where
lnWij = the natural logarithm of the observed hourly wage of the ith 
worker in the jth workplace,
Srij = years of required schooling of the ith worker in the jth workplace,
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Soij = years of surplus schooling of the ith worker in the jth workplace 
(overeducation),
Suij = years of defi cit schooling of the ith worker in the jth workplace 
(undereducation),
Xij = a vector of (other) personal characteristics for the ith worker in 
the jth workplace,
γ = a vector of estimated slope coeffi  cients for worker characteristics,
Yji = a set of characteristics of the jth workplace for worker i,
δ = a vector of estimated slope coeffi  cients for workplace characteristics, 
and
ij = an error term.
If the results from the earnings regressions are tabulated with separate esti-
mations for the Canadian-born, recent immigrants and recent immigrants of 
Chinese ethnicity (see Table 17.4), one fi nds that returns to years of overedu-
cation were positive in all three samples, but were smaller than those to years 
of required education. Both returns to required education and returns to 
overeducation were smaller for Chinese recent immigrants and for all recent 
immigrants than for the Canadian-born (4.6 percent, 7.5 percent, 8.9 per-
cent, 3.9 percent, 5.7 percent, 6.6 percent).
Th e estimates for the relative returns to overeducation, as compared with 
returns to required education, are at the high end of the range of typical 
results, whereas the estimates for recent immigrants are at the low end of 
the range. An analysis of forty-fi ve studies from numerous countries covering 
various time periods found that returns to overeducation averaged about half 
to two thirds of the returns to required education (see Hartog 2000). In all 
estimates based on equation 1, the implicit assumption within human capi-
tal theory that returns to education are not contingent on job requirements 
(i.e. 1 = 2 = 3) is rejected. For the three equations the relevant F statistics 
corresponding to the Wald tests are F(2,5024) = 157.97, Prob>F = 0.0000, 
F(2,706) = 16.36, Prob>F = 0.0000, and F(2, 117) = 7.99 and Prob>F = 0.0006.
Th ere were signifi cant earnings diff erences among recent immigrants 
according to ethnic background. Relative to those of European descent, Chi-
nese immigrants earned signifi cantly less (12.7 percent, 15.3 percent for the 
dummy variable approach), followed by other non-Europeans (5.7 percent, 
7.8 percent for the dummy variable approach). Th e impact of having a foreign 
language as the main language spoken within the household was signifi cantly 
negative for other non-Europeans (15.5 percent), and was also negative for 
Chinese immigrants (7.2 percent), but was not signifi cant. Th e returns to 
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prior work experience diff ered across the three subsets: the Canadian-born 
reaped signifi cant returns for their years of work experience, whereas recent 
immigrants, and especially recent Chinese immigrants, did not (returns per 
year were 0.8 percent, 0.5 percent and 0.3 percent for Canadian-born, recent 
immigrants and recent Chinese immigrants respectively). In other words, the 
prior work experience of recent immigrants, which is typically comprised 
largely of foreign work experience, was seriously discounted by employers. 
Unfortunately, due to the nature of the data, it was not possible to parti-
tion prior work experience into that specifi cally obtained in Canada and that 
obtained abroad. Specifi cally, while there are data of immigration and years 
of total work experience, there are no complete work histories of time spent 
in Canada. Accordingly, it is not known, for example, what part of the years 
since immigration was spent not in the labour force or in unemployment. 
However, I defi ne prior work experience to exclude experience obtained in 
the current job (job tenure), which is by defi nition Canadian experience, thus 
partially rectifying this problem.
Conclusion
Analysis with the WES data supports fi ndings from other data sets, as well 
as substantial anecdotal evidence, that recent Chinese immigrants have faced 
heightened levels of overducation in the Canadian labour market. Of all 
recent immigrants arriving between 1990 and 2003, fi fty-one percent were 
overeducated in 2003, according to data from the WES, which was higher 
than the fi gure for 1999 (forty-eight percent). Among recent immigrants, the 
Chinese experienced a heightened level of overeducation, at fi fty-six percent. 
Multivariate analysis confi rmed the signifi cance of this relationship when 
many other potential determinants of overeducation were considered.
Th is study has shown that, in addition to the high incidence of overeduca-
tion, recent immigrants suff ered a larger earnings disadvantage from overedu-
cation than the Canadian-born did, and that this was particularly the case for 
recent Chinese immigrants. Th is supports fi ndings based on Canadian Cen-
sus data (see Galarneau and Morissette 2004). Th e wage impact of overeduca-
tion was assessed in two ways. First, recent immigrants were found to receive 
lower economic returns both to years of required education (8.9 percent for 
the Canadian-born, 7.5 percent for recent immigrants and 4.6 percent for 
recent Chinese immigrants) and to years of surplus schooling (6.6 percent, 
5.7 percent and 3.9 percent, respectively), compared to the Canadian-born. 
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Second, it was found that immigrants had a larger earnings penalty associated 
with overeducation in an estimation approach that measured the incidence, 
rather than the magnitude, of overeducation (-0.144 for the Canadian-born, 
-0.184 for recent immigrants and -0.280 for recent Chinese immigrants). 
Th us, with respect to earnings a proper job match was relatively more impor-
tant for recent Chinese immigrants than for other recent immigrants and 
the Canadian-born. Th is is consistent with the evidence that, compared with 
recent immigrants from European background, Chinese immigrants earned 
15.3 percent less, after controlling for other wage determinants.
Th e most plausible explanations for the earnings consequences of 
overeducation for recent Chinese immigrants are either non-recognition 
of foreign credentials, employment discrimination or, most likely, both. 
Although they are somewhat correlated, in this study I cannot disentangle 
these two types of eff ects. Th ere might well be a disconnection between for-
eign education or training and the Canadian labour market, and/or genuine 
concerns about the quality of foreign education or training, which supports 
initiatives such as bridge programmes, especially in the medical and engi-
neering fi elds, or language and skill training specifi c to the Canadian labour 
market, including job search skills. However, it is also possible that some 
employers simply used this possibility as an excuse to discriminate against 
recent immigrants in employment and/or earnings. Certainly, we cannot 
rule out this possibility of employer discrimination, including discrimina-
tion against foreign education and credentials. Fresh and convincing evi-
dence supports this argument through a carefully designed fi eld experiment 
(see Oreopoulos 2009): all qualifi cations being equal, job applicants with 
Chinese, Indian or Pakistani names were found to be forty percent less 
likely to be called for a job interview than otherwise equivalent applicants 
with English-sounding names (eleven percent versus sixteen percent).
Depending on the interpretations of the empirical fi ndings—non-recog-
nition of credentials or quality of education, which is again hard to measure 
and validate, or employment discrimination—there can be various diff erent 
policy responses. If we are concerned about the quality of education, then the 
government may wish to develop a more vigorous selection system to vali-
date the value of credentials, and add language profi ciency test requirements 
in the selection process, rather than providing various bridge programmes 
or language training programmes after the immigrants have arrived. On the 
other hand, if the job–education mismatch is attributable to non-recognition 
of foreign education and experience, then it appears to be appropriate to pro-
vide skilled immigrants with bridge programmes, especially for those in the 
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medical and engineering fi elds, and language and skill training specifi c to the 
Canadian labour market, including job search skills. In the case of employ-
ment discrimination, the government may want to tighten human rights leg-
islation, employment equity legislation and other anti-discrimination laws, 
and make the enforcement more proactive, rather than mainly complaint-
driven. Th ere also appears to be a need to educate employers, especially small 
and medium-sized employers, about the benefi ts of hiring and rewarding 
skilled immigrants, such as population and labour force growth, creativity 
and innovation through workforce diversity, knowledge of emerging markets 
and links to international trade.
Th ere  is even a possibility that highly educated, highly skilled immi-
grants may be oversupplied in the Canadian labour market. If this is proved 
to be true through a thorough labour market analysis, then a shift from 
highly educated to relatively less educated immigrants or temporary foreign 
workers can be a reasonable policy option. In fact, such a policy change is 
occurring. Th e number of immigrant intakes from the Temporary Foreign 
Workers programme has increased dramatically in recent years, while the 
number of landed immigrants remains stable (see Citizenship and Immigra-
tion Canada 2009a and 2009b). However, the eff ect of such programmes 
on overeducation and job–education match remains to be seen.
Future studies should do a better job of teasing out the two potential 
causes of earnings penalty associated with overeducation of Chinese immi-
grants, that is, employment discrimination and non-recognition of foreign 
credentials, possibly by using Census data. For example, employment dis-
crimination could be investigated by comparing Chinese and Caucasians 
with the same Canadian education and other qualifi cations in job–educa-
tion match. Alternatively, non-recognition of foreign credentials could be 
examined by studying diff erences in job–education match between Cana-
dian-born Chinese with Canadian education and immigrant Chinese with 
Chinese education. Although somewhat outside the scope of this chapter, 
these are certainly areas of research that are worth further exploration.
Given the greater rewards for profi ciency in one or other of the offi  cial lan-
guages, and for work experience in Canada, potential immigration applicants 
should expose themselves to Canadian or equivalent experience as much 
as possible. Th ey should also acquire skills and training that are unique to 
the Canadian market, including language and job search training, as well as 
targeting specifi c organizations for pre-arranged employment. In doing so, 
future immigrants from China may be able to expedite their assimilation into 
the Canadian labour market and maximize their career success in Canada.
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Senator Poy and Dr. Cao have assembled contributions from policy prac-
titioners and academic commentators that critically examine the Canada–
China relationship over the past forty years. In this brief concluding chap-
ter I look at what we must do in light of these contributions to build a 
robust partnership that will benefi t both our countries, and the world, over 
the next forty years.
Challenging Our Complacency
As B. Michael Frolic points out in his chapter, Canada’s relations with 
China over most of the past forty years have been premised on a single 
idea: in partnering with China, a major power outside the mainstream of 
international society, Canada can play a valuable, even principal role in 
improving China’s integration into international society and global gov-
ernance, and might thereby advance Canada’s own international stature. 
Having, in our own minds, rummaged in the wilderness to fi nd the magic 
lamp that will yield the genie who will accede to our wishes, we have found 
along the way that the genie is no slave to our commands, and is not exactly 
grateful for being liberated.
Th ere is a story told in the Mencius of two soldiers on a battlefi eld. When 
the attack drums sound, both take off  to the rear. One soldier stops after fi fty 
paces and, seeing that his companion has already retreated a hundred paces, 
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laughs out loud. Mencius asks whether there is any diff erence in the coward-
ice of either soldier. So too, China’s leaders see no need to single Canada out 
among Western nations. China engages the world on its own terms.
Faced with this, Canadian leaders have played both ardent suitor and 
hard to get, in the mirror image policies of the Chrétien and Harper 
regimes. Arguably, neither path has yielded satisfactory results. Each has 
been premised on what China represents to us, rather than on where we 
are of interest to China, or on mobilizing latent resources that can be 
synergized through a more active partnership with China. Our policy has 
yet to move from a perception that we are closer to the fulcrum of global 
politics than the Chinese are, to a recognition that it is up to us to move 
ourselves closer to the fulcrum of global politics if we are to leverage our 
relatively modest power.
Th e past forty years have seen several important milestones. Even before 
diplomatic recognition, wheat sales were initiated through the Canadian 
Wheat Board under Prime Minister Diefenbaker. Canada’s recognition ini-
tiative was a milestone event in China’s relations with the West, underlining 
Canada’s understanding that China had the potential to be a signifi cant 
global power, but that it had little experience in engaging the multilateral 
institutions created in the wake of the Second World War. Th e third mile-
stone was our aid programme in China, put in place through a memoran-
dum of understanding in 1983. Th e importance of this programme was the 
focus that it gave to human resources, and to enhancing the capacity of civil 
society in meeting the challenges of a China that was becoming more open 
and more globalized. Th is was an important leg of our China strategy in the 
1980s, as so masterfully set out in Professor Frolic’s chapter. Coming soon 
after Deng Xiaoping had launched the reform and opening process at the 
Th ird Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, all 
along our programme was aimed at enhancing and reinforcing that process. 
We can fairly claim some credit for training at least some of China’s agents 
of internationalization and, in the process, normalizing China’s engage-
ment with the world, through tools ranging from technical, managerial and 
language to legal reform and environmental capacity enhancement.
While our modest aid programme and our extensive welcoming of Chi-
nese immigrants and students engaged a broad range of Chinese institutions 
and institutional actors, as well as fostering university linkages, these were 
not translated into lasting institutional bonds that could have transcended 
project funding or the human contacts among diverse individual actors. 
Canada remains well-regarded in China, but our role in China’s opening is 
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poorly appreciated and seldom commented on. Of the thousands of Cana-
dians engaged by this process, only a minority remain engaged in China 
relations as a regular aspect of their careers, and there has been little or no 
eff ort to mobilize this latent source of guanxi in any systematic way.
A number of Canadian fi rms have been active in the Chinese market 
since the earliest days of its opening to the world, but few have established 
a signifi cant footprint in any individual sector, with Bombardier Transpor-
tation and Manulife Financial being signifi cant among those few. Nortel’s 
adventures in China followed the bittersweet trajectory of that fi rm. Com-
plementing this has been the rather timid and slow penetration of Chinese 
investment in our resources sector, which is only now assuming signifi cant 
momentum and scale. All in all, despite quite signifi cant and energetic 
eff orts at various junctures by governments at the national and provincial 
levels, and with signifi cant input at the municipal level, we remain fond 
acquaintances rather than fast friends or even active partners.
While there can be no gainsaying the cultural and linguistic barriers to 
closer ties, some fault for this modest achievement lies with our own paro-
chial and smug self-satisfaction, rooted, perhaps, in a benign missionary 
condescension. Our refl exive insistence on seeing the Chinese as latecomer 
pupils in need of benign tutelage, or else as virgin market terrain whose 
superfi cial penetration should exact exorbitant rents, has belied the actual 
picture of our engagement. Few have followed in the footsteps of Mark 
Rowswell, the Canadian media celebrity known in China as Dashan, and 
bothered to invest the time and energy to establish a lasting presence in 
the intricate web of Chinese social, political and economic organization 
suffi  cient to yield the status of knowledgeable insiders with the capacity to 
recognize, and capitalize on, reciprocal interests and opportunities. Th ose 
who have , are reluctant to generalize their experience to others and in 
many cases are unable to because their success is intensely localized and 
particularistic, in keeping with the intricacy of the Chinese environment. 
As a result we are unaware of our resources and ignorant of our opportuni-
ties, except when they are spelled out directly by Chinese offi  cials eager to 
transact specifi c deals in specifi c circumstances.
Charles Burton has highlighted some of these aspects of our underper-
formance in China, while Sonny Lo and Ming Chan both highlight the 
bridging role that Hong Kong has played in Canada’s relations with China. 
However, they also critique our underexploitation of this potential aspect 
of our “soft power” in China, despite the fact that, as far back as the mid-
1980s, it was an important element in the “China Strategy” that Professor 
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Frolic describes. Perrin Beatty again emphasizes the positive role played by 
Hong Kong in our relationship with China.
In general, this volume testifi es to the potential of our soft power, but 
laments the lack of recognition by our policy-makers of our potential and 
capacity to mobilize this latent resource. Qiang Zha shows how educa-
tion, traditionally one of the areas where Canadians prided themselves on 
being tutors of China’s modernization, is increasingly a two-way street, in 
which our own high-tech fi rms are increasingly reliant on imported human 
resources. Indeed, one of the most important fi ndings of this entire volume 
is that Canadians must be made more aware of, better appreciate and make 
better use of the two-way character of Sino-Canadian exchanges.
China is a terrain where local knowledge is crucial and can be scaled 
up only with care and experimentation. Here there is an obvious asym-
metry between our vast and relatively sparse network, and China’s simul-
taneous vastness and density. Our eff orts to engage bump up awkwardly 
against a further instance of cultural inconsistency. Ours is a rule-bound 
society integrated through the rule of law, where teams of lawyers hash 
out agreements according to standard formulas recognizable in the com-
mon law and sanctifi ed through precedent. China is a newly (re)born 
market society where rules are relative, policies are correlative and trust 
is intimate and personalized. Under the mantle of the general author-
ity of the Communist Party of China, offi  cials maximize their personal 
authority by using all the discretion granted them by law and policy to 
realize their personal interest. Nothing is possible unless those interests 
are met or that discretion is neutralized by the favour of a more power-
ful offi  cial. Contracts are only as valid as the interest and capacity of the 
party involved in the agreement. Court justices are offi  cials with interests 
also. Legal boilerplate cannot make up for relations of trust at any level 
of the Chinese hierarchy. Trust grows from mutual commitment and is 
cemented through easy familiarity. It is not transferable and has a “best 
before” date. Given that neither our politicians nor our active entrepre-
neurs can spend more than a minor portion of their careers on the oppo-
site side of the Pacifi c Ocean, our initiatives and interactions are destined 
to be sporadic at best. Th is necessary drawback must be compensated by 
intensity and consistency. Given our vast landscape and sparse popula-
tion, we rarely achieve that kind of intimacy even in our domestic poli-
tics, let alone with our favoured allies. How much less is it possible for 
us to imprint ourselves on the consciousness of statesmen of a diff erent 
language, culture and ideology?
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And yet, over the decades since Canadian immigration laws removed the 
last vestiges of formal discrimination by race and country of origin, almost 
all our urban spaces have been transformed by infusions of Chinese cul-
ture. Kenny Zhang’s chapter provides concrete data showing the visibility 
of Chinese communities in various major metropolitan centres, as well as 
their strong representation in a large number of professional and manage-
rial categories. Chinese cuisine and public fi gures of Chinese ethnic origin 
have become commonplaces of our own landscape, from our municipal 
councils through to Parliament and even the offi  ce of Governor General. 
Where Chinese Canadians may once have represented the face of Canadian 
multiculturalism, they now represent unhyphenated Canada, full stop.
Transforming Our Imaginary
Unfortunately the same cannot be said of our Pacifi c imaginary. Twenty-
fi ve years after the establishment of the Asia Pacifi c Foundation of Canada, 
funded by all ten provinces and the federal government, we do not have 
a Pacifi c Council to focus the attention of civic leaders and policy-makers 
on the strategic challenges of forging trans-Pacifi c linkages. Our stra-
tegic culture still looks across the Northwest Atlantic and to our close 
neighbours to the South. Th us, for example, the website of the Canadian 
Defence and Foreign Aff airs Institute shows only one article on East Asia 
(specifi cally, on China) for the past two years, and that by a non-expert 
(see Burney 2009), while a more recent study of the rise of the Chinese 
military was conducted by a colleague who has no expertise on China and 
largely recaps verbatim assessments coming from the United States (see 
Sloan 2010). Th e most recent statement of Canada’s Defence Strategy, 
Canada First, contains a single sentence in the page about the Strategic 
Environment: “Th e ongoing build-up of conventional forces in Asia–
Pacifi c countries is another trend that may have a signifi cant impact on 
international stability in coming years” (see Ministry of National Defence 
2010). We remain hostage to mainstream historiography on both sides 
of the Pacifi c, to a vision of Canada forged in the trenches of Flanders, 
and a vision of China that “stood up” by facing down the missionaries, 
adventurers and imperialist exploiters. Yet Norman Bethune was a rela-
tive latecomer in a long series of Canadians who made their eff orts to 
contribute to China’s re-emergence as a modern and dignifi ed society in 
the community of nations.
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Charles Burton’s contribution to this volume applies a kind of revi-
sionist twist to the self-congratulatory historiography of Sino-Canadian 
relations that was prevalent from the 1970s through the 1980s and, even 
after the trauma of the Tiananmen tragedy, extended beyond the 1990s. 
He reminds us that we have never shared a common ideological outlook 
with the Communist rulers of the People’s Republic and that this diff erence 
forms a fact of life in our relationship. Th is sober outlook provides helpful 
background to changing perspective on Sino-Canadian relations under the 
current Harper government. Yet, despite the fact of diff erent values, China’s 
place in the world has radically changed and our policy must take account 
of this in the interest of all Canadians.
Canada’s “Grand Strategy,” as identifi ed by David Haglund (2000) and 
re-emphasized by David Pratt (2008), has been securely nestled within a 
North Atlantic Triangle. Both these authors emphasize Canada’s overlap-
ping interests in maintaining close coordination with the United King-
dom and the United States, and maintaining a foreign policy based on 
multilateralism and internationalism, and anchored in liberal economic 
and political values, including the rule of law and individual rights. 
Over the more than sixty years that have passed since this foreign policy 
direction became institutionalized in Canada’s commitments to NATO, 
NORAD and the UN, the economic and political centre of gravity has 
shifted towards the Asia–Pacifi c region. However, despite the formation 
of APEC, the institutions that frame the Asia–Pacifi c region lack the same 
nexus of values and institutions that cemented the North Atlantic Tri-
angle in the past. In the early pages of his study, Haglund reviews Prime 
Minister Chrétien’s conviction that the 21st century would be the Pacifi c 
Century and then, in a few words, simply dismisses it as an exagger-
ated fantasy about a remote future (Haglund 2000, pp. 2 and 67–72). 
While the contribution to this volume by that experienced practitioner 
of Canadian diplomacy, former Ambassador Fred Bild, may question the 
relevance and usefulness of grand ideas in the practical course of events, 
as the Sino-Canadian relationship has unfolded, those who shape and 
advise our country’s foreign policy can only work on the assumption that 
the ship of state will go in the direction in which it is steered. Without a 
fi rm grasp of its destination, our country is quite literally lost.
Recent non-government reports, especially the Canadian International 
Council’s Open Canada: A Global Positioning Strategy for a Networked Age 
(the Greenspon GPS project, 2010), along with the contributions to this 
volume, have highlighted the need to engage China more strategically. 
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Open Canada specifi cally recommends making Vancouver our Asia–Pacifi c 
Gateway, reaching an agreement on dual Canadian–Chinese citizenship 
and doing more to encourage Chinese investment and higher education 
in Canada. Th ese are worthy goals, but unless our policy is anchored in 
a vision that places our identity within the Asia–Pacifi c region and ties 
our destiny to our trans-Pacifi c relationships, such eff orts are likely to be 
crowded out by other priorities on either side of the Pacifi c Ocean. Fully 
supporting a Gateway oil pipeline to the Pacifi c coast would be a signifi -
cant commitment that would demonstrate in material form our faith in 
strategic energy ties across the Pacifi c. Th is should be coupled with joint 
research and development eff orts in green energy, and better environmental 
stewardship of oil sands energy resources. Collectively these eff orts would 
have an impact in mutually indigenizing our trans-Pacifi c business cultures 
and broadening the social and economic stakes in maintaining a healthy 
relationship. We could jointly apply the profi ts of current energy technol-
ogy to the search for a more sustainable future for the planet that would 
simultaneously sustain Sino-Canadian relations.
Th e main reason why our North Atlantic imaginary endures is because it 
is both anchored in history and reinforced by the enduring values underly-
ing our federation and political life. Even the way in which we have inte-
grated immigrants coming from diverse cultural origins is closely tied in 
with the evolving character of the liberal institutions that underpin our 
bilingual federation. While we have relationships that span the Pacifi c 
Ocean, the integration of our own society appears to owe more to the val-
ues transmitted across the Atlantic. Further, we staked our claim to nation-
hood largely on the battlefi elds of Europe during the two world wars. As 
the diplomat John Holmes pointed out in his survey of our foreign policy 
more than thirty years ago, even in the Second World War we left the fi ght-
ing in the Pacifi c to our American allies.
Mobilizing Our Latent and Potential Resources
Few Canadians had ties to the Communist guerrilla elites that ruled China 
after 1949, and those who did fell under the shadow of the Cold War. Among 
the immigrants who have enriched Canada since the late 1960s, few have 
been able to retain infl uential ties back home while struggling to establish 
themselves in Canada. Th e hard work of the fi rst generation, and the anxi-
ety of the second generation to blend into their parents’ new homeland, has 
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not been conducive to forming ties that bind. At the same time, Canada 
has been considerably enriched by the contributions of Chinese immigrants 
from Hong Kong and other former British colonies, who have in turn served 
as a bridgehead for immigrants from mainland China. Senator Poy rightly 
emphasizes the catalytic role that Canada’s relationship with Hong Kong has 
played in stimulating and developing our relationship with China as a whole. 
It may take another generation for a cohort to arise that can ride the jet 
stream and stride the dateline with equanimity and confi dence, but, just as 
many Canadians travel the arc between homes in Vancouver and Hong Kong 
on a regular basis and divide family relations between the two port cities, the 
same kind of nexus of business, family and culture is gradually being woven 
between Vancouver and Shanghai, and various other gateways of Canada and 
China. Open Canada seeks to speed that process by proposing that Canada 
reach a formal agreement with China on dual citizenship. Th at may be a 
laudable objective, but it is unnecessary under Canadian law and too sensitive 
for Chinese legislation. We should instead work for some kind of framework 
bilateral agreement for visas for business executives and skilled workers, while 
working harder here at home to facilitate the integration of highly educated 
Chinese into the professional labour force. Th is laudable goal, articulated by 
Senator Poy and documented most notably by Tony Fang, along with others 
in this volume, must be backed up by practical measures that bring immigrant 
professionals into the workplace before their job experience in their home-
land becomes stale. Th is will require cooperation, not only between federal 
immigration authorities and provincial credential-granting authorities, but 
also between the private sector and the voluntary associations assisting immi-
grant settlement. As Ghazy Mujahid, Ann Kim and Guida Man point out 
in Chapter 14, socioeconomic pressures of aging in the transnational family 
create incentives for offi  cials from both countries to ease the burden of the 
‘sandwich generation’ caught between the caring for young children as well as 
elderly parents. Th e dividends, however, will fl ow to the country as a whole, 
not just because we benefi t from the full applications of the human resources 
of immigrants, but because professional immigrants who are fully integrated 
into our private and public sectors form a human bridge back to China, as 
both Kenny Zhang, Huhua Cao and Olivier Dehoorne point out, and keep 
open the channels of technical cooperation and technology transfer, invest-
ment and multinational management.
We must also do more to ensure that the welcome we have extended to 
Chinese students in our schools and universities, so that they can acquire 
sophisticated knowledge in our two offi  cial languages, as well as the thousands 
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of language teachers we have dispatched to China over the past forty years, 
are matched by equal commitments by our provincial education authori-
ties, not only to provide heritage language programmes, but to expand the 
learning of Mandarin Chinese as a second language, and a more robust com-
mitment to acquainting our young people with the historic achievements of 
Chinese civilization. As Jack Jedwab has pointed out in his contribution to 
this volume, language retention enhances social capital, and thus increases 
the social capital available in this country to maintain and advance our rela-
tions with China and the world.
Professor Errol Mendez recommends our federal constitutional model 
for China as a method of resolving problems of minority rights. We are 
justly proud of our record of progress in multiculturalism, and our survival 
as a multiethnic and multilingual state largely free from violent confronta-
tion. It might be better to use a diff erent metaphor, for each country to 
use the other, not as a model, but as a mirror in which to examine its own 
practices to see whether they can improve. Without preaching, we can hold 
out our human rights culture and institutions as a mirror in which the 
Chinese may look at their own practice. We can admire and learn from 
Chinese practices in development and the eradication of poverty, while 
sharing experience in bringing prosperity to minorities and the historically 
disadvantaged. Th e challenge before us is to go beyond the instrumental 
ties of commerce to forge deep and abiding relationships, while holding 
fast to the cherished values that cemented our historic genesis in the North 
Atlantic Triangle. As China rises, we need to convince ourselves that our 
participation was integral to China’s successful re-emergence on the global 
stage. Secure in this knowledge, we may then integrate our identity as a 
multicultural Asia–Pacifi c nation with China’s rise. Th e challenge is to look 
at China not as a refl ection of our values or as a favoured pupil, but as a 
complex reality in which our values are embedded in a confi guration that is 
distinctive, but not identical. As the Chinese sage Confucius recommends, 
“the authoritative person seeks harmony without sameness, whereas the 
inferior one only attaches himself to the same.”
Reorienting Our Partnership to a Post-Western World
Canada does have much to off er in the area of governance and the rule of 
law, and we have actively shared our experience through the programmes 
administered by CIDA in China. However, our experience both in the 
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integration of skilled immigrants, and in the economic and social devel-
opment of remote Aboriginal communities, leaves much to be desired. 
We can and should acknowledge China’s success in economic develop-
ment, while sharing experience in the management of minority issues. 
As our relationship matures after forty years, we should move away from 
the frame of teacher and pupil, and the frame of fi rst encounters, into 
a new cooperative framework, where participants from both sides work 
together to tackle common problems in economic development, envi-
ronmental sustainability and multiethnic governance in a globalized 
world. Th is cooperative framework is hinted at in the contribution by 
Th omas d’Aquino. We should encourage our government and business 
leaders to elaborate on this through the strategic working groups already 
established between our national governments, supplemented by other 
initiatives from the provinces and the private sector. We can not only 
encourage the “whole of government” approach to China recommended 
by former Minister Emerson, but add federal–provincial cooperation and 
the participation of the private and voluntary sectors. In looking to the 
next forty years of our bilateral relations, we must focus more strategically 
to reorient our vision across the Pacifi c Ocean, adapting without losing 
the values that have shaped our success so far, and looking to shape our 
mutual relationship in a way that enhances the building of a “harmoni-
ous world.”
Prime Minister Harper has grown much keener on the relationship with 
China, as seen not just in the Joint Statement issued during his visit to 
China in December 2009, but in his reaffi  rmation of our strategic partner-
ship during the state visit of President Hu Jintao in June 2010. Th e Prime 
Minister views China partly through the lens of his own self-proclaimed 
vision of Canada as an “energy superpower” and his recognition of Canada 
as a Pacifi c nation with important investment in an Asia–Pacifi c Gateway 
(see Harper 2009 and 2010). However, without a specifi c commitment to 
creating the infrastructure that will enable China to have strategic access 
to our petroleum resources, Canada cannot fi gure in China’s calculations 
of energy security. In his speech to the Canada–China Business Council 
on June 24, 2010, President Hu expressed the need to deepen energy and 
resource cooperation and expand two-way investment, and also expressed 
China’s willingness to participate in the Asia–Pacifi c gateway projects.
With China’s rise and growing dependence on our resources, we have 
a unique opportunity to take advantage of China’s “going out” strategy 
to forge new and more durable links that will bind us more intimately. 
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We have the mineral resources and China has vast fi nancial resources, in 
addition to a growing market, but commodity exchange will not suffi  ce to 
cement enduring relations. We also have the cultural and human resources 
that can be put together in common enterprises, projects, and institutions 
that will further build intimacy and trust. To achieve these goals, we must 
commit to better and fuller integration of Chinese immigrants into the 
mainstream of professional and managerial careers, and turn our strategic 
vision across the Pacifi c to achieve a complementary partnership of distinct 
actors with diff ering perspectives but common goals.
Rather than view our interests in strictly regional or hemispheric terms, 
we should promote Canada as a platform for all-round cooperation in 
China’s global “going out” strategy. We should fully realize and utilize our 
unique advantages as a multicultural country of immigration, our open 
markets and our sophisticated and stable fi nancial system, as Yuen Pau Woo 
points out in this volume. Th ese advantages, like our social and political 
system, are grounded on a robust foundation of the rule of law that is open 
to innovation and the participation of new actors. Further, our advanced 
education and technology should be put to greater and better use, ensur-
ing that our common ventures will be more energy-effi  cient, cleaner and 
more environmentally sustainable, as urged by Th omas d’Aquino. We can 
and should create new synergies in our areas of technological strength in 
energy, transportation systems, aerospace and telecommunications. How-
ever, the ultimate test of our relationship will be measured, not in profi ts or 
even common prosperity, but by the way that we will have transformed a 
cultural divide into a meeting point of mutual appreciation and a network 
of indissoluble bonds. Only then will we achieve the “harmony without 
sameness” that both sides sincerely yearn for.
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Sociological Methods and Research), immigrant generations and homeowner-
ship (Canadian Journal of Urban Research), and international migration 
fl ows (Canadian Studies in Population). More recently, she has developed 
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an expanding program of research on the Korean diaspora in Canada which 
encompasses ethnic entrepreneurship, immigrant seniors, new destinations, 
and transnational families, and currently, she is working on two major pro-
jects, one on Korean transnational families and another on the gendered 
and racialized patterns of economic security in later life.
Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo is Professor in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at the 
Hong Kong Institute of Education and Co-Director of the Research Center 
for Greater China Studies there. He formerly taught political science at the 
University of Waterloo, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong University of 
Science and Technology, Hong Kong Lingnan College, and the University of 
East Asia, Macau. In 1991-92, he was a research fellow at Murdoch University, 
Australia. His recent publications include Th e Politics of Cross-Border Crime in 
Greater China (M. E. Sharpe, 2009) and Th e Dynamics of Bejing-Hong Kong 
Relations: A Model for Taiwan? (Hong Kong University Press, 2008).
Guida C. Man is an Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Liberal Arts and 
Professional Studies at York University, teaching in the Departments of 
Sociology, Equity Studies, and Women Studies. She is a Faculty Associate 
of the Centre for Feminist Research and the York Centre for Asian Research, 
and an Affi  liate of CERIS-Th e Ontario Metropolis Centre. Her research inter-
est encompasses the interactions of globalization, transnational migration, 
gender, work, and social inequality, as they are articulated to gender, race and 
class relations. She has conducted a number of research studies concerning 
Chinese immigrants in Canada, addressing such issues as transnationalism, 
families, gender relations, employment, and integration. Currently, she is 
the Principal Investigator of a research entitled “Transnational Migration 
Trajectories of Immigrant Women Professionals in Canada: Strategies of Work 
and Family” funded by SSHRC Standard Research Grant (2009-11), and 
another research on transnational linkages of Chinese immigrant women 
in Toronto funded by a York University research grant (2009-10). She has 
published extensively in her area of specialization, and is presently involved 
in a co-edited book project entitled Transnational Voices: Global Migration 
and the Experiences of Women, Youth and Children.
Errol P. Mendes is a lawyer, professor, author and advisor to corporations, 
governments, civil society groups, and the United Nations. His areas of 
expertise include corporate law, governance and social responsibility, inter-
national business, trade and public law, constitutional law, and human 
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rights law and policy. He has taught in these areas at law schools across 
Canada and is presently a full Professor of law at the University of Ottawa. 
He has also been a human rights Tribunal member in Canada, acted as an 
international arbitrator and an advisor in Canada’s Privy Council Offi  ce, 
and recently served as a Visiting Professional at the International criminal 
Court in Th e Hague. While his ethnic roots are from Goa, India, Professor 
Mendes was born in Kenya, East Africa. He obtained his Bachelor of Law 
degree from the University of Exeter in the UK, followed by a Master 
of Laws degree from the University of Illinois. In 1979, he emigrated to 
Canada and was called to the Bar of Ontario in 1986. Prof. Mendes has 
been a Project Leader for confl ict resolution, governance and justice proj-
ects in Asia and Latin America, and has lectured and given media com-
mentaries across Canada and throughout the world. He led a project on 
human rights in China in partnership with Beijing University, which pro-
duced three landmark books he co-edited on human rights that included 
contributions from leading Chinese and Canadian intellectuals and prac-
titioners. He has authored, co-authored, or edited several other books, 
including the landmark constitutional law text, Th e Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, 3rd Edition, Carswell, 1996. He is also Editor-in-
Chief of Canada’s leading constitutional law journal, Th e National Journal 
of Constitutional Law. In 2006, Prof. Mendes was awarded the Walter 
S. Tarnopolsky Human Rights Award by the Canadian Section of the 
International Commission of Jurists and the Canadian Bar Association.
Ghazy Mujahid, a former United Nations Advisor on Population Policies 
and Development for East and South-East Asia, is an Affi  liate of CERIS-
Th e Ontario Metropolis Centre and an Associate of the York Centre for Asian 
Research. He has focused his research increasingly on population ageing and 
issues of senior populations. He has published extensively on the subject 
and his major publications include “Population Ageing in East and South-
East Asia: Current Situation and Emerging Challenges” (2006); “Th e Impact of 
Social Pensions: Perceptions of Asian Older Persons” (2008) and “Demographic 
Prognosis for South Asia: a future of rapid ageing” (2009), all published by the 
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). His most recent work “Th e 
Senior Population in Peel Region: Trends, Characteristics and Issues (1996-
2006)” was published by the Social Planning Council of Peel in March 
2010. He is currently working with Professor (Emerita) Kenise Murphy 
Kilbride on a project “Immigrant Senior Men in Ontario: Understanding and 
Meeting Th eir Needs and Challenges” based in Ryerson University, Toronto.
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Jeremy Paltiel is professor of political science at Carleton University in 
Ottawa and was visiting professor at the department of international rela-
tions at Tsinghua University in Beijing in 2009. He previously taught at the 
University of Alberta (1984-1990), the University of Arizona (1983-84) 
and the University of California at San Diego (1981-83). He received his 
BA in East AsianStudies from the University of Toronto in 1974, a diploma 
in Philosophy from Beijing University in 1976, and his MA (1979) and his 
PhD (1984) in political science from the University of California, Berkeley.
Most recently he co-ordinated the Chinese domestic background theme 
of the Canadian International Council’s China Working Group and authored 
two of its papers: “Canada in China’s Grand Strategy” and “Structure and 
Process in China’s Foreign Policy Making – implications for Canada”. He is 
the author of Th e Empire’s New Clothes: Cultural Particularism and Univer-
sality in China’s Rise to Global Status (Palgrave, 2007), “China and the Six-
Party Talks” (2007), “Mencius and World Order Th eories” (2010), “China’s 
Regionalization Policies: Illiberal internationalism or Neo-Mencian Benevo-
lence?” (2009), “Peaceful Rise? Soft Power? Human Rights in China’s New 
Multilateralism”(2007) as well as numerous other articles on Chinese poli-
tics, East Asian foreign relations and Sino-Canadian relations.
Yuen Pau Woo is President and CEO of the Asia Pacifi c Foundation of 
Canada. Mr. Woo is an advisor to the Shanghai WTO Aff airs Consultation 
Centre and the Canadian Ditchley Foundation. He is also on the Global 
Council of the Asia Society in New York, a member of the Greater 
Vancouver Advisory Board for the Salvation Army, and a board member of 
the Mosaic Institute.
Since 2006, Mr. Woo has been coordinator of the State of the Region 
Report, the fl agship publication of the Pacifi c Economic Cooperation 
Council (PECC). He is also on the editorial board of Pacifi c Aff airs.
Qiang Zha is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Education, York 
University. He holds a PhD in Higher Education, earned at the Ontario 
Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto (OISE/UT). 
As a Chevening Scholar, he received a Master of Art degree in Comparative 
Education from the University of London Institute of Education. In 2004, 
he was a co-recipient of the inaugural UNESCO Palgrave Prize on Higher 
Education Policy Research.
In recent years, Qiang Zha focused his research on two SSHRC-sup-
ported projects, “China’s Move to Mass Higher Education: Implications for 
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Democratization and Global Cultural Dialogue” and “Canadian Universi-
ties and International Talent in a New Era of Global Geo-Politics.” Th e fi rst 
project shed light on China’s move to mass higher education in terms of the 
policy making process and the empirical experience. Its major fi ndings are 
to be reported in a book titled Portraits of 21st Century Chinese Universities: 
In the Move to Mass Higher Education (Springer and Comparative Educa-
tion Research Centre, Th e University of Hong Kong, 2011), which Qiang 
Zha co-authored with Ruth Hayhoe, Jun Li, and Jing Lin. Th is second 
project explores Canadian universities’ attractiveness to international tal-
ent, and in particular to university professors originating from China who 
now hold Canada Research Chairs (CRC). Th is study is situated in the 
current context of a global geo-political shift, with emerging powers such 
as China and India shaping global interactions in new ways.
Kenny Zhang is a Senior Project Manager at the Asia Pacifi c Foundation of 
Canada, which was created by an Act of Parliament in 1984, as an indepen-
dent, not-for-profi t think-tank on Canada’s relations with Asia.
Mr. Zhang joined the Foundation in January 2003 and specializes 
in China and immigration topics. His main research interests include 
Canada-China trade and investment relations, economics of immi-
gration of Canada with focus on the Canadians abroad. Mr. Zhang 
received his BA and MA degrees in economics from Fudan University, 
China and the Institute of Social Studies, Th e Netherlands, respectively. 
Prior to joining the Foundation, he worked as associate research profes-
sor at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and senior researcher 
at the Centre of Excellence on Immigration Studies at Simon Fraser 
University, Vancouver.
Mr. Zhang is on the Board of Directors of Canada China Business 
Council (BC Chapter) and the Board of Directors of Metropolis British 
Columbia. He has been a member of Vancouver Mayor’s Working Group 
on Immigration since 2005. He is also member on the Joint Federal Pro-
vincial Immigration Advisory Council and Immigrant Employment Coun-
cil of British Columbia.
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